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If I were a carpenter, and you were a lady,  
would you marry me anyway? Would you have my baby? 
 
—Tim Hardin, “If I were a carpenter” 
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Thesis overview 
 
 
Abstract 
The aim of this dissertation is to study the relationship between education-specific mate 
patterns and fertility behavior, addressing the following general question: how does 
educational assortative mating affect fertility behavior? To address this question, the 
dissertation develops, theoretically and empirically, two under-researched topics in the field 
of family demography: men’s and couple’s fertility. The empirical analysis of this study is 
centered on a micro-level perspective that looks at the effects of the three main dimensions of 
education (enrollment, attainment level, and field of study) on the transition to parenthood 
and higher order births. The macro-level aspect is considered by keeping a multi-country 
design. Overall, this thesis shows that the individual-level analysis is needed to account for 
the role of partners’ education in the study of fertility; this is connected to the fact that 
education is an important dimension that determines the selection into union for men and, 
expectedly, for women. Consequently, the couple-level analysis may shed light on how 
educational pairing affects fertility outcomes and its consequences for the reproduction of 
societal inequalities. 
  
2 
 
Introduction 
Until the end of the 1960s, marriage and childbearing were strictly connected processes in 
Western societies; moreover, the male-breadwinner family model prevailed: the men were the 
achievers in the labor market, whereas the women had to care for the house and the family. 
Women’s age and men’s earnings at marriage were considered the main determinants of 
fertility behavior. Couples mostly constituted of partners with similar family backgrounds and 
husbands, who were in charge of the family income, were typically more educated than their 
wives. Women’s participation in the labor market was characterized by several intermittences 
or it was non-existent. During these years, college education for women was a kind of 
marriage market, rather than a real investment in their human capital (Marini 1978).  
Since the end of the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s, a combination of structural 
changes enhanced what Goldin (2006) called a “quiet revolution.” Women’s education 
expansion, with ensuing labor force participation, began to massively increase. Women began 
to invest their human capital in consolidating their position in the labor market: they changed 
their horizon from having a job to having a career (Goldin 2006). Women’s educational 
expansion and ensuing labor force participation have been often considered a major cause of 
changes in family behaviors (Sobotka 2004; Esping-Andersen 2009). Given those changes, 
scholars interested in fertility have primarily focused on women’s characteristics, whereas the 
role of men and changes in men’s union formation and fathering behaviors have hardly been 
considered. 
One exception is the work of Oppenheimer (1994), according to which low and delayed 
fertility could have also be an outcome, at least to some extent, of the deteriorating economic 
position of young men. The increased uncertainties generated by the globalized world 
challenged the capability of young men to form new families, due to a lack of stable 
professional positions and income (Oppenheimer, Kalmijn and Lim 1997; Oppenheimer 
2003; Blossfeld et al. 2005). Overall, men’s economic position is still necessary, but not 
sufficient, to be in a stable relationship and have children (Toulemon and Lapierre-Adamcyk 
2000; Cherlin 2016).  
The two arguments, on one hand the changing role of women and on the other hand the 
deterioration of young men’s economic position, are not competing after all, since one does 
not exclude the other. Still, while a lot of studies have focused on women, much less is known 
about men. Contextually, scholars claimed that new family behavior, such as the diffusion of 
divorce, the emergence of multi-partnered fertility, and the formation of step-families, 
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necessarily needed a male perspective as well (Goldscheider and Kaufman 1996; Forste 
2002).  
In the last decade, the interest in the role of male partners’ characteristics on fertility 
resulted from the fact that in contemporary societies, parenthood implies parental investment 
from both women and men (Hobcraft and Kiernan 1995; Huinink and Kohli 2014). Women’s 
participation in tertiary education has expanded to the extent that already, since the 1990s in 
many European countries, tertiary-educated women outnumbered tertiary-educated men 
(Vincent-Lancrin 2008). Van Bavel (2012) argued that this structural change in the 
composition of education-specific mating markets has consequences for fertility. Highly 
educated women tend to be more attached to the labor market than their low educated 
counterparts and, as a consequence, women, the highly educated in particular, may require 
men’s active involvement in household work and childcare activities to engage in motherhood 
(McDonald 2000a; McDonald 2000b; Huinink and Kohli 2014). This implies that the timing 
and number of children a couple has is not confined to the decision of one of the partners but 
instead depends on both partners, who increasingly become more equally involved in the 
process of parenthood. 
Low fertility rates have been, already for a long period of time, a concern for many 
European countries. One of the main reasons for being concerned is that persistent very low 
fertility, in most cases, will affect the age structure of the population, which will have short-, 
medium-, and long-term consequences for wellbeing in general (McDonald 2013). According 
to McDonald (2000a; 2000b), relatively high fertility, i.e., fertility rates that tend to be close 
to replacement level, and the stability of unions are a by-product of an equitable family 
model, characterized by gender equality at a macro-level (e.g., the same proportion of women 
and men in the labor market, educational systems, politics, and institutional powerful 
positions), which goes along with gender equity at a micro-level (e.g., women and men being 
equally involved in family duties and equally satisfied by the couple’s division of unpaid 
work). 
Building on McDonald’s work, several scholars have re-theorized about the role of 
gender egalitarianism as a booster for fertility. According to Esping-Andersen and Billari 
(2015), European countries are experiencing a transition from the Becker equilibrium, 
characterized by a gender division of paid and unpaid work (i.e., where the male-breadwinner 
model prevails), towards the gender-egalitarian equilibrium. In the latter case, gender 
egalitarianism diffuses in society, i.e. it becomes a social norm in both the public and the 
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private sphere. This transition from one equilibrium to the other, however, is characterized by 
the coexistence of the two within a society: very low fertility and raising income inequality 
are outcomes of a multiple equilibria phenomenon (Esping-Andersen 2009). 
Goldscheider, Bernhardt and Lappegård (2015) suggest that the changes that occurred 
over the last two decades of the twentieth century and the first decade of the twenty-first 
century can be framed within the “Gender Revolution Theory.” According to the authors, the 
Gender Revolution has two stages. In the first stage, women’s life course dramatically 
changes due to their increasing participation in the public sphere, i.e., educational systems, the 
labor market, and political institutions. Among the outcomes of this change, we observe the 
increasing age at union formation, postponement of childbearing, and increasing divorce rates 
among the more highly educated and career-oriented women. In the second stage, the 
widespread and socially accepted idea of women as achievers in the public sphere gives space 
to changes in men’s life courses. Men increasingly become involved in housework and 
childcare, expanding the role of father beyond that of breadwinning. According to the authors, 
the observable outcomes of the completeness of the Gender Revolution are the rebound of 
fertility rates, increasing stability of unions, and decreasing divorce rates. 
All these frameworks that consider gender egalitarianism the key to enhance fertility to 
the replacement level have had also a positive effect on increasing the interest toward the role 
of male partners in fertility studies. According to these theoretical approaches, the relationship 
between education and fertility represents a sort of indicator of the changes that occurred and 
of those that will occur, i.e., increasing involvement of men in the private sphere. Education 
shapes gender relationships within the family and also represents a dimension where social 
inequalities may be enhanced or reduced. Remarkably, empirical evidence on the relationship 
between education and fertility is mostly based on findings concerning women’s life course, 
whereas the male side of the story is lacking. In particular, gaps in research concern: (1) the 
effects of men’s educational characteristics on fertility; and (2) the effect of education-
specific mating processes, i.e., the way partners combine their education, on fertility 
outcomes. In sum, fertility studies have disregarded the role of male partners and how the 
process of selecting a mate with given characteristics may affect fertility. This project aims to 
fill these gaps, contributing to our understanding of men’s fertility behavior, which could not 
be achieved if considered in isolation from those of the female partners (Bledsoe, Lerner and 
Guyer 2000; Goldscheider and Kaufman 1996; Toulemon and Lapierre-Adamcyck 2000). 
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Considering how women’s life courses have changed, the consequences unavoidably also 
impact men’s life courses. Fertility studies will benefit from such an extended perspective, 
which accounts for the role of male partners since, expectedly, men’s intentions, preferences, 
and characteristics weigh at least as much as those of their partners in fertility decision-
making. Given that gender egalitarianism has become an important feature, we suggest that 
the processes of individuals’ entering into a union and with whom they mate affect the 
fertility outcomes of men, women, and couples in general. As a result, the non-random sorting 
of partners (assortative mating) and the fertility patterns related to it may become a source of 
inequality in society at large. 
Aim of the study and research questions 
The contribution of this thesis consists in investigating the effect of education-specific mating 
processes on fertility, at both the individual and couple levels. We want to explore gender-
driven mechanisms in social reproductive behavior, acknowledging contextual variation. The 
project will be developed both from theoretical and empirical points of view. 
The theoretical framework is based on mechanisms that explain the relationship between 
educational characteristics and the fertility of men and women. Further, we explore how those 
mechanisms combine in order to hypothesize upon the fertility outcomes of couples. The 
scheme in Figure 1 highlights the two levels of analysis: 1) the individual level above the line, 
which concerns the effects of women’s and men’s education on union formation and 
parenthood; and 2) the couple level below the line, which accounts for the role of educational 
assortative mating on fertility. Following the scheme in Figure 1, the empirical study is 
divided into two parts. The dyadic articulation of the project is based on two fundamental 
research objectives: the first one is to uncover mechanisms that link men to the process of 
fertility, whereas the second one is to uncover the role of the interaction between partners’ 
educational endowment on fertility. 
The first part aims to contribute to the literature by primarily uncovering the role of 
men’s education in the transition to fatherhood. Next, we will also focus on men’s higher 
order births. Overall, results about the relationship between education and women’s fertility 
have been quite consistent regarding the fact that schooling enrollment delays the transition to 
motherhood (Blossfeld and Huinink 1991; Sobotka 2004). The relationship between women’s 
education (attainment and field) on higher-order births, however, is less clear-cut, often due to 
selectivity effects and the role of partners (Kreyenfeld 2002). For men, the effect of education 
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(attainment and field) on the transition to fatherhood and higher-order births has been almost 
overlooked; the mechanisms linked to the educational gradient of men’s fertility in low-
fertility settings are still nebulous. The main idea within this project is that the inconsistency 
found so far is driven by neglecting the role of men’s education for their selection into union. 
In order to disentangle the relationships between education, transition to fatherhood, and 
union formation, we ask the following research questions:  
1. How does education affect the transition to fatherhood? Is the effect of education on the 
transition to fatherhood related to the effect of education in men’s transition to union? 
[Chapter 1: “Education and the transition to fatherhood: the role of selection into 
union”] 
In the same part of the thesis, we look at gender differences in the role of education on 
fertility. By extending the project to another dimension of education, the field of study, we 
compare the fertility trajectories of men and women, aiming to answer the following research 
questions: 
2. Are there gender differences in the effect of education on fertility? Is the effect of earning 
potential by type of field the same for men and women? Does the gender composition of 
the field of study matter for men’s and women’s fertility trajectories? [Chapter 2: 
“Gender differences in the effect of education on fertility”] 
Separately studying women’s and men’s fertility gives us an incomplete picture of the 
impact of education on fertility. Partnership formation, in general, and educational assortative 
mating, in particular, may play a role in shaping fertility, both for women and men; the effect 
of their own education on fertility may also depend on their partner’s education. In fact, in the 
second part of the dissertation, we move forward considering the couple as the main unit of 
analysis.  
Studies on couples’ fertility behavior have been a growing research field since the 1990s. 
Some of those studies focused on the fertility intentions, preferences, and desires of partners, 
with a special focus on the fertility decision-making process (Thomson 1990; Thomson 1997; 
Jansen and Liefbroer 2006; Bauer and Kneip 2013; Stein, Willen and Pavetic 2014; Testa, 
Cavalli and Rosina 2014). Other studies have focused on the socioeconomic characteristics of 
the partners and their effects on fertility outcomes (Corijn, Liefbroer and de Jong Gierveld 
1996; Kreyenfeld 2002; Gustafsson and Worku 2006; Kreyenfeld and Konietzka 2008; 
Vignoli, Drefahl and De Santis 2012; Begall 2013; Jalovaara and Miettinen 2013). We will 
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develop the latter strand of research by combining male and female characteristics to define 
the couple-level variables.  
The first topic builds on the work of the previous chapter (2) about gender differences in 
the effect of education on fertility. The main contribution of this study is to analyze the role of 
pairing by partners’ levels of education and earning potential of the field of study on the 
transition to first- and higher-order births, keeping a couple-level perspective. We will address 
the following research questions: 
3. How does the educational pairing by level of education and earning potential affect the 
transition to first- and higher-order births? Does the effect of pairing by level of education 
differ from the effect of earning potential? [Chapter 3: “Educational assortative mating 
and couples’ fertility”] 
Finally, given the increasing relevance of non-marital childbearing, we chose to focus on 
another fertility outcome: the transition to a first non-marital birth. By keeping into account 
the marital history of the couple, we analyze three sub-processes and how they are related to 
educational assortative mating: the transition from cohabitation to marriage; the transition to 
first non-marital birth; and the transition to first marital birth. We address the following 
questions: 
4. Does the educational pairing affect the transition from cohabitation to marriage and the 
one from cohabitation to first birth in the same way? How does the educational pairing 
affect the risk of non-marital first childbirth? [Chapter 4: “Pathways to marital and non-
marital first birth: the role of his and her education”] 
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Figure 1 Theoretical scheme  
 
 
 
A gender perspective on the linkages between education and 
reproduction 
The link between education and fertility has been a long-standing research interest in family 
demography, since education is considered an important indirect determinant of fertility 
behavior (Bongaarts 1978). Education has ambivalent aspects; it is strongly associated with 
occupational success and also reflects cultural resources that influence individuals’ 
preferences for specific partners and family pathways in general (Basu 2002; Blossfeld and 
Timm 2003).  
Studies in family demography have mostly focused on the relationship between education 
and union formation (marriage in particular) and/or fertility. Scholars have been interested on 
how women’s educational characteristics (e.g., enrollment, attainment, and field of study) 
affect childbearing behavior in terms of the likelihood to remain childless and the timing of 
births (Balbo, Billari and Mills 2012; Tesching 2012). In the following subsections, we 
discuss the main theoretical perspectives that have been used by scholars to approach the 
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study of education (broadly speaking) and fertility. This overview will keep a gender 
perspective, which is in line with the research questions of this dissertation. 
The economic perspective 
The economic perspectives introduced in this subsection will be present throughout the 
development of this project, since most of the hypotheses that will be formulated in order to 
answer our research questions, both on the individual and couple-level analyses (i.e., above 
and below the line of Figure 1), stem from the assumptions of micro-economic theories of the 
family.  
The framework of the New Home Economics applies micro-economic theories to family 
behavior, and Gary Becker is one of the main exponents who contributed to the development 
of this theoretical approach. Family members are assumed to be rational decision-makers who 
allocate their resources, i.e., income and time, in order to maximize the total utility of the 
household, given preferences that are assumed to be homogenous and stable (Becker 1991). 
Within a household, partners allocate their resources between household chores and labor 
market jobs and they specialize for efficiency reasons. The specialization strategy increases 
the interdependency between the partners and then creates the gain to marriage. 
An assumption of the New Home Economics is that men and women have different 
comparative advantages in household and market activities, and therefore marriage may be 
seen as a contract between the sexes. Women trade their “expertise” in household activities, 
whereas men trade their income and market activities. This sort of labor division between 
sexes has been addressed as the male-breadwinner model. With increasing women’s human 
capital and participation in the labor market, however, the male-breadwinner model has 
eroded. According to the New Home Economics, increasing women’s economic 
independence decreases the gains to marriage, leading to increasing divorce rates and, as an 
indirect consequence, the demand for children decreases.  
Economists distinguish two types of mechanisms that drive the relationship between 
education and the demand for children: the income effect and the price effect. The income 
effect accounts for the fact that the most educated people are more likely to afford the 
monetary costs of having more children because they tend to have a higher income than low 
educated people. The price effect, on the other hand, acts through opportunity costs: highly 
educated people have higher opportunity costs because they may renounce part of their 
(generally high) income to devote time in unpaid market activities, mainly childcare and 
household chores, once they have a child. 
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These considerations led Becker and colleagues to predict different associations for men 
and women between education and fertility. The price effect characterizes the relationship 
between education and fertility for women, as the income effect does for men. Because highly 
educated women earn higher incomes than low educated women, reducing their working 
hours or leaving the labor market to devote their time to household activities would increase 
the opportunity costs, i.e., the earnings they renounce for an alternative occupation. In 
contrast, because men are more specialized in labor market activities and because they are not 
expected to spend time in household chores, being highly educated and having a higher 
income will allow them to afford more children. Note, however, that a higher level of 
education and earning potential are acknowledged to have ambivalent effects on fertility. The 
micro-economic theories also highlight that higher income is often associated with higher 
quality of children, i.e., the investments of parents in their children’s economic wellbeing. A 
higher income may enhance the possibilities to invest on a child, which is also a reason to 
have fewer children (Becker 1991).  
Extensions of the New Home Economics focused more generally on the timing of 
fertility (Happel, Hill and Low 1984; Cigno and Ermisch 1989; Heckman and Walker 1990; 
Gustafsson 2001). From these extensions, it clearly emerged that men’s and women’s earning 
potential differentially affect the timing of births. The optimal woman’s age at first birth is 
estimated as a function of the man’s earnings and it is considered optimal when these are the 
highest (Happel et al. 1984). According to Cigno and Ermisch (1989)’s theoretical model, a 
high man’s earning profile would decrease the tempo of fertility and it also positively affects 
the investments on each child. Women’s earning profiles are negatively related to the tempo 
of fertility (Cigno and Ermisch 1989). The higher the human capital of the woman, both in 
terms of education and work experience, and the steeper the career profile of the woman’s 
occupation, the longer the couple would postpone a birth.  
Heckman and Walker (1990), in their theoretical model, argue about the importance of 
considering heterogeneity in women’s fecundity. The introduction of this element has been 
justified to account for the fact that (future) parents cannot fully plan and control the timing of 
their births, since the timing of women’s pregnancy also depends on partners’ fecundity 
(Heckman and Walker 1990). The role of unobserved heterogeneity helps to account for this 
uncertainty. The disadvantage of Heckman and Walker’s approach is that they use male and 
female current wages without considering other measures that refer to the earning potential as 
lifetime earnings (Gustafsson 2001). In their economic model, women’s earning potential is 
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treated as endogenous with the timing of a birth, whereas the husband’s earning profile is 
treated as exogenous. Men’s education does not appear since priority is given to men’s actual 
earnings, which, however, also may incur endogeneity problems (Gustafsson 2001).  
Men’s earnings are not treated as endogenous because the economic perspective is based 
on the assumption that women are the sole party responsible for household activities and 
childrearing, whereas men are solely responsible for breadwinning. As a result, economic 
perspectives sustain that fertility rates have been negatively affected by women’s increasing 
accumulation of human capital. As argued by Oppenheimer (1994), higher economic 
standards of living make the couples’ specialization model inefficient. Men’s economic 
ability to become a breadwinner may have been challenged during times of increasing 
inequality, which may also have favored the shift from the male-breadwinner model to the 
dual-earner family model (Blossfeld and Drobnič 2001). 
Socio-cultural aspects 
The social and cultural endowment of education is often seen as a competitive mechanism to 
explain the relationship between education and fertility. The changes in family behavior that 
occurred in the 1970s and onwards have been addressed as the “Second Demographic 
Transition (SDT)” (Lesthaeghe and Van de Kaa 1986; Van de Kaa 1987). Within this 
framework, socio-cultural changes, particularly the secularization and individualization of 
society, are considered important factors that led to increasing rates of divorce, cohabitation, 
and non-marital births. 
Building on Maslow’s theory of needs, proponents of the SDT assume that as long as the 
well-being of the population increases, the needs of individuals shift from the more 
materialistic, like survival security and solidarity, to more individualistic, like those based on 
self-realization, independence, and individual freedom. Namely, this framework tends to 
emphasize the changes that lie in ideational and cultural aspects. Post-materialist values, such 
as self-realization and individual autonomy, become more important in one’s life. The child is 
not any more the center of the new household, but rather the couple itself: the motivation to 
become a parent is self-realization (Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 1988; Surkyn and Lesthaeghe 
2004). The promoting of individual freedom correlates with increasing rebellion against 
authority, in particular religious authority, which accelerates secularization processes. In this 
framework, more highly educated people are believed to be the trendsetters of new behaviors, 
such as the diffusion of cohabitation and non-marital childbearing, acceptance of divorce, and 
abortion (Surkyn and Lesthaeghe 2004).  
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Rather than rebellion toward institutions and authority, the socio-cultural endowment of 
education is often associated with the fact that the more educated develop other interests, 
which leads far from a family-oriented life course (Rindfuss, Morgan and Swicegood 1988; 
Kravdal 2007). Longer periods spent in education may generate other needs in competition 
with family building processes. This perspective emphasizes the role of individuals’ 
preferences for certain lifestyles, in line with Hakim’s preference theory (2003), according to 
which women have pre-defined preferences that may explain their family outcomes. 
Both the SDT and Hakim’s theory have the peculiarity that they miss an important gender 
perspective. First, the SDT does not consider that values such as independence and autonomy 
gained more emphasis in women’s lives rather than in men’s lives, since for the former being 
economically independent from both their parents and their partners was a new achievement, 
whereas for the latter it was the norm (Bernhardt 2004; Goldscheider 2012; Goldscheider et 
al. 2015). Second, Hakim’s theory of preferences focuses only on women; it is plausible, 
however, that men’s preferences about family life are also heterogeneous. The definition of 
categories such as being “career-oriented,” “adaptive,” or “family-oriented” can become more 
insightful if it relates partners to each other. This may be done by studying how preferences 
regarding desired fertility vary with mating markets. A drawback of the preference theory is 
that it considers women’s preferences as stable, but they may change over time because of 
defined circumstances and life experiences, since they are also in relation to partners’ 
preferences (McRae 2003; Voas 2003). 
The theme of preferences is strongly present in the literature about education and fertility 
and it is often indirectly addressed via the concept of self-selection. As already mentioned, 
individuals adjust their life course in order to fit their lifestyle preferences and family values 
(Hakim 2003; Surkyn and Lesthaeghe 2004). Several scholars have pointed out the role of 
self-selection processes with regard to both educational level and field of study (self-selection 
and the level of education, see Marini 1984; Billari and  Philipov 2004; Martín-García and 
Baizan 2006; Kravdal and Rindfuss 2008; Martín-García 2009; self-selection and field of 
study, see Tesching 2012; Begall and Mills 2013; Opperman 2014). 
The fact that people may self-select in a determined field of study (or may decide or not 
to continue with university) because they foresee their -normative- role in the family has been 
called the “anticipatory role” argument (Martín-García and Baizan 2006) or “family plan” 
thesis (Cech 2015). For instance, women who envisage their role as mothers would tend to 
choose fields of study that enhance compatibility between family and work (Martín-García 
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and Baizan 2006). Similarly, men who envisage their role as fathers would be more inclined 
to enroll in fields of study that allow them to have a secure job that can face the economic 
burden of children and related costs (Lappegard, Rønsen and Skrede 2011). As a 
consequence, both the choice of discipline and the fertility quantum and timing may be the 
result of interrelated processes, by-products of preferences, and personality traits (Hoem, 
Neyer and Andersson 2006a). However, it still remains unclear to what extent individuals 
make rational considerations by being completely informed about the future labor market 
characteristics of the field of study they chose or if it is rather the social environment that 
shapes inclinations towards certain roles. The “anticipatory role” argument seems to assume 
that women and men do not face any (social) constraints in accomplishing their pre-defined 
family ideal, since they make choices on the basis of full-informed cost-benefits trade-offs, 
even if this is not often the case (England et al. 1988; Okamoto and England 1999; Cech 
2015). 
A life course approach: reconciling economic and socio-cultural aspects 
The interrelatedness of processes is a forte of the life course approach to fertility. Within this 
framework, the economic and socio-cultural aspects are complementary in explaining 
linkages between education and fertility, as we will particularly emphasize in the first chapter 
about the transition to fatherhood and the empirical part about the couple-level analysis. 
The life course approach in the social sciences has been developed since the 1970s by 
Elder (1975; 1994). It builds on four conceptual pillars: 1) historical times, i.e., the role that 
cohort memberships have on explaining individual behavior; 2) the timing of lives, which is 
related to the social meaning of age and to the expectations about the timing of acquiring 
certain roles given beliefs based on age; 3) linked human lives, which acknowledges the role 
of networks, since individuals’ behaviors affect each other; and 4) human agency, according 
to which individuals act given the opportunities and constraints that they have to face (Elder 
1994). Each human life articulates in historical times, where the past affects the future but 
also where the individual is embedded in human relationships that are interlinked and 
interdependent across the life span. 
Within the life course approach, Huinink and Kohli (2014) specifically focus on fertility. 
The authors emphasize the multilevel structure of one’s individual biography and the 
multidimensionality of life domains, which are strongly interrelated and compete for 
individuals’ resources, e.g., time. Each life domain (e.g., education, partnership, work, 
parenting, retirement) interacts within the same person’s individual biography and 
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environment, leading to shifts in the timing and pathways in case of incompatibilities. The 
authors often refer to “life-scripts” in the sense that the life course is strongly 
institutionalized, given social norms and expectations. For instance, the expansion of 
education has contributed to the institutionalization of the life course, such as in the past 
where the consolidation of the male-breadwinner model was a common “life script”, 
according to which men and women clearly knew their roles in society and within the family. 
A lack of institutionalization may lead to competing decisions about family-related events. In 
this case, preferences for one domain or the other drive the decision, and as a result self-
selection processes become increasingly important (Huinink and Kohli 2014). 
The authors try to expand their perspective by also referring to the role of men in fertility. 
The authors suggest that the nature of competing life domains have been changing for men 
too. The life domain of employment increasingly competes with the life domain of parenting, 
since men, in order to persuade their partners to have children, may become more involved in 
household activities and childrearing. As a result, the opportunity costs of fertility may also 
increase for men. The raise of opportunity costs for men may, in turn, enhance men’s say on 
fertility-decision making, which makes women’s and men’s family building processes even 
more interlinked and “de-institutionalized.” These expectations about the increasing role of 
men in fertility decisions are also in line with the theoretical arguments of Van Bavel (2012), 
who has seen in structural changes, i.e., changes in education-specific mating markets, the 
engine for considering the role of male partners in fertility behavior. 
Thus, keeping the focus on fertility, one’s individual life domains, which regard 
education, work, and leisure, become interdependent with life domains concerning the family. 
Once in a couple, however, the life domains of partners interact with each other and, as a 
result, not only are life domains interdependent for the individual but also intertwined with 
the other partner, becoming interdependent life domains. Huinink and Kohli (2014) suggest 
that postponement is more likely when both partners have to synchronize their employment 
careers. Still, a synchronization of partners’ pathways may help in developing “shared goals”, 
such as similar fertility preferences and family plans (Thomson 1990). The increasing 
institutionalization of domains like education and work leads to similar pathways and, 
plausibly, may enhance a homogenization of the socio-cultural endowment between (future) 
partners. It still remains unclear, however, to what extent and how this will impact the fertility 
behavior of the partners. 
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Educational assortative mating and reproduction  
The last paragraph of the previous subsection has touched upon an important point relative to 
the similarities and differences in partners’ characteristics, which is also a key feature in our 
couple-level approach. Prior studies on fertility focused on the characteristics of only one 
partner, typically the woman, by assuming that people often mate with individuals who share 
the same values and lifestyles (Corijn et al. 1996). People who mate homogamously mostly 
come from the same social background and followed similar educational paths or attended the 
same religious community (Kalmijn 1991; Blossfeld and Timm 2003).  
A positive assortative mating with regard to education would imply an accumulation of 
advantages or disadvantages endowed in the level of education. The less educated may 
improve their social status by partnering with an individual more highly educated than 
him/herself. The degree to which this is possible depends on the level of social stratification 
in a society (Blossfeld 2009); a more stratified society will offer fewer opportunities to the 
more disadvantaged to improve their social status. As a matter of fact, homogamy in 
education is the most typical mating pattern across countries and indicates the level of 
accumulation of resources within the couple. The distribution of heterogamous couples, who 
are less typical, has been changing in the last few decades due to changes in education-
specific mating markets. The reversal of gender inequality in tertiary education contributed to 
an increase of couples where the woman is more educated than her partner (Esteve, García-
Román and Permanyer 2012; De Hauw, Grow and Van Bavel 2015; Grow and Van Bavel 
2015). 
The way partners combine their educational outputs may have consequences for fertility 
outcomes. To the extent that educational assortative mating is linked to differentials in 
fertility rates, there would be consequences for the widening of inequalities in societies too 
(Esping-Andrsen 2009). Since education represents an important dimension of the mating 
market, this implies that individuals also tend to sort partners out, indirectly, in terms of social 
background and cultural traits, which may shape fertility preferences and family behavior 
(Voas 2003). Partnering among the highly educated has different implications than partnering 
among the less educated. On one hand, committed relationships formed by the more educated 
may be characterized by a longer search for a suitable partner; more years spent accumulating 
human capital can better re-define what is considered an ideal partner (Oppenheimer 1988). 
Moreover, couples characterized by a higher level of education may show a more dual-earner 
type of family model, with a higher level of gender equity within the couple. On the other 
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hand, the less educated, despite homogamy, may be more inclined to traditional family 
models due to more traditional gender norms and attitudes, which are typically more diffused 
among the low educated social strata (Blossfeld and Drobnič 2001; Esping-Andersen 2009; 
Esping-Andersen and Billari 2015). 
The study of educational assortative mating, however, cannot be reduced only to the level 
of education. As a matter of fact, a similar level of education between partners does not 
necessarily warrant similar life pathways. For instance, the choice of the field of study, given 
the level of education, implies different opportunities and constraints on the career path of 
each partner (Esping-Andersen 2009). The earning potential is also dependent on the field of 
study, as reflected by the gender wage gap (Blau and Kahn 2016). To the extent that pairings 
by level of education and fields of study entail differentials in fertility behavior (cf. Chapters 
3 and 4), it will be necessary to reflect on the consequences of these factors for the 
reproduction of inequalities in society. 
The European context 
As mentioned above, this thesis exclusively focuses on the micro-level perspective; however, 
we are aware of the fact that a macro-level perspective enhances the understanding of family 
processes, given that contextual factors may influence micro-level behavior. In this section, 
we briefly describe some salient features of our context of analysis, i.e. Europe. Billari 
(2004:17), whose focus was on the transition into adulthood, noted that “Europe provides an 
extremely interesting setting to study the transition to adulthood. Cultural and institutional 
heterogeneity, economic differences and the interaction between them, have shaped an 
incredibly diverse way of becoming an adult in a demographic sense.” 
Balbo et al. (2012) identify several macro-factors that may explain the differentials in 
fertility behavior in advanced societies; following Billari (2004), the authors distinguish 
among cultural and economic determinants. In the literature on the effect of macro-factors on 
fertility behavior, a stream of research has emphasized the role of economic trends, 
socioeconomic policies, and welfare regimes, whereas another stream of research has focused 
on the influence of values, attitudes, and cultural aspects (Balbo et al. 2012). In this review, 
we focus on macro-factors, which will be often mentioned in this project and represent 
sources of heterogeneity across European countries: inequalities in education, gender 
inequalities, and welfare regimes. 
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First, as linked to the theoretical section above, we mentioned how education correlates 
with the socioeconomic resources of an individual. In Europe, the way education correlates 
with success in the labor market is linked to developments that occurred after the Second 
World War. The period after the Second World War was characterized by economic and 
political differences that separated European countries into two blocks: the capitalist, in the 
West, and the socialist, in Central and Eastern Europe. After the collapse of the socialist 
regimes in Central and Eastern Europe (by the end of the 1980s), the centralized socialist 
regimes were replaced with democracies and free-market economies. 
The societal transition posed new challenges for family behavior in the ex-socialist 
countries: the emergence of new factors, such as competition in the labor market, job and 
housing insecurity, and rising cost of children, inflated the negative effects of the economic 
problems of these countries (Frejka 2008). The high level of job security for different strata of 
societies, which characterized the period before the shifting institutional setting, was replaced 
by a higher competition in the labor market. As a consequence, the value of higher education 
increased (Frejka 2008).  
Despite convergence policies adopted by the European Union, socioeconomic 
inequalities in education exist across Europe. Figure 2 and Figure 3 show the ratio of 
unemployment rates by level of education of people aged 25-39 years old with medium/low 
education and highly/medium education, respectively. Overall, in almost all countries 
considered, the values stay below one, both for men and women, which indicates that 
unemployment rates tend to be higher for those with a lower level of education. While the 
differences between medium and low education are generally more similar across European 
countries, with regard to the differences between high and medium educations a country-
gradient emerges. Looking at Figure 3, it seems that, especially for men, countries from 
Central-Eastern Europe cluster all together, whereas Western European countries (Austria, 
Belgium, France, and Norway) are more similar. In the latter group, inequalities in education 
seem to be a concern more for women than men. In general, the returns in education in terms 
of unemployment rates are similar between males and females. Focusing on Figure 3, 
however, we observe that in the Czech Republic, Belgium, France, Norway, and Italy, gender 
differences in inequalities of education are stronger. In those countries, it seems that the 
protective role of high education against unemployment is much stronger for women than for 
men, while the opposite holds for Austria. 
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Figure 2 Ratio of unemployment rates by medium and low levels of education of people aged 
25-39 years old, selected European countries, years 1998-2015 
 
Source: Eurostat database on labor market participation, EU-Labor Force Survey data 
Note: We took an average of unemployment rates over the period of 1998 – 2015 
 
Figure 3 Ratio of unemployment rates by high and medium levels of education of people 
aged 25-39 years old, selected European countries, years 1998-2015 
 
Source: Eurostat database on labor market participation; EU-Labor Force Survey data 
Note: We took an average of unemployment rates over the period of 1998 – 2015 
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Beyond socioeconomic differences, educational inequalities are relative to another 
dimension, i.e., gender. In the last few decades, most European countries have witnessed a 
reversal of gender inequality in education, given that women are more likely to successfully 
graduate in tertiary education than men (Vincent-Lancrin 2008). Recent findings showed that 
this reversal has had consequences for the dynamic of education-specific mating markets: 
more highly educated women are on the market compared to highly educated men, since at 
least the 1990s for many European countries (Grow and Van Bavel 2015). For some 
European countries, this trend has preceded the 1990s: in the Baltic countries, Bulgaria, 
Poland, and Norway, the sex ratio of people aged 25-29 years old in tertiary education 
favored women as early as the 1970s (cf. Van Bavel 2012:9). The author argues that these 
changes have far-reaching consequences for family behavior given that, in recent decades, if a 
difference in education exists between partners, it is more likely that the woman is more 
educated than the man. Klesment and Van Bavel (2015) showed that if the woman is more 
educated than her partner, it is often associated with the fact that she earns more than he does. 
The extent to which this holds also depends on the gender system in force in the country. 
The socially constructed expectations for male and female behavior tend to prescribe a 
division of labor between women and men, which may create inequalities in power between 
the sexes (Mason 1995). Kalmijn (2013), using three items (women’s labor force 
participation, the degree to which husband and wives share equally unpaid work, and attitudes 
towards gender equality) built an index that indicates the level of gender role segregation 
across European countries. Countries that showed more segregated gender roles were mostly 
represented among the Southern and Central-Eastern European countries, e.g., Italy, Spain, 
Greece, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria. This is mostly related to the fact that, especially in 
those European countries, the time spent in care and housework activities is much higher for 
women than for men (European Institute for Gender Equality - EIGE 2015). 
Cultural changes across and within countries regarding gender role expectations tend to 
take place slowly, and policies may often intervene to accelerate this process. The way family 
behavior at the individual level is affected by policies is usually addressed in the literature 
through the differentials in welfare regimes (Esping Andersen 1999; 2009). Country 
differences in terms of welfare regimes include three main features: (1) the degree of support 
to the strata of societies outside the labor market; (2) the degree and range of support to the 
family; and (3) supporting policies with regard to the active population and the share of the 
public sector among the active population (cf. Blossfeld et al. 2005). The first and third items 
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regard labor policies and taxation, which may help reduce social inequalities derived from 
education. The feature of a welfare regime that may more directly affect family formation 
behavior regards the second item, i.e., family policies. Family policies may act on the 
individual’s family behavior at least in two aspects: (1) reducing the work-family 
incompatibility, e.g., improving childcare services; and (2) enhancing gender equity more 
broadly, e.g., implementing policies that favor men’s involvement in extra-labor market 
activities (McDonald 2000a, 2000b). 
Regarding family policies, European countries vary widely. The ideal policy type of 
Scandinavian countries corresponding to the social-democratic welfare regime aims at full 
employment, gender equality at work and in the house, and low levels of income inequality 
(Esping-Andersen 1999; Blossfeld et al. 2005). In contrast, the familialistic welfare regime, 
typical of Southern European countries, reinforces the traditional work-care models, based on 
women as the main caregivers and household keepers; as a result, women’s employment in 
these countries is amongst the lowest across Europe (cf. European Commission 2015). These 
two ideal types represent opposite poles in the European panorama of family policies 
practices. Within this context, the European Union has an important role in aiming to reduce 
gender inequality by setting standards for women’s employment, giving directives and 
guidelines about family-related policies (cf. Thevenon and Neyer 2014). Such kinds of 
convergence measures may enhance the diffusion of gender egalitarianism as the norm in 
society, which will eventually have those positive effects on fertility that many scholars 
expect in the future (Esping-Andersen and Billari 2015; Goldscheider et al. 2015). 
Empirical design 
In this section, we highlight in more detail the empirical approach that characterized this 
thesis project. The first subsection focuses on the reasons behind the choice for a multi-
country design. Secondly, we describe the data chosen for this project, with particular focus 
on the Generation and Gender Surveys (GGS) data. Finally, we briefly explain the applied 
methodology, which mostly relies on the advanced methods of event history analysis used in 
the field of demography. 
Multi-country approach 
This project focuses on countries that are part of the European Union. We chose a multi-
country approach to assess the sensitivity of our hypotheses to different contexts and expand 
the generalizability of our results to additional contexts since inter-country differences exist in 
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the European Union. A case-study approach would have provided an in-depth examination of 
the national context; however, it would have been difficult to directly assess the role of 
structural factors on individual behavior, since the varieties of factors that characterize a 
society are usually interdependent. Next, a case study approach limits the generalization of 
results, which are necessarily specific to one country. 
It must be emphasized that the aim of this project is not to explain contextual differences, 
but rather to explore cross-country variation and improve the generalizability of the results. 
For this reason, we do not follow a multilevel approach, nor did we choose the countries by 
following a standard criteria (e.g., East vs. West; North vs. South; Conservative vs. 
Democratic; Egalitarian vs. non-Egalitarian). The selection of countries based on special 
criteria is troublesome, since there are usually many other between-country differences that 
could affect the interpretations of findings beyond the factors chosen to select the countries 
(Yu 2015). Moreover, the different macro-level factors that characterize a group of countries 
may actually have different impacts on individual behavior (cf. Gornick et al. 2003 about 
potential negative outcomes of generous maternity leaves on women’s labor force 
participation). In the next section, we delineate the characteristics of the main dataset that we 
used in order to keep a multi-country design; the selection of countries is detailed in each 
empirical chapter, since the group of countries that was analyzed varies according to the 
availability of the data.  
The data: Generation and Gender Surveys 
The main dataset used for this dissertation comes from Wave 1 of the Generation and Gender 
Surveys (GGS). The GGS are part of a wider program whose aim is to improve the 
knowledge of the macro and micro factors that affect the relationships between generations 
and between genders (http://www.ggp-i.org/). The surveys, which include individuals 
between 18 and 79 years old, deal with different topics, such as: fertility and partnership 
histories, the transition to adulthood, economic activity, care duties, and attitudes. The GGS 
are the most recent available large-scale panel and internationally comparable demographic 
surveys available to date; the GGS are characterized by an independent sample of men and 
women that were interviewed separately. The other available European surveys (European 
Labor Force Surveys, European Union Statistics on income and living conditions, European 
Social Surveys) lacked fundamental information, i.e., detailed partnerships and fertility 
trajectories, that was useful to answer the research questions of this thesis. 
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Each country developed the survey independently, following the guidelines of the 
Generation and Gender Programme. Fokkema and colleagues (2016) offer an overview of all 
the specific sampling designs and fieldworks. In general, the GGS have relatively high 
response rates, over 60% for many countries, except for Belgium, Lithuania, and the Czech 
Republic, with response rates of 42%, 36%, and 49%, respectively. The main reasons for 
these lower response rates compared to the other countries were the difficulties in contacting 
the sample units and, if contacted, the unwillingness to cooperate (Fokkema et al. 2016), so 
caution is needed in particular for those countries. 
Overall, GGS data are suitable to study fertility, especially for cohorts born after the mid-
1940s and for periods after the mid-1970s (Vergauwen et al. 2015). Alich (2009), focusing on 
Russia, showed that GGS male fertility data are also reliable. One of the main goals of the 
Generation and Gender Programme was to collect information about partnership and fertility 
histories for both women and men. Studies focusing on men’s fertility showed that if children 
do not co-reside with the father because of union dissolution, men may underreport their non-
co-residential children (Toulemon and Lapierre-Adamcyk 2000; Joyner et al. 2012). Alich 
(2009) suggested that the setup of the GGS questionnaire may have been organized in a way 
that facilitates recalling and limits the likelihood of underreporting male fertility. The fact that 
fertility and union histories were connected may have improved recalling. Moreover, 
information on child allowances and support was requested in a separate section, which seems 
to be a good device to limit underreporting by men (Lindberg et al. 1998). 
With regard to union histories, the date of first partnership formation has been coded 
using information on the month and year of the first co-residential partnership. If the 
respondent answered positively to the question “Have you ever before lived together with 
someone as a couple or have you ever been married?”, then the first partnership coincides 
with “partner 1” of the partnership history grid and so on for higher-order unions, till the 
current one at interview. If the answer was negative, the first co-residential partnership 
coincides with the co-residential partnership (if any) at the moment of interview. In general, 
we could distinguish if the partnership started as an un-married cohabitation or as a marriage. 
In case the couple made the transition from cohabitation to marriage, we also have 
information on the date of the marriage. The GGS surveys collected information only on 
partnerships that lasted for at least three months (Vikat et al. 2007). 
Concerning the main independent variable, educational attainment, GGS do not provide 
the entire educational trajectory; however, it was still possible to obtain information regarding 
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the highest level of education by combining the questions: “What is the highest level of 
education you have successfully completed?” and “In what month and year did you reach that 
level?”. In Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, we also consider an additional dimension of the highest 
level of education, the field of study, via the open question “What was the main subject matter 
of these studies?”. The harmonization of the field of study has been done by following 
UNESCO guidelines (UNESCO 2014). Further details about the data and methods used will 
be given in each empirical chapter. 
Analytical strategy 
In this dissertation, the main technique applied is event history analysis and its advancements. 
Since the 1970s, the theoretical framework based on the life course approach has often been 
combined with survival analyses methodology. The enhancements in data availability with 
regard to retrospective and longitudinal data, which give information about the time of 
occurrence of the events under study, have contributed to the diffusion and improvements of 
event history techniques. 
Event history analysis is an adequate method to study the events that occurred during the 
life history of an individual (e.g., enrollment in education, employment, union formation, 
migration, parenthood, and retirement); the occurrence of these events marks the transition 
from one state of the life course to another (Blossfeld, Golsch and Rohwer 2007). Transition 
rate models estimate the effect of the time constant and time-varying covariates on the 
occurrence of an event, taking into account censored data. 
The focus of this thesis is on fertility trajectories. In two chapters (1st and 4th), the main 
event of interest is the transition to parenthood, i.e., transition to first birth, whereas in the 
other two chapters (2nd and 3rd), we also focus on the transition to the second and third births. 
The entity of interest in survival analysis is the hazard rate, which, in its continuous-time 
specification, is described by the following formula: 
 
ℎ(𝑡) = lim
∆𝑡→0
𝑃(𝑡 ≤ 𝑇 < 𝑡 +  ∆𝑡 | 𝑇 ≥ 𝑡)
∆𝑡
 
 
The numerator represents the conditional probability of experiencing the event of interest 
in the interval of time between t and t +Δ t, given that the individual survived at least till time 
T, i.e., did not experience the event, whereas the denominator is the variation of a small 
interval of time. The different types of hazard analyses vary according to the specification of 
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the time dependence, which can be left unspecified, like in Cox models, or it can be 
parametrically specified. In the last case, the tricky task is to find an adequate 
parameterization. Here, we applied a very flexible approach, i.e., a piecewise linear 
specification of the hazard (also known as a generalized Gompertz), which assumes a 
multiplicative effect of covariates on the baseline hazard (proportional hazard models, cf. 
Lillard and Panis 2003). 
Extended event history models take into account the problem of unobserved 
heterogeneity, i.e., those factors that are not available in the data. This kind of omission leads 
to a misspecification of the model that can bias the hazard estimates; for instance, 
underestimating the effect of some covariates or biasing the duration dependence. In this 
thesis, unobserved heterogeneity will be taken into account, especially when we examine 
different correlated events for the same individual.  
Accounting for unobserved heterogeneity means to account for compositional changes, 
which are driven by selectivity that occur in the population at risk during the observation 
period. Because selection occurs over time, individuals in higher risk groups tend to 
experience the event of interest earlier, and consequently, they will be those who live the risk 
set first (Vaupel and Yashin 1985). With the passing of time, the population of survivors will 
look like less similar to the original population; in fertility analysis, this would be the case if 
there is substantial heterogeneity in fecundity. 
The inclusion of the unobserved heterogeneity term prevents biases due to the non-
proportional behavior of some covariates, which is the result of changes over time of the 
population at risk (Kleinbaum and Klein 2006). For instance, low educated women experience 
first birth at an earlier age than highly educated women, so that they will leave the population 
earlier in time. However, if the low educated group is not homogenous itself, we will observe 
a convergence of hazard rate (or even a cross-over) over time between the less educated and 
the highly educated, because those low educated people with a slower transition to first birth 
will be more similar to the highly educated group. 
All these models, which include an unobserved heterogeneity term, were estimated by 
means of aML software. aML uses full information maximum likelihood, which consists in an 
iterative search algorithm where the parameters for the first iteration need to be specified by 
the user (Lillard and Panis 2003). The selection of starting values is important in order to 
minimize the time of estimation and to enhance convergence: we started by specifying the 
simplest model and then updating the starting values each time we added an explanatory 
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variable, until we developed the more complex version. Identification of these kinds of 
models is more easily reached in case the user deals with repeatable events (e.g., births). In 
contrast, it is more troublesome in cases of non-repeatable events, and it is necessary to make 
additional assumptions about the random effect, i.e., the unobserved heterogeneity term (cf. 
Chapter 1). 
Structure of the thesis 
As mentioned above, we have articulated this thesis in two empirical parts. Each part is 
constituted of two chapters, and in turn, each chapter has been written in a format of journal 
article, i.e., each chapter has its own introduction, theoretical background, data and methods, 
results, and discussion sections. At the end of each chapter, we have included the Appendices, 
whereas the reference list can be found after the conclusion chapter, at the end of the thesis. 
Note that Chapters 2 and 3 share Appendix 2.A, which concerns the estimation of the earning 
potential by field of study. 
Overview of empirical chapters 
Chapter 1: How does education affect the transition to fatherhood? 
In this chapter, we hypothesize that men’s educational attainment consistently and positively 
affects the transition to fatherhood via higher rates of union formation. In order to test this 
hypothesis, we apply multi-process event history analysis, which accounts for the correlation 
of unobserved factors between the process of first birth and the process of first union. 
We used data from the Generations and Gender Surveys for 10 European countries. Our 
results show a consistent positive effect of education on the transition to fatherhood, but it 
operates chiefly through selection into union. Failing to account for this selection process 
leads to a major underestimation of the salience of education for the transition to fatherhood. 
Chapter 2: Are there gender differences in the effect of education on fertility? 
The aim of this chapter is to test micro-economic theories of the family, according to which 
the relationship between education and fertility differs for men and women. We contributed to 
the literature about the role of education for men and women in fertility by particularly 
focusing on the effect of earning potential and gender composition of the study discipline, as 
well as the level of educational attainment. 
We used the GGS data of eight European countries (1960-1987 cohorts) that collected 
information on the field of study, i.e., Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
France, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania. We used European Labor Force Survey data to 
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estimate the earning potential of study disciplines and Eurostat data to calculate the share of 
women within each field of study. Next, by means of event history analysis, we modeled 
jointly the transition to first, second, and third births for women and men in order to take into 
account the process of selection into parenthood, which may affect the result concerning 
higher order births. 
Our results show that the effect of educational attainment differs between genders, 
mainly with regard to the transition to first birth, and that an important role is played by the 
selection into union in line with the findings in Chapter 1. The earning potential by field of 
study, instead, similarly affects all parities for men and women, i.e., a higher earning potential 
is associated with lower birth rates. Effects on births beyond the first child appear to be more 
similar between genders than expected. 
Chapter 3: How does educational pairing affect couples’ fertility? 
Building on the work that we did in Chapter 2, this study aims to extend the literature about 
the effect of partners’ educational characteristics on fertility, i.e., including the level of 
education and the field of study. We have used the country- and sex-specific estimates of 
earning potential by field of study to account for the earning potential of the partners. With 
GGS data of eight countries, the same that we used in Chapter 2, we modeled couples’ 
transition to first and higher order parities jointly, accounting for couples’ unobserved 
characteristics. 
The findings suggest that both men and women face opportunity costs between fertility 
and increased earning potential in terms of both higher educational level and more profitable 
field of study. Overall, we found that traditional pairings, characterized by an imbalance of 
education and earning potential in favor of the man, are more conducive to fertility than non-
traditional pairings, i.e., where the woman is more educated than the man. However, highly 
educated women partnered with highly educated men tend to have a higher transition rate to 
second birth, compared to highly educated women who partnered with man lower educated 
than themselves.  
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Chapter 4: How does educational pairing affect the pathways to couples’ first 
birth? 
In this last chapter, we focus on non-marital childbearing. In analyzing the factors associated 
with childbearing outside marriage, scholars tended to focus on the characteristics of only one 
of the parents, typically the mother. Given that the majority of non-marital births occur within 
unions, we considered a couple approach to study non-marital transitions to first birth. 
By means of a multistate approach, we examined the connection between educational 
pairings and the occurrence of the first birth inside or outside marriage for 12 European 
countries. Overall, we found that the presence of at least one highly educated partner lowers 
the rate of non-marital first births, relative to first childbearing within marriage, a finding 
which holds across all the countries considered. Strikingly, it does not matter whether it is he 
or she who has the highest level of education. 
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PART I. Individual-level analysis 
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Chapter 1. Education and the transition to fatherhood: 
the role of selection into union 
 
 
Abstract 
While advanced education has been found to be consistently associated with a later transition 
to parenthood for women, findings about education and the transition to parenthood have been 
much less consistent for men, and no stylized fact has emerged from the literature. We argue 
that the inconsistency of findings for men is due to the fact that the selection process involved 
in union formation has been disregarded in earlier studies. We hypothesize that men’s 
educational attainment consistently and positively affects the transition to fatherhood via 
higher rates of union formation. We apply multi-process event history analysis to data from 
the Generations and Gender Surveys for 10 European countries. Our results show indeed a 
consistent positive effect of education on the transition to fatherhood, but it operates chiefly 
through selection into union. Failing to account for this selection process, leads to a major 
underestimation of the salience of education for the transition to fatherhood. 
 
Keywords: fatherhood, union formation, education, selection 
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Introduction 
A major fertility trend of the past decades in the West has been the postponement of 
parenthood. Chief explanations of postponement include the expansion of women’s 
enrollment in advanced education and their increased participation in the labor market. More 
highly educated women, who are also more likely to be active in the paid labor market, tend 
to make the transition to parenthood at a later age than their lower educated peers – even if the 
former often catch up at later ages (Sweeney 2002; Sobotka 2004; Mills et al. 2011). 
The role played by men’s education in the transition to parenthood has received much 
less attention. It is high time to focus on the role of men’s education because major changes 
have taken place in the relative education of men and women. While men were typically more 
educated than women in the past, the gender gap in education has turned around in most 
Western countries. In recent years, the number of highly educated women reaching the 
reproductive ages is exceeding the number of highly educated men (DiPrete and Buchmann 
2006). This has affected educational assortative mating: while educational homogamy 
remains dominant, wives’ education now typically exceeds husbands’ (hypogamy) in case of 
differential attainment, whereas the reverse (hypergamy) has always been true in the past 
(Schwartz and Mare 2005; Esteve et al. 2012; Grow and Van Bavel 2015). This reversal has 
potentially far-reaching consequences for family formation (Van Bavel 2012). 
Parenthood implies parental investments and resources from both women and men. The 
decline of the male breadwinner–female homemaker model has turned obsolete the “separate 
spheres” argument for focusing only on women’s characteristics. Women’s increased earning 
potential and activity in the labor market may put pressure on men to be more actively 
involved in household work and childcare activities (McDonald 2000b; Sweeney 2002; 
Huinink and Kohli 2014). Both partners may become more equally involved in daily 
parenting activities. As Martín-García (2009:200) points out: “fatherhood no longer means 
being the only breadwinner of the household, it demands more time and more active role in 
childcare than ever before”. In this context, education plays an important role in shaping 
gender relations in family formation processes, as well as gender relations in established 
households (Martín-García 2009; Van Bavel 2012; Carlson, VanOrman and Pilkauskas 2013; 
Goldscheider, Bernhardt and Lappegård 2014). 
So far, the findings about the effect of men’s education on the transition to parenthood 
have been inconsistent. We argue that this is because earlier studies of men’s education and 
family formation have typically looked at it either in the context of an established couple or 
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without simultaneously considering the education of the female partner. Studies investigating 
fertility from the couple’s perspective fall into the first category (see, e.g., Corijn et al. 1996; 
Vignoli et al. 2012; Begall 2013; Jalovaara and Miettinen 2013). A limitation of such studies 
is that they suffer from selection bias: since only partnered men are analyzed, these studies 
lose sight of how some men are selected into unions while others are not. The second type of 
studies that have looked at the effect of male characteristics do not suffer from this bias, but at 
the expense of failing to control for the effect of female characteristics. In the literature about 
the transition to adulthood, scholars have investigated the effect of education both for men 
and women, but in order to be able to include singles, the effect of the partner’s education had 
to be left out of the equation (Corijn and Klijzing 2001; Billari and Liefbroer 2007). Such 
study design fails to account for strong educational homogamy and, as a result, one cannot tell 
to what extent the estimated effect of his education really reflects his rather than her 
education. 
In this paper, we propose to combine the advantages of both approaches, namely to 
include both single and partnered men while taking into account the education of the female 
partner, if any. We do this by simultaneously modeling union formation and the transition to 
parenthood as two interrelated processes. We hypothesize that men’s education has a 
consistent and positive effect on fatherhood rates, but that this acts chiefly through the process 
of union formation: men with higher educational attainment tend to be more attractive on the 
mating market and therefore exhibit higher rates of union formation. As a result, they also 
exhibit higher fatherhood rates. If only men with a partner are considered – after the selection 
effect has played out its role – the effect of his education on top of the effect of the wife’s 
education becomes much more uncertain, which is why estimates from couple-level studies 
may be inconsistent. Within couples, it is typically the wife’s education that plays the first 
violin when it comes to fertility outcomes. 
In order to test the selection-into-union hypothesis for men, we fit a multi-process model 
to account for the endogeneity of union formation and parenthood. So far, the literature 
considering the endogenous relations between family events has mostly focused on women’s 
characteristics (see e.g., Brien, Lillard and Waite 1999; Baizan, Aassve and Billari 2003). To 
date, there is a lack of studies focusing on the link between men’s education and the transition 
to fatherhood, and the relationship between union formation and fatherhood. This paper aims 
to fill that gap. We replicate our multi-process model in 10 different European countries, 
using data from the Gender and Generations Surveys (GGS), to explore the sensitivity of our 
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hypothesis to different European contexts. Our findings do indeed show consistently positive 
effects of education on the transition to fatherhood in diverse European contexts for men, but 
they operate mainly through union formation. 
The following sections discuss theoretical insights about the relationship between men’s 
education and family formation and then review lessons learned from earlier empirical 
studies. Next, we explain more about our empirical strategy and report on our findings. 
Education and men’s family formation 
Given the multidimensional nature of education, education may affect union formation and 
the transition to parenthood through several mechanisms (Lappegård and Rønsen 2005; 
Kravdal and Rindfuss 2008; Van Bavel 2010; Tesching 2012) which may differ between 
women and men. Two types of economic mechanisms are usually distinguished that relate 
education and fertility: the positive income effect and the negative price effect. The income 
effect accounts for the fact that the more educated people tend to earn a higher income and 
they are therefore more likely to afford the monetary costs of having (additional) children. 
The price effect, on the other hand, acts through opportunity costs: highly educated people 
have high opportunity costs because they have more to lose when they have to devote more 
time to non-paid activities like childcare and household chores after becoming a parent 
(Becker 1991).  
In the male breadwinner model, opportunity costs predominate for women while the 
income effect is more important for men. In this model, the expected educational gradient in 
union formation and fertility is negative for women and positive for men, since the 
opportunity costs of family formation are larger for college educated women while the 
positive income effect predominates for their male peers. Even before graduating, women 
have more difficulty to balance the role of wife/mother with that of student, so the negative 
effect of educational enrollment is expected to be stronger for women than for men (Blossfeld 
and Huinink, 1991; Liefbroer and Corijn 1999). 
To a large extent, the male breadwinner model has now given way to a dual earner model 
(Sweeney 2002). Since the last decades of the twentieth century and the first decades of the 
twenty-first, gender inequalities at macro and micro levels have changed. In education, the 
gender gap has reversed: since about the 1990s, in most of the OECD countries, female 
enrollment in college level education exceeds male enrollment, and women also complete 
their education more successfully (Vincent-Lancrin 2008). Female labor market participation 
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has increased dramatically and, to a much lesser extent, men have also become more involved 
in household chores and childcare (Oppenheimer 1994; England 2010; Raley, Bianchi and 
Wang 2012). Women’s earnings in the labor market are increasingly considered an essential 
part of the family budget (Oppenheimer 1994). 
When the dual earner model prevails, the expected relationship between educational 
attainment and family formation is different. Women with high earning potential increasingly 
become more attractive partners on the mating market (Oppenheimer 1988; 1994; Sweeney 
2002; DiPrete and Buchmann 2006). For them, the positive income effect may start to prevail, 
while they may dampen opportunity costs either by outsourcing child care and household 
chores (Kravdal 2007) or by sharing household work more equally with the male partner 
(Sullivan, Billari and Altintas 2014). For men, in turn, the opportunity costs may rise, because 
men are under pressure to increase their engagement in parenting and housework (Huinink 
and Kohli 2014:1301). 
Not only an individual’s own education matters for family formation, also the partner’s 
education is relevant. The relative education of husband and wife has been affected by the 
reversal of the gender gap in education: before, husbands typically had as much as or more 
education as their wives; after the reversal, women typically are equally or more educated 
than their husbands (DiPrete and Buchmann 2006; Esteve et al. 2012; Grow and Van Bavel 
2015). This is associated with an increased proportion of families where the wife is the main 
breadwinner (Klesment and Van Bavel 2015). Under these new circumstances, the 
significance of the educational attainment of the male partner may change. The income of the 
male partner may become a less crucial selection criterion who themselves have a high 
income. High earning women may become more interested in the social fathering skills of 
potential partners. Men with less education may compensate a limited income potential by 
showing off as “good fathers” on the mating market. By exhibiting the will and ability to be 
involved in household chores and child-rearing tasks, they may enhance their attractiveness to 
college educated women who want both a career and a family (Van Bavel 2012). 
Summing up the argument so far, to the extent that the dual earner family becomes the 
norm, the impact of education on family formation will tend to become more similar for men 
and women, with opportunity costs of parenthood for men and income effects for women 
becoming more salient. At the same time, the impact of men’s own education will also 
depend on the education of the chosen spouse, and vice versa. All this implies that the effect 
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of education on the transition to parenthood cannot be understood without considering the 
selection effects involved in union formation. 
On top of the selection effects, the interdependencies between union formation and the 
transition to parenthood complicate the distinction between cause and effect. For men in 
particular, accounting for the interrelatedness of union formation and parenthood is crucial. 
Finding a suitable partner is a necessary prerequisite to become a father. After finding a 
partner, the transition to fatherhood strongly depends on the stability of the union and the 
characteristics of the spouse. Co-residence typically implies an acceleration of the family 
formation process. Conversely, looking in the other causal direction, a pregnancy may 
expedite co-residence (Baizan et al. 2003). The interrelationship between union formation and 
parenthood is strengthened by the fact that individuals are heterogeneous in factors that may 
simultaneously affect both kinds of events. Some of such factors are observed, like education, 
but many are typically unobserved, like personality traits and physical characteristics. A 
proper empirical analysis should account for these interdependencies. 
Earlier empirical findings 
Studies addressing men’s transition to parenthood tend to fall into one of two categories. 
First, life course research about the transition to adulthood typically looks at men and women 
separately, investigating variability in the occurrence, order, and timing of events. Second, 
studies that focus on fertility from a couple’s perspective typically look at the influence of 
male characteristics after controlling for female characteristics. 
Studies about the transition to adulthood consistently show that school and college 
enrollment delay union formation and parenthood, for men as well as for women (Blossfeld 
and Huinink 1991; Corijn and Klijzing 2001). Enrollment delays parenthood more than union 
formation, and the effect is found to be weaker for men than for women (Liefbroer and Corijn 
1999; Corijn and Klijzing 2001; Winkler-Dworak and Toulemon 2007). The effect of 
educational attainment is much less clear than the enrollment effect. Some studies found that 
high attainment accelerates men’s union formation and marriage (Goldscheider and Waite 
1986; Corijn and Klijzing 2001; Winkler-Dworak and Toulemon 2007). Kalmijn (2011; 
2013) showed that, in Europe, men with better career prospects and positions on the labor 
market have higher chances of forming a union and getting married, while unmarried 
cohabitation was related to a lower socioeconomic position. As to the effect on the transition 
to parenthood, Corijn and Klijzing (2001) found that the effect of educational attainment was 
negative both for men and women in several Western European countries, but weaker for men 
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than for women. Yet, in France, the effect was found to be positive for men, while for women 
a U-shaped effect was found – both low and highly educated women showing higher first 
birth rates compared to the medium educated) (Winkler-Dworak and Toulemon 2007). 
Perhaps some of these inconsistencies relate to the fact that the effect of education may 
change over the life course. Previous studies suggest that the association between educational 
attainment and the transition to parenthood may depend on time since graduation (Brien et al. 
1999; Martín-García and Baizan 2006; Winkler-Dworak and Toulemon 2007; Martín-García 
2009). The economic rationale for this is that differences in earning potential may show up 
only a couple of years after graduation, after a professional career has been established and 
people get ready for family formation. This would hold most for people with advanced 
degrees. 
In the literature on fertility from a couple’s perspective, scholars have been looking at the 
relative influence of partners’ characteristics on the transition to parenthood (Corijn et al. 
1996; Gustafsson and Worku 2006; Martín-García 2009; Vignoli et al. 2012; Begall 2013; 
Jalovaara and Miettinen 2013). These studies include individuals who were in a co-residential 
union at the time of data collection. This implies that those less likely to enter or stay in a 
union are more likely to stay out of the picture. This is a crucial shortcoming because it 
disregards the effects of mate selection on fertility. More specifically, we expect that men’s 
education affects their fathering rates chiefly through its effect on being selected by women as 
sexual partners. If this is true, studies from a couple’s perspective might wrongly conclude 
that the husband’s education matters less for fertility than the wife’s, while in fact his 
education may matter as much or more, but only during a different stage of the family 
formation process. 
Few studies account for the interrelationships between union formation and fertility, 
applying the simultaneous equations approach for hazards developed by Lillard and 
colleagues (Lillard 1993; Lillard and Waite 1993; Lillard, Brien and Waite 1995; Brien et al. 
1999; Lillard and Panis 2003). A couple of studies have analyzed the interrelationship 
between first union formation and the transition to parenthood for women (Brien et al. 1999; 
Baizan et al. 2003). Both studies concluded that the two processes share unobserved factors 
that jointly affect the experience of events. For men, the relationship between union formation 
and the transition to fatherhood has hardly been studied. Winkler-Dworak and Toulemon 
(2007) considered the role of men’s selection into unions when analyzing the transition to 
fatherhood in France. Their results suggest that part of the positive effect of men’s 
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educational attainment on the transition to fatherhood was driven by the higher rate of union 
formation among highly educated men. In Finland, Jalovaara (2012) and Jalovaara and 
Miettinen (2013) found that socioeconomic resources for Finnish men and women were 
important to be selected into unions as well as to become parents. Still, the authors find that 
the female partner’s education has a stronger impact on the transition to parenthood than the 
male partner’s education (Jalovaara and Miettinen 2013). The latter finding suggest, in line 
with our hypothesis, that his education matters more for being selected into a union rather 
than for becoming a father once selected into a union. 
The selection-into-union hypothesis 
Based on the theoretical arguments and earlier empirical studies summarized above, we 
expect that the level of educational attainment has a consistently positive effect on men’s 
transition to fatherhood, but that this effect is largely indirect, namely through its positive 
effect on the rate of union formation. The underlying assumption is that highly educated men 
tend to be attractive on the mating market. An economic reason for their attractiveness is their 
relatively high earning potential. Another attractive feature, at least for some women, may be 
that they are more likely to hold egalitarian gender-role attitudes, and thus may be more prone 
to share household chores with their partners. Lower educated men have more difficulty 
finding a committed partner and therefore, all else equal, are expected to experience lower 
fatherhood rates. 
These expectations hold for men who have completed their studies and who are no longer 
enrolled in education. The effect of enrollment is expected to be negative throughout. So, 
even if men who pursue a college degree will have their first child later, we are predicting 
consistently higher fatherhood rates for them once they have obtained their higher degree. Our 
hypothesis implies that the higher fatherhood rates for the college educated can be explained 
by the fact that they are able to match with a committed female partner more quickly than 
their low educated counterparts. When we model union formation and fatherhood jointly, we 
expect to find a consistent positive effect of educational attainment on union formation but no 
consistent effect on the transition to fatherhood. 
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Data and methods 
Data and measures 
To test our hypothesis, we have used survey data of the Generations and Gender Surveys 
(GGS, see http://www.ggp-i.org/) for 10 European countries that provide the information 
needed: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Estonia, France, Hungary, Lithuania, Norway, Poland 
and Romania. We chose to replicate our empirical tests in these 10 countries rather than 
focusing on just one or a couple of countries. We included these particular countries because 
the GGS-data needed to test our hypothesis are available for them.1 The number of countries 
is insufficient, however, to test the role played by country-level factors using multilevel 
models. 
The GGS surveys include men and women between 18 and 79 years old and deal with 
topics such as fertility and partnership histories, the transition to adulthood, economic 
activity, care duties and attitudes (Vikat et al. 2007). For this study, we selected men born 
after 1949. Men were censored at age 45 for both union formation and first birth, because 
both first unions and first births very rarely occur at older ages even among men. We used 
information about the month and year of events. If the month was missing, we randomly 
imputed it. From an initial sample of 51224 men (for all countries), we excluded from the 
analysis men involved in same-sex relationships (n=163) and those born before 1950 
(n=14881). Then we dropped cases with missing or misreported information on the date of 
first union (n=703) as well as date of first birth (n=28), cases where it was not possible to 
determine whether or not the event of interest occurred and cases for whom the event 
occurred before the 15th birthday (n=125 for first union and n=29 for first birth). After these 
selections, our sample totaled 35295 men. We distinguish between three birth cohorts: 1950-
1959, 1960-1969, and 1970-19902. Table 1.1 gives descriptive statistics for the samples and 
variables used. 
  
                                                 
1 We excluded Russia and Georgia because of the very different cultural and institutional backgrounds of these 
countries. The data for the Czech Republic have become available later on, but not when we were conducting 
our analyses. 
2 The higher limit of this birth cohort differs among countries: 1983 (Estonia, Hungary); 1988 (Norway); 1989 
(Lithuania); 1990 (Austria, Belgium); 1993 (Poland). 
39 
 
Table 1.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
 
Austria Belgium Bulgaria Estonia France Hungary Lithuania Norway Poland Romania 
Cohort % 
          
1950-1959 NA 27.55 20.10 28.52 28.09 29.40 25.16 25.66 29.20 31.30 
1960-1969 29.84 28.07 29.59 27.22 30.71 22.76 24.84 28.00 20.07 29.65 
1970-1990 70.16 44.38 50.31 44.26 41.20 47.84 50.00 46.35 50.72 39.05 
Education % 
          
Low 10.54 26.25 23.79 17.80 21.54 12.97 14.47 19.70 12.20 21.44 
Medium 72.35 38.19 62.20 62.39 50.27 73.38 64.79 48.41 67.98 66.62 
High 17.11 34.99 13.96 19.81 28.20 13.65 20.75 30.80 19.34 11.94 
Unknown 0.00 0.56 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.09 0.47 0.00 
Parents' 
education %           
Both low 24.13 44.85 42.07 32.14 49.56 34.72 35.71 21.25 31.89 60.62 
Only father 
medium-high 
25.36 18.43 9.51 12.12 17.25 21.99 7.39 22.42 14.41 16.59 
Only 
mother 
medium-high 
9.73 11.85 12.21 20.02 11.55 7.20 21.19 18.86 10.92 4.03 
Both 
medium-high 
36.00 19.51 32.93 35.39 12.50 35.38 27.03 32.78 38.91 17.07 
Both 
unknown 
4.79 5.36 3.27 0.32 9.14 0.71 8.68 4.69 3.87 1.69 
Partner's 
education %           
Low 12.12 11.63 15.16 8.60 11.16 8.44 4.09 7.13 6.59 20.46 
Medium 48.22 13.02 33.89 55.41 20.76 30.72 38.28 17.26 47.05 38.51 
High 9.06 18.17 14.18 16.02 14.67 8.39 16.13 17.49 18.46 7.34 
Unknown 0.15 39.49 0.59 0.00 31.42 22.60 14.20 34.71 0.42 10.35 
Not in 
union 
30.45 17.69 36.18 19.97 22.00 29.85 27.29 23.41 27.48 23.34 
Siblings % 
          
No siblings 10.13 9.90 13.66 14.50 6.59 11.67 16.89 4.90 8.07 15.12 
1 33.30 29.37 55.54 46.32 25.86 48.58 41.06 29.15 29.38 31.91 
2 24.34 21.84 14.57 21.32 25.54 21.33 21.74 32.05 24.92 22.05 
3+ 32.23 38.88 16.22 17.86 42.01 18.42 20.31 33.90 37.63 30.91 
Number of 
events by 
type 
          
Number of 
first births  
809 1186 2273 1170 1359 1675 1873 2690 3833 2457 
Number of 
first unions 
1366 1903 2597 1479 2202 2651 2488 3857 4458 2986 
Sample size 1964 2312 4069 1848 2823 3779 3422 5036 6147 3895 
Source: own calculations on selected GGS data 
 
The date of first partnership formation has been coded using information on the month 
and year of the first reported co-residential partnership, distinguishing between unmarried 
cohabitation and marriage and keeping track of any changes in marital status. The GGS 
surveys collected information only on partnerships which lasted for at least three months 
(Vikat et al. 2007). To focus on the relationship between first union as well as first birth, 
respondents who experienced more than one co-residential union have been censored at the 
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end of the first one, so that first births happening in higher order union are not considered. 
Only in Norway and Austria did the proportion of first births in higher order unions exceed 
10% (namely 12 and 11%, respectively). In France, it was almost 9%, in Belgium and 
Hungary 7%, far below 6% in the rest of the countries. As a robustness check, for countries 
where the proportion of first births in higher order unions exceeded 6%, we ran a version of 
our models that was modified to include higher order unions. The results do not deviate 
substantially from the ones reported here. 
The date of the transition to fatherhood was back-dated by 8 months to avoid anticipation 
bias (Baizan et al. 2003), based on the date of birth reported by the respondent for his first 
biological child, if any. It is known that men may underreport their fertility (by a major 
margin in the US and the UK according to Rendall et al. 1999; only minor underreporting 
according to the estimates by Alich 2009 for Russia). However, we are interested in the 
transition to actual fathering of own children rather than in fertility per se. We assume that, if 
men fail to report any children, then they were probably not actually performing father roles 
for these children. Conversely, if a husband reports a child as his own biological child while 
his wife actually got pregnant from another man, this still implies a father role, in sociological 
terms, for the husband. 
Our analysis looks at two dimensions of education: enrollment and attainment. Both 
variables are constructed as time-varying covariates. To capture the enrollment dimension, 
time since graduation is included as a categorical variable with three categories: (1) still 
enrolled in education; (2) up to two years after graduation; (3) more than two years after 
graduation. We distinguish between the very recent graduates and those who left school or 
college more than two year ago because it takes some time to find a job after graduation 
(typically 1 to 2 years, Quintini and Manfredi 2009), earn a living and be ready for family 
formation (cf. Martín-García 2009). The end of enrollment is based on the time of actual 
graduation as reported by the respondent in most cases (93.64%). It is based on the standard 
age at graduation for the relevant attainment level and country in a minority (6.36%) of cases; 
for men attaining a high (college) level of education, where study duration is more varying, 
this percentage is only 0.38%. Still, as a robustness check, we re-ran our models after 
dropping cases where explicit information on the actual date of graduation was missing. The 
results remained basically the same and would not affect our conclusions. 
For educational attainment, we grouped men into three levels (low, medium, high), 
collapsing categories from the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED 
41 
 
1997). The first group includes those who completed primary plus lower secondary school (at 
least 8 years of schooling, ISCED 0, 1, and 2). The medium category includes men who 
attained the upper-secondary and those who also got a post-secondary level (ISCED 3 and 4). 
The highly educated men are those who got a bachelor/master/PhD degree (ISCED 5 and 6). 
Corijn and Klijzing (2001) argue that the effect of education on the transition to 
parenthood may not be constant but changing over the life course, which would represent a 
violation of the proportionality assumption. One way to try to account for this time-
dependency is to interact age with education. However, earlier studies suggest that the time-
dependence is a function of time since graduation rather than age per se (Brien et al. 1999; 
Martín-García and Baizan 2006; Martín-García 2009) – with age at graduation obviously 
correlating with the level of the degree obtained. We have therefore included interaction terms 
between men’s educational attainment and the three categories of years since graduation in all 
models. Apart from that, we also include five-year age splines to accommodate any non-linear 
relationship between age and the events of interest (see below for more technical details). 
The female partner’s education is categorized in the same way as for the male 
respondent. To catch the effect of a long-term dimension of the social status, we included 
parents’ educational attainment, coded into 4 categories (“both parents low educated”, “only 
the father at least medium educated”, “only the mother at least medium educated”, “both 
parents at least medium educated”). Since it has been showed that individuals with more 
siblings are more prone to start a family (Murphy 2013), we included the number of siblings 
as a time constant variable. 
All variables mentioned so far have been included in both the model of first birth and first 
union. Next, the model of first birth includes the time-varying endogenous variable “union 
status”, indicating whether the male respondent is living in a co-residential union or not. Once 
a man is living with a female partner, we distinguish between those partnered with a low, 
medium or highly educated woman. We added a category “not available” to accommodate 
men in union but with missing information on the partner’s education. We also included a 
time varying dummy variable indicating whether the union is a formal marriage rather than 
unmarried cohabitation. Finally, in the model of first union formation, a time-varying dummy 
variable for the conception of the first child (birth date backdated by 8 months) is included. 
Analytical strategy 
We test the selection-into-union hypothesis in two steps. First, we model first union formation 
and the transition to parenthood separately. In the second step, we model the two processes 
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jointly. For the first step we fitted both a piecewise exponential hazard model (see, e.g., 
Blossfeld et al. 2007) using the STATA software and a piecewise linear hazard model using 
the aML package (Lillard and Panis 2003). We compared the results from both approaches to 
check whether the results would be similar, which was indeed the case. We present the results 
from the piecewise linear approach, which was also the one applied in the second step. A 
general formulation of the piecewise linear hazard model is: 
lnh(t) = γ ′T(t) + β ′X(t) 
lnh(t) is the log-hazard of occurrence at time t, γ ′T(t) captures the baseline hazard 
duration dependence, and β′X (t) represent the covariates (both fixed and time-varying) which 
shift the baseline hazard up or down. In the piecewise linear specification γ ′T(t), we 
implement five year age intervals to parameterize the baseline log-hazard. The duration 
dependence is characterized by a pattern of nodes and slopes as well as an origin (Panis 
1994). We set the latter at the 15th birthday of the respondent. 
To address the endogeneity of union formation and parenthood, with both processes 
affecting each other, we jointly model the two processes and estimate the correlation between 
residuals to represent unobserved heterogeneity. In doing so, we account for unmeasured, 
time-constant factors that simultaneously affect union formation and parenthood. One 
advantage of the joint model is that we account for the fact that individuals with a higher 
probability of experiencing the two events will leave the population at younger ages. As a 
result, the observed hazard at older ages for both events strongly reduces due to selection. 
When we do not account for this, the baseline hazard represents also this selection effect 
rather than only the actual effect of age (Baizan et al. 2003). Our statistical estimations follow 
the framework developed by Lillard (1993). In formal terms, we have: 
lnh(t)F = γ ′T(t) + β ′X(t) + ε 
lnh(t)U = γ ′T(t) + β ′X(t) + δ 
The superscripts F and U refer to the equation for fatherhood and union formation, 
respectively. The random variables ε and δ represent unobserved heterogeneity terms, which 
are assumed to have a joint bivariate standard normal distribution: 
(
𝜀
𝛿
) ~ 𝑁 ((
0
0
) , (
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2
𝜌𝜀𝛿
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Since we consider only first unions and births, we deal with non-repeatable events. 
Aassve et al. (2003) showed that the estimates of hazard models for non-repeatable, correlated 
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events may be sensitive to the variance of the unobserved heterogeneity term. To check the 
sensitivity in our case, we ran our models in two versions: one with fixing the variance to 1 
(the variance of the standard normal distribution) and one where we estimated the variance 
empirically. The results tend to be robust as to the direction of the effects and their 
significance, changing slightly with regard the magnitude of the effects. In France and 
Estonia, the estimated correlation between unobserved factors changes both in sign and 
statistical significance, but the estimates for the fixed effects of education – the ones of 
substantive interest – remain stable also in these two countries. 
The models are estimated and replicated for each country-sample separately. We did not 
apply multilevel modeling because our focus is not to test the effect of country characteristics. 
Rather, we want to replicate the same hypothesis testing in different contexts. Anyway, the 
number of countries would be too small to apply multilevel modeling and test hypotheses 
about the role of country characteristics. Note that, in an analysis not reported below, we 
combined our 10 countries. The results we then got are an averaged, stylized summary of our 
main finding, consistent with what we do report below for countries separately. 
Results 
We have fitted 3 models for each of the 10 countries. Appendix 1.A reports the estimates for 
all 30 models. For each country, Model 1 is the model of the transition to fatherhood that does 
not control for union status. Controls that are included, as well as in all subsequent models, 
are age, cohort, time since graduation, own educational attainment of the male respondent, 
parental educational attainment, and number of siblings. Model 2 adds the control for union 
status, type of union, and the educational attainment of the female partner, if any. Figure 1.1 
plots the effects of own educational attainment on the transition to fatherhood, estimated from 
Model 1, along with their 95% confidence intervals; Figure 1.2 is doing the same for Model 2. 
All figures compare the rates for men with high or medium educational attainment with the 
reference category with low educational attainment (represented by the 1.0 line), two years or 
more after graduating from school or college. 
 As can be seen in Figure 1.1, educational attainment has a consistently positive effect 
on the transition to fatherhood when union status is not controlled for. In all countries except 
Austria, the difference between low educated and highly educated men is statistically 
significant. In the majority of countries, the fatherhood rates are more than 50% higher for 
college educated men compared to men with low educational attainment. The relative rate for 
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medium educated men is in most countries in between. Figure 1.2 shows that once we control 
for union status, the effect of education is strongly reduced in most of the countries. Thus, 
most of the positive effect of education on the transition to fatherhood appears to be driven by 
union formation. 
 
Figure 1.1 Estimates for the effect of educational attainment on the transition to fatherhood 
without controlling for union status: relative risks for highly educated (square with dashed 
bars) and medium educated men (circles with solid bars) compared to low educated men (1.0 
reference line) 
 
 
Note: displayed relative risks apply for men who have been out of school for more than two years 
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Figure 1.2 Estimates for the effect of educational attainment on the transition to fatherhood 
after controlling for union status: relative risks for highly educated (square with dashed bars) 
and medium educated men (circles with solid bars) compared to low educated men (1.0 
reference line) 
 
 
Note: displayed relative risks apply for men who have been out of school for more than two years 
 
Next, we account for the selection-into-union effect and the endogeneity of union 
formation and fatherhood by simultaneously estimating joint models of both processes. This 
is Model 3. Again, full results are shown in Appendix 1.A. Figure 1.3 plots the effects of male 
educational attainment on fatherhood (a) and union formation (b). It turns out that there is no 
effect of educational attainment on fatherhood rates after accounting for the selection-into-
union process in most countries. Belgium, Romania and Bulgaria are the only countries where 
we still see a direct, statistically significant effect: in these three countries, college educated 
men exhibit higher fatherhood rates compared to men with low educational attainment. In 
Austria, the point estimate for highly educated men is also a bit above the 1.0 reference line of 
the low educated men, but the difference is not statistically significant. For medium educated 
men, there are no significant differences in any country. In contrast, educational attainment 
positively influences union formation in most countries, with statistically significant 
differences in all countries except Bulgaria and Norway. In France, unexpectedly, medium 
educated men appear to exhibit higher union formation rates than highly educated men, but 
the difference is not statistically significant. All-in-all, the estimates quite consistently point to 
a positive educational gradient in union formation rates. 
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Figure 1.3 Estimates for the effect of educational attainment on the transition to fatherhood (a) 
and union formation (b) from a joint model simultaneously estimating the parameters for both 
processes: relative risks for highly educated (square with dashed bars) and medium educated 
men (circles with solid bars) compared to low educated men (1.0 reference line) 
 
Note: displayed relative risks apply for men who have been out of school for more than two years 
 
The control variables in all models (Appendix 1.A) tend to have the expected effects – 
discussing these is beyond the focus of this paper. The joint models (Model 3 in each country) 
also yield estimates of the correlation between residual, unobserved terms in the fatherhood 
and union formation equations (see Appendix 1.B). Both processes are obviously positively 
correlated. Indeed, in all countries, the estimated correlation between the unobserved factors 
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in the joint model is positive as long as we exclude any of the two endogenous variables 
(union status in the equation of first birth or conception in the equation of first union). 
Interestingly, however, once we include in the system of equations both endogenous 
variables, the positive correlation between unobserved factors disappears in almost all 
countries. Only in Belgium the correlation between unobserved factors remains positive. In 
Austria it is not significant (probably due to the small sample size), in Norway it is positive 
but not significant, while in France the significance and sign of the correlation term are 
sensitive to the values of the unobserved heterogeneity factors. 
In all eastern European countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Romania as well as 
in Lithuania), the correlation between unobserved factors in both processes turns negative (the 
estimated correlation is not robust for Estonia). Such negative correlation implies that, after 
accounting for the effect of union formation on fatherhood and vice versa, there are some 
unobserved factors that enhance the experience of one event but delay the other. For instance, 
it could be that men with unobserved personality traits who are particularly eager to enter a 
romantic relationship decide to live with a partner relatively early while they are at the same 
time not eager to actually start fathering a child. Testing this interpretation is beyond the focus 
of this paper. 
Discussion 
Several authors have recently argued that men’s attitudes, intentions and behaviors are 
becoming increasingly important factors to understand patterns and trends in family formation 
(Van Bavel 2012; Goldscheider et al. 2014; Huinink and Kohli 2014). Yet, empirical research 
so far has not yielded clear and consistent results about how men’s characteristics affect the 
transition to parenthood. In this paper we have argued that the explanation for this may be that 
men’s characteristics perhaps matter most in the process of union formation, where men with 
more attractive features for women are more likely to be selected as their partners. Empirical 
analyses that look at the couple level, after unions have been formed, will then perhaps fail to 
see any clear effects of male characteristics, net of the effects of female characteristics. 
More specifically, in this paper we wanted to test the selection-into-union hypothesis 
with a focus on educational attainment. We expected that educational attainment has a 
consistently positive effect on men’s transition to fatherhood, but that this effect is largely 
indirect, namely through its positive effect on the rate of union formation. Our results 
generally supported the hypothesis, with differences between European countries but with a 
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clear overall pattern: there is a positive educational gradient in men’s union formation but, 
after accounting for that, not in their transition to fatherhood. This pattern shows up 
particularly for men who left school more than two years ago – presumably the time needed 
for the majority to have gained an established position in the labor market; before that, just 
after leaving school, the results are more mixed. 
Our hypothesis appears to apply particularly strongly in Central and Eastern European 
countries, including the Baltic countries Lithuania and Estonia. In the latter two countries, 
there is a clear positive educational gradient in fatherhood rates, but this gradient vanishes 
completely when selection into union is accounted for. The positive educational gradient in 
union formation came out even more clearly in the joint modeling framework. 
In Western Europe, Belgium is the only country where a positive educational gradient in 
fatherhood stands strong in the joint modeling framework, after accounting for union 
formation. Here, we can only speculate about the reasons for the Belgian exception – and it 
remains to be seen whether future studies with other data can replicate our GGS-based 
finding. If real, a positive educational gradient in fatherhood (after accounting for selection-
into-union) could signify that there are strong father role expectations, and that the highly 
educated are the most likely to meet these expectations. An alternative explanation could be 
that the effect of educational attainment represents a direct income effect on the transition to 
fatherhood. We speculate, however, that this would rather hold for the other two countries 
where a positive effect of education on fatherhood remains in the joint model – namely in 
Romania and Bulgaria, two economically disadvantaged Eastern European countries. In these 
countries, more highly educated men can perhaps more easily “afford” to father children – 
and perhaps low educated fail to report any children they have, if they are aware of them at 
all. 
By jointly modeling union formation and fatherhood, this study was able to overcome 
major limitations of earlier work on education and the transition to fatherhood. Earlier studies 
with models that included the education of the husband along with the education of the wife 
typically selected only established couples in the analytical sample. Our argument is that this 
approach suffers from a crucial selection bias because men’s education chiefly influences 
fertility through the selection into unions. Alternatively, studies in the transition-to-adulthood 
tradition have typically failed to control for the wife’s educational attainment, ignoring strong 
educational homogamy and, hence, unable to tell whether it is his or her education that 
matters. 
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This study has its limitations. First, we cannot be sure about whether or not the men in 
our sample may have had other, perhaps unacknowledged children with other women than the 
ones identified in our data. Yet, as social scientists, we are more interested in children who 
are at least actually acknowledged by their fathers than in biological fatherhood per se. 
Second, we have disregarded the distinction between marriage and unmarried cohabitation in 
this study. For example, we have not modeled the selection process which would lead highly 
committed men to marry for having children rather than to cohabit. This could affect the 
correlation terms between unobserved factors: men who signal stronger commitment by 
marrying would probably have higher fatherhood rates than those who choose to cohabit. As a 
result, the positive correlation between the transition to parenthood and marriage would be 
stronger compared to the correlation with unmarried cohabitation. The aim of this paper, 
however, was not to analyze the role of different kinds of living arrangement histories, but 
rather to assess the role played by men’s educational attainment in their transition to 
parenthood through the selection into union. Note that, while we do not model the selection 
process into marriage versus cohabitation, we do control for the distinction in the equation for 
the transition to fatherhood. Third, our paper focused only on two dimensions of education: 
enrollment and attainment. Still it would be interesting to test if the selection-into-union 
hypothesis holds with regard to the effect of educational field of study. Finally, future 
research could also address the role of mating market composition in terms of educational 
attainment on the selection effect at the time of union, including both individual- and macro-
level indicators.  
Even with all mentioned limitations in mind, we forcefully argue that the selection-into-
union effect should be taken into account, particularly when comparing the role of education 
in the transition to parenthood between men and women. Currently, the consensus in the field 
seems to be that women’s education matters more for fertility than men’s. However, this 
paper has shown that earlier research may have strongly underestimated the role of men’s 
education because the process of their selection into unions has been ignored.  
With the reversal of the gender gap in education, the selection of men into unions based 
on their education may even become a more important factor, given that the growing group of 
college educated women typically are looking for  partners with the same educational status 
(Van Bavel 2012). More generally, we speculate that role of men’s characteristics, intentions 
and behaviors may become more and more important for future fertility trends and patterns 
because college educated women are increasingly “competing” for men with similar 
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education. The relative scarcity of the latter on the marriage market may enhance their power 
to have they say in decision-marking about fertility. But if we fail to account for the selection-
into-union process, we risk missing that point. 
It would be interesting to compare the effect of education on fertility through selection-
into-union between men and women. Perhaps selection on education is playing an 
increasingly important role for women, as their contributions to the household budgets are 
becoming more significant and as their own earning potential is playing an increasingly 
important role in mate selection by men. Several studies have reported that the positive effect 
of education, and its earning potential, on marriage rates has strongly increased over time 
(Oppenheimer 1994; 1997; Sweeney 2002). In a recent European study, low educated mothers 
were found to remain single more often than in earlier cohorts and compared to college 
educated women (De Hauw et al. 2015). Selection based on education may therefore 
increasingly play a role for women’s transition to parenthood as well. These findings and 
trends highlight the relevance of investigating the selection-into-union hypothesis not only for 
men, as was done in this study, but also for women. 
 
 
  
51 
 
Appendices 
Appendix 1.A 
Model 1 (M1) refers to analysis of first birth without controlling for union status. Model 2 
(M2) is the full model of the transition to fatherhood. Model 3 (M3) refers to the joint model 
of first birth and first union. 
 
Table 1.A1 Regression coefficients Austria, stepwise modeling 
 
 
Austria 
 
M1 M2 M3 First birth M3 First union 
 
Coef. se 
 
Coef. se 
 
Coef. se 
 
Coef. se 
 Duration splines 
            15-19 0.70 0.08 ** 0.54 0.08 ** 0.54 0.08 ** 0.55 0.04 ** 
20-24 0.19 0.03 ** 0.04 0.03 
 
0.06 0.04 † 0.17 0.02 ** 
25-29 0.01 0.03 
 
-0.07 0.03 * -0.04 0.04 
 
0.07 0.03 * 
30-34 0.00 0.04 
 
-0.04 0.04 
 
0.01 0.05 
 
-0.10 0.05 * 
35-39 -0.30 0.09 ** -0.29 0.09 ** -0.26 0.09 ** -0.08 0.10 
 40+ -0.03 0.29 
 
-0.03 0.30 
 
-0.06 0.29 
 
0.23 0.21 
 Constant -7.51 0.43 ** -7.14 0.42 ** -7.91 0.47 ** -5.93 0.28 ** 
Cohort (Ref. = 1970-1990) 
            1950-59 - - 
 
- - 
 
- - 
 
- - 
 1960-69 0.40 0.08 ** 0.32 0.08 ** 0.48 0.10 ** 0.04 0.09 
 Education (Ref.= Low educated with at 
least 2 years after leaving school) 
            Enrolled -0.52 0.18 ** -0.57 0.18 ** -0.53 0.24 * 0.11 0.17 
 Low0-2 1.30 0.38 ** 0.96 0.40 * 1.13 0.42 ** 0.94 0.34 ** 
Medium0-2 -0.26 0.21 
 
-0.33 0.21 
 
-0.22 0.26 
 
0.24 0.18 
 Medium2+ -0.04 0.15 
 
-0.13 0.15 
 
-0.04 0.21 
 
0.27 0.17 
 High0-2 -0.29 0.27 
 
-0.22 0.26 
 
-0.28 0.32 
 
0.31 0.26 
 High2+ 0.17 0.19 
 
0.19 0.21 
 
0.20 0.27 
 
0.53 0.23 * 
Unknown - - 
 
- - 
 
- - 
 
- - 
 Parents' education (Ref.=Both low) 
            Only father medium-high -0.17 0.10 † -0.19 0.11 † -0.25 0.14 † 0.13 0.11 
 Only mother medium-high -0.14 0.14 
 
-0.30 0.17 † -0.43 0.19 * 0.41 0.16 ** 
Both medium-high -0.23 0.10 * -0.23 0.11 * -0.25 0.14 † 0.01 0.12 
 Both unknown 0.04 0.17 
 
-0.01 0.16 
 
-0.07 0.21 
 
0.36 0.21 † 
Siblings (Ref.= No siblings) 
            1 0.50 0.15 ** 0.45 0.15 ** 0.56 0.20 ** 0.19 0.14 
 2 0.45 0.15 ** 0.43 0.16 ** 0.53 0.21 * 0.16 0.15 
 3+ 0.55 0.15 ** 0.53 0.15 ** 0.69 0.20 ** 0.05 0.15 
 Partner's education (Ref.=Not in union) 
            Low 
   
1.87 0.17 ** 2.42 0.23 ** 
   Medium 
   
1.83 0.11 ** 2.19 0.18 ** 
   High 
   
1.66 0.16 ** 1.89 0.22 ** 
   Unknown - - 
 
- - 
 
- - 
 
- - 
 Married (Ref. = Not married) 
   
1.17 0.10 ** 1.60 0.11 ** 
   Conception (Ref.=No conception) 
         
2.04 0.20 ** 
SigmaEps 
      
1.00 
  
1.00 
  SigmaDelta 
      
1.00 
  
1.00 
  Rho 
      
-0.22 0.17 
 
-0.22 0.17 
 ln-L -4584.45 -4124.73 -11015.80 
†p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01 
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Table 1.A2 Regression coefficients Belgium, stepwise modeling 
 
 
Belgium 
 
M1 M2 M3 First birth M3 First union 
 
Coef. se 
 
Coef. se 
 
Coef. se 
 
Coef. se 
 Duration splines 
            15-19 0.76 0.13 ** 0.60 0.13 ** 0.54 0.13 ** 0.27 0.03 ** 
20-24 0.28 0.03 ** 0.07 0.03 * 0.13 0.04 ** 0.20 0.02 ** 
25-29 0.01 0.02 
 
0.00 0.02 
 
0.10 0.03 ** -0.05 0.03 
 30-34 -0.16 0.03 ** -0.16 0.03 ** -0.13 0.03 ** -0.10 0.04 * 
35-39 -0.13 0.05 * -0.14 0.05 ** -0.12 0.05 * -0.07 0.07 
 40+ -0.41 0.15 ** -0.41 0.15 ** -0.41 0.15 ** -0.27 0.15 † 
Constant -7.98 0.65 ** -8.04 0.64 ** -8.39 0.64 ** -3.64 0.18 ** 
Cohort (Ref. = 1970-1990) 
            1950-59 0.11 0.08 
 
-0.14 0.09 
 
-0.03 0.12 
 
-0.11 0.09 
 1960-69 0.15 0.07 * 0.11 0.08 
 
0.16 0.10 † -0.14 0.09 
 Education (Ref.= Low educated with at 
least 2 years after leaving school) 
            Enrolled -0.69 0.14 ** -0.42 0.15 ** -0.60 0.17 ** -0.44 0.10 ** 
Low0-2 -0.01 0.38 
 
0.28 0.38 
 
0.24 0.42 
 
-0.38 0.16 * 
Medium0-2 -0.73 0.29 * -0.43 0.30 
 
-0.43 0.31 
 
-0.37 0.14 ** 
Medium2+ 0.20 0.09 * 0.11 0.10 
 
0.08 0.12 
 
0.14 0.10 
 High0-2 -0.58 0.18 ** -0.39 0.18 * -0.59 0.21 ** 0.07 0.14 
 High2+ 0.51 0.09 ** 0.44 0.11 ** 0.41 0.14 ** 0.41 0.13 ** 
Unknown 0.30 0.29 
 
0.67 0.46 
 
0.63 0.79 
 
-0.38 0.34 
 Parents' education (Ref.=Both low) 
            Only father medium-high -0.05 0.08 
 
-0.02 0.09 
 
-0.04 0.12 
 
0.10 0.10 
 Only mother medium-high 0.02 0.10 
 
0.10 0.11 
 
0.12 0.15 
 
0.13 0.12 
 Both medium-high -0.15 0.09 
 
-0.13 0.10 
 
-0.22 0.13 † 0.03 0.11 
 Both unknown 0.03 0.13 
 
0.08 0.15 
 
0.15 0.19 
 
0.07 0.14 
 Siblings (Ref.= No siblings) 
            1 0.09 0.12 
 
0.06 0.12 
 
0.15 0.15 
 
0.04 0.13 
 2 0.25 0.12 * 0.20 0.12 
 
0.32 0.15 * 0.12 0.14 
 3+ 0.25 0.11 * 0.24 0.12 * 0.33 0.14 * -0.08 0.13 
 Partner's education (Ref.=Not in union) 
            Low 
   
2.55 0.15 ** 2.52 0.21 ** 
   Medium 
   
2.65 0.14 ** 2.62 0.19 ** 
   High 
   
2.64 0.13 ** 2.56 0.17 ** 
   Unknown 
   
1.71 0.12 ** 1.44 0.21 ** 
   Married (Ref. = Not married) 
   
0.57 0.08 ** 0.87 0.10 ** 
   Conception (Ref.=No conception) 
         
1.43 0.37 ** 
SigmaEps 
      
1.00 
  
1.00 
  SigmaDelta 
      
1.00 
  
1.00 
  Rho 
      
0.35 0.15 * 0.35 0.15 * 
ln-L -6525.80 -5887.11 -15421.65 
†p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01 
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Table 1.A3 Regression coefficients Bulgaria, stepwise modeling 
 
 
Bulgaria 
 
M1 M2 M3 First birth M3 First union 
 
Coef. se 
 
Coef. se 
 
Coef. se 
 
Coef. se 
 Duration splines 
            15-19 0.51 0.04 ** 0.31 0.04 **  0.30 0.04 ** 0.54 0.04 ** 
20-24 0.21 0.02 ** -0.01 0.02      0.04 0.02 †   0.22 0.02 ** 
25-29 -0.18 0.02 ** -0.20 0.02 **  -0.18 0.02 ** -0.14 0.02 ** 
30-34 -0.13 0.03 ** -0.16 0.03 **  -0.14 0.04 ** -0.13 0.04 ** 
35-39 -0.13 0.07 *  -0.14 0.07 *   -0.12 0.07 †   -0.19 0.08 *  
40+ -0.30 0.18 †   -0.31 0.18 †    -0.30 0.18 †   -0.09 0.14     
Constant -5.91 0.22 ** -5.88 0.22 **  -6.48 0.23 ** -5.82 0.20 ** 
Cohort (Ref. = 1970-1990) 
            1950-59 0.54 0.06 ** 0.18 0.09 *   0.22 0.10 *  0.48 0.08 ** 
1960-69 0.56 0.06 ** 0.35 0.07 **  0.34 0.08 ** 0.38 0.07 ** 
Education (Ref.= Low educated with at 
least 2 years after leaving school) 
            Enrolled -0.61 0.09 ** -0.18 0.12     -0.19 0.14    -0.77 0.11 ** 
Low0-2 0.51 0.22 *  0.48 0.21 *   0.39 0.22 †   0.55 0.18 ** 
Medium0-2 -0.58 0.12 ** -0.05 0.13      -0.03 0.15     -0.76 0.12 ** 
Medium2+ 0.02 0.06     0.25 0.10 *   0.19 0.12     -0.08 0.10     
High0-2 0.29 0.13 *  0.58 0.16 **  0.55 0.19 ** -0.07 0.16     
High2+ 0.35 0.11 ** 0.53 0.16 **  0.42 0.19 *  0.24 0.16     
Unknown - - 
 
- - 
 
- - 
 
- - 
 Parents' education (Ref.=Both low) 
            Only father medium-high -0.14 0.08 †   -0.13 0.11     -0.10 0.13    -0.28 0.12 *  
Only mother medium-high -0.25 0.08 ** -0.04 0.10      -0.02 0.12     -0.48 0.10 ** 
Both medium-high -0.26 0.06 ** -0.20 0.09 *   -0.20 0.10 *  -0.36 0.08 ** 
Both unknown -0.22 0.13     -0.08 0.18      -0.07 0.20     -0.14 0.18     
Siblings (Ref.= No siblings) 
            1 0.10 0.07    0.03 0.09     -0.01 0.10    0.20 0.09 *  
2 0.35 0.08 ** 0.16 0.12      0.18 0.14     0.48 0.12 ** 
3+ 0.46 0.08 ** 0.33 0.11 **  0.32 0.14 *  0.44 0.12 ** 
Partner's education (Ref.=Not in union) 
            Low 
   
3.29 0.11 **  4.29 0.12 ** 
   Medium 
   
3.50 0.09 **  4.32 0.10 ** 
   High 
   
3.58 0.11 **  4.24 0.12 ** 
   Unknown 
   
2.47 0.28 **  3.28 0.37 ** 
   Married (Ref. = Not married) 
   
-0.01 0.08      0.47 0.08 ** 
   Conception (Ref.=No conception) 
         
3.65 0.12 ** 
SigmaEps 
      
1.00 
  
1.00 
  SigmaDelta 
      
1.00 
  
1.00 
  Rho 
      
-0.57 0.03 ** -0.57 0.03 ** 
ln-L -12114.05 -9801.37 -22053.67 
†p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01 
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Table 1.A4 Regression coefficients Estonia, stepwise modeling 
 
 
Estonia 
 
M1 M2 M3 First birth M3 First union 
 
Coef. se 
 
Coef. se 
 
Coef. se 
 
Coef. se 
 Duration splines 
            15-19 0.77 0.06 ** 0.54 0.06 ** 0.51 0.06 ** 0.71 0.05 ** 
20-24 0.17 0.02 ** -0.10 0.03 ** -0.08 0.05 † 0.24 0.02 ** 
25-29 -0.14 0.03 ** -0.15 0.03 ** -0.13 0.04 ** -0.11 0.03 ** 
30-34 -0.12 0.05 * -0.16 0.05 ** -0.15 0.06 * -0.04 0.06 
 35-39 -0.34 0.12 ** -0.34 0.11 ** -0.35 0.12 ** -0.20 0.14 
 40+ -0.21 0.23 
 
-0.27 0.25 
 
-0.24 0.24 
 
-0.16 0.31 
 Constant -7.14 0.33 ** -6.61 0.32 ** -7.02 0.34 ** -6.85 0.29 ** 
Cohort (Ref. = 1970-1990) 
            1950-59 0.69 0.08 ** 0.51 0.10 ** 0.56 0.14 ** 0.36 0.11 ** 
1960-69 0.61 0.08 ** 0.62 0.09 ** 0.66 0.12 ** 0.27 0.10 ** 
Education (Ref.= Low educated with at 
least 2 years after leaving school) 
            Enrolled -0.23 0.12 † -0.26 0.14 † -0.44 0.18 * 0.01 0.15 
 Low0-2 0.20 0.32 
 
0.12 0.32 
 
0.02 0.34 
 
0.74 0.24 ** 
Medium0-2 -0.57 0.17 ** -0.54 0.18 ** -0.65 0.20 ** -0.21 0.16 
 Medium2+ 0.21 0.10 * 0.08 0.12 
 
-0.02 0.15 
 
0.38 0.14 ** 
High0-2 0.04 0.18 
 
-0.16 0.20 
 
-0.36 0.25 
 
0.37 0.21 † 
High2+ 0.38 0.14 ** 0.18 0.18 
 
0.00 0.23 
 
0.72 0.21 ** 
Unknown - - 
 
- - 
 
- - 
 
- - 
 Parents' education (Ref.=Both low) 
            Only father medium-high 0.26 0.10 ** -0.03 0.13 
 
-0.04 0.18 
 
0.31 0.16 † 
Only mother medium-high -0.08 0.09 
 
-0.08 0.11 
 
-0.08 0.13 
 
-0.02 0.11 
 Both medium-high -0.03 0.08 
 
-0.21 0.10 * -0.31 0.13 * 0.29 0.12 * 
Both unknown -0.86 0.52 † -1.04 0.81 
 
-0.89 0.94 
 
-0.16 0.42 
 Siblings (Ref.= No siblings) 
            1 0.10 0.09 
 
0.14 0.10 
 
0.19 0.13 
 
0.08 0.11 
 2 0.20 0.10 † 0.12 0.12 
 
0.20 0.16 
 
0.34 0.13 ** 
3+ 0.06 0.11 
 
0.10 0.13 
 
0.15 0.16 
 
0.14 0.14 
 Partner's education (Ref.=Not in union) 
            Low 
   
3.00 0.16 ** 3.81 0.29 ** 
   Medium 
   
2.95 0.11 ** 3.76 0.25 ** 
   High 
   
2.91 0.13 ** 3.68 0.27 ** 
   Unknown - - 
 
- - 
 
- - 
 
- - 
 Married (Ref. = Not married) 
   
0.38 0.09 ** 0.67 0.10 ** 
   Conception (Ref.=No conception) 
         
3.49 0.27 ** 
SigmaEps 
      
1.00 
  
1.00 
  SigmaDelta 
      
1.00 
  
1.00 
  Rho 
      
-0.53 0.28 † -0.53 0.28 † 
ln-L -6018.90 -5066.86 -11765.65 
†p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01 
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Table 1.A5 Regression coefficients France, stepwise modeling 
 
 
France 
 
M1 M2 M3 First birth M3 First union 
 
Coef. se 
 
Coef. se 
 
Coef. se 
 
Coef. se 
 Duration splines 
            15-19 0.76 0.10 ** 0.56 0.10 ** 0.51 0.10 ** 0.80 0.10 ** 
20-24 0.22 0.03 ** -0.05 0.03 † 0.00 0.03 
 
0.24 0.03 ** 
25-29 0.02 0.02 
 
0.04 0.02 † 0.12 0.02 ** -0.04 0.02 † 
30-34 -0.17 0.03 ** -0.15 0.03 ** -0.13 0.03 ** -0.06 0.03 
 35-39 -0.17 0.06 ** -0.17 0.06 ** -0.15 0.06 ** -0.17 0.06 * 
40+ -0.25 0.14 † -0.25 0.14 † -0.23 0.14 * 0.01 0.14 
 Constant -7.68 0.49 ** -7.33 0.47 ** -7.75 0.49 ** -6.78 0.29 ** 
Cohort (Ref. = 1970-1990) 
            1950-59 0.18 0.08 * 0.01 0.09 
 
0.10 0.11 
 
0.09 0.08 
 1960-69 0.15 0.07 * 0.15 0.07 * 0.18 0.09 * 0.05 0.08 
 Education (Ref.= Low educated with at 
least 2 years after leaving school) 
            Enrolled -0.67 0.12 ** -0.41 0.13 ** -0.49 0.16 ** -0.56 0.10 ** 
Low0-2 0.31 0.60 
 
0.61 0.63 
 
0.59 0.66 
 
-0.26 0.44 
 Medium0-2 -0.51 0.21 * -0.40 0.22 † -0.42 0.24 † 0.01 0.12 
 Medium2+ 0.27 0.08 ** 0.08 0.09 
 
0.14 0.11 
 
0.37 0.09 ** 
High0-2 -0.19 0.16 
 
-0.05 0.17 
 
-0.20 0.19 
 
-0.05 0.13 
 High2+ 0.26 0.10 ** 0.14 0.11 
 
0.05 0.13 
 
0.20 0.13 
 Unknown - - 
 
- - 
 
- - 
 
- - 
 Parents' education (Ref.=Both low) 
            Only father medium-high -0.09 0.09 
 
-0.01 0.09 
 
-0.01 0.11 
 
0.18 0.09 * 
Only mother medium-high -0.16 0.10 
 
-0.19 0.10 † -0.28 0.12 * 0.21 0.11 † 
Both medium-high -0.19 0.10 † -0.13 0.11 
 
-0.15 0.13 
 
-0.04 0.11 
 Both unknown -0.22 0.11 * 0.12 0.10 
 
0.12 0.15 
 
0.05 0.13 
 Siblings (Ref.= No siblings) 
            1 0.06 0.13 
 
-0.16 0.13 
 
-0.18 0.16 
 
0.06 0.15 
 2 0.06 0.13 
 
-0.06 0.13 
 
-0.05 0.16 
 
0.03 0.15 
 3+ 0.08 0.12 
 
-0.07 0.12 
 
-0.04 0.16 
 
-0.03 0.15 
 Partner's education (Ref.=Not in union) 
            Low 
   
2.96 0.14 ** 3.24 0.19 ** 
   Medium 
   
2.90 0.11 ** 3.02 0.16 ** 
   High 
   
2.72 0.12 ** 2.73 0.17 ** 
   Unknown 
   
1.14 0.13 ** 1.01 0.21 ** 
   Married (Ref. = Not married) 
   
0.98 0.07 ** 1.35 0.08 ** 
   Conception (Ref.=No conception) 
         
2.09 0.21 ** 
SigmaEps 
      
1.00 
  
1.00 
  SigmaDelta 
      
1.00 
  
1.00 
  Rho 
      
0.10 0.14 
 
0.10 0.14 
 ln-L -7684.29 -6510.45 -17285.24 
†p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01 
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Table 1.A6 Regression coefficients Hungary, stepwise modeling 
 
 
Hungary 
 
M1 M2 M3 First birth M3 First union 
 
Coef. se 
 
Coef. se 
 
Coef. se 
 
Coef. se 
 Duration splines 
            15-19 0.67 0.07 ** 0.50 0.06 ** 0.46 0.06 ** 0.68 0.04 ** 
20-24 0.24 0.02 ** 0.02 0.02 
 
0.00 0.02 
 
0.26 0.02 ** 
25-29 -0.05 0.02 * -0.07 0.02 ** -0.04 0.02 † -0.07 0.02 ** 
30-34 -0.16 0.03 ** -0.14 0.03 ** -0.10 0.03 ** -0.12 0.04 ** 
35-39 -0.23 0.06 ** -0.24 0.06 ** -0.24 0.06 ** -0.18 0.09 * 
40+ 0.05 0.10 
 
0.03 0.10 
 
0.05 0.10 
 
-0.11 0.20 
 Constant -7.61 0.35 ** -6.81 0.33 ** -7.13 0.34 ** -7.06 0.23 ** 
Cohort (Ref. = 1970-1990) 
            1950-59 0.34 0.07 ** -0.34 0.08 ** -0.41 0.10 ** 0.68 0.07 ** 
1960-69 0.60 0.07 ** 0.40 0.08 ** 0.38 0.09 ** 0.47 0.08 ** 
Education (Ref.= Low educated with at 
least 2 years after leaving school) 
            Enrolled -0.25 0.12 * -0.30 0.13 * -0.46 0.16 ** -0.25 0.12 * 
Low0-2 1.30 0.30 ** 0.91 0.30 ** 0.61 0.34 † 1.17 0.24 ** 
Medium0-2 0.06 0.15 
 
0.01 0.16 
 
-0.13 0.18 
 
-0.03 0.13 
 Medium2+ 0.19 0.08 * 0.04 0.10 
 
-0.08 0.12 
 
0.23 0.11 * 
High0-2 0.23 0.18 
 
0.15 0.19 
 
0.02 0.21 
 
0.32 0.18 † 
High2+ 0.47 0.12 ** 0.28 0.14 † 0.07 0.16 
 
0.70 0.15 ** 
Unknown - - 
 
- - 
 
- - 
 
- - 
 Parents' education (Ref.=Both low) 
            Only father medium-high -0.04 0.07 
 
-0.06 0.08 
 
-0.07 0.09 
 
0.09 0.08 
 Only mother medium-high -0.24 0.11 * 0.00 0.13 
 
-0.05 0.15 
 
-0.23 0.12 † 
Both medium-high -0.17 0.07 * -0.18 0.08 * -0.22 0.09 * 0.10 0.08 
 Both unknown -0.18 0.28 
 
-0.08 0.40 
 
-0.06 0.53 
 
-0.35 0.49 
 Siblings (Ref.= No siblings) 
            1 0.12 0.08 
 
-0.01 0.09 
 
0.07 0.11 
 
0.04 0.09 
 2 0.25 0.09 ** 0.04 0.10 
 
0.13 0.13 
 
0.26 0.10 ** 
3+ 0.27 0.10 ** 0.09 0.11 
 
0.16 0.13 
 
0.32 0.10 ** 
Partner's education (Ref.=Not in union) 
            Low 
   
2.40 0.15 ** 3.24 0.17 ** 
   Medium 
   
2.54 0.11 ** 3.29 0.14 ** 
   High 
   
2.47 0.13 ** 3.13 0.16 ** 
   Unknown 
   
0.77 0.12 ** 1.22 0.17 ** 
   Married (Ref. = Not married) 
   
0.62 0.09 ** 0.92 0.10 ** 
   Conception (Ref.=No conception) 
         
4.02 0.12 ** 
SigmaEps 
      
1.00 
  
1.00 
  SigmaDelta 
      
1.00 
  
1.00 
  Rho 
      
-0.66 0.09 ** -0.66 0.09 ** 
ln-L -9683.29 -8542.27 -21088.58 
†p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01 
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Table 1.A7 Regression coefficients Lithuania, stepwise modeling 
 
 
Lithuania 
 
M1 M2 M3 First birth M3 First union 
 
Coef. se 
 
Coef. se 
 
Coef. se 
 
Coef. se 
 Duration splines 
            15-19 0.83 0.06 ** 0.71 0.06 **  0.71 0.06 ** 0.77 0.05 ** 
20-24 0.26 0.02 ** 0.03 0.02      0.00 0.03     0.30 0.02 ** 
25-29 -0.11 0.02 ** -0.12 0.02 **  -0.14 0.02 ** -0.08 0.02 ** 
30-34 -0.25 0.04 ** -0.22 0.04 **  -0.22 0.04 ** -0.11 0.04 ** 
35-39 -0.08 0.07     -0.09 0.07      -0.07 0.07     -0.02 0.06     
40+ -0.59 0.24 *  -0.59 0.23 *   -0.59 0.22 ** -0.61 0.20 ** 
Constant -8.22 0.32 ** -7.74 0.32 **  -8.20 0.35 ** -7.52 0.27 ** 
Cohort (Ref. = 1970-1990) 
            1950-59 0.20 0.06 ** 0.10 0.08     0.17 0.09 †   -0.16 0.08 †   
1960-69 0.38 0.06 ** 0.30 0.07 **  0.34 0.09 ** -0.03 0.08     
Education (Ref.= Low educated with at 
least 2 years after leaving school) 
            Enrolled 0.19 0.11 †   0.14 0.13     0.03 0.15    0.17 0.13    
Low0-2 0.26 0.23     0.06 0.23      -0.04 0.23     0.44 0.19 *  
Medium0-2 0.37 0.12 ** 0.20 0.13      0.08 0.15     0.55 0.13 ** 
Medium2+ 0.42 0.09 ** 0.21 0.11 †    0.18 0.13     0.40 0.12 ** 
High0-2 0.34 0.15 *  0.08 0.16      0.01 0.19     0.68 0.15 ** 
High2+ 0.64 0.11 ** -0.01 0.15      -0.16 0.17     0.93 0.17 ** 
Unknown - - 
 
- - 
 
- - 
 
- - 
 Parents' education (Ref.=Both low) 
            Only father medium-high -0.22 0.10 *  -0.19 0.13     -0.21 0.13 †  -0.14 0.13    
Only mother medium-high -0.01 0.07     0.02 0.09      -0.03 0.11     0.11 0.10     
Both medium-high -0.01 0.07     -0.04 0.09      -0.09 0.10     0.09 0.09     
Both unknown -0.11 0.09     0.02 0.12      0.05 0.11     -0.12 0.11     
Siblings (Ref.= No siblings) 
            1 0.37 0.08 ** 0.26 0.09 **  0.34 0.11 ** 0.19 0.10 †   
2 0.55 0.08 ** 0.33 0.10 **  0.34 0.12 ** 0.35 0.11 ** 
3+ 0.49 0.09 ** 0.33 0.10 **  0.38 0.12 ** 0.21 0.11 †   
Partner's education (Ref.=Not in union) 
            Low 
   
2.34 0.20 **  3.40 0.21 ** 
   Medium 
   
2.16 0.12 **  3.16 0.13 ** 
   High 
   
2.12 0.14 **  3.07 0.15 ** 
   Unknown 
   
0.23 0.16      1.07 0.17 ** 
   Married (Ref. = Not married) 
   
0.90 0.11 **  1.17 0.12 ** 
   Conception (Ref.=No conception) 
         
3.83 0.09 ** 
SigmaEps 
      
1.00 
  
1.00 
  SigmaDelta 
      
1.00 
  
1.00 
  Rho 
      
-0.89 0.03 ** -0.89 0.03 ** 
ln-L -9960.81 -8549.17 -19686.95 
†p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01 
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Table 1.A8 Regression coefficients Norway, stepwise modeling 
 
 
Norway 
 
M1 M2 M3 First birth M3 First union 
 
Coef. se 
 
Coef. se 
 
Coef. se 
 
Coef. se 
 Duration splines 
            15-19 0.85 0.06 ** 0.70 0.06 ** 0.68 0.06 ** 0.83 0.03 ** 
20-24 0.25 0.02 ** 0.00 0.02 
 
0.05 0.02 * 0.29 0.01 ** 
25-29 0.04 0.02 * -0.01 0.02 
 
0.09 0.02 ** -0.02 0.02 
 30-34 -0.08 0.02 ** -0.06 0.02 ** -0.01 0.02 
 
-0.02 0.03 
 35-39 -0.26 0.05 ** -0.27 0.05 ** -0.24 0.05 ** -0.20 0.05 ** 
40+ -0.19 0.11 † -0.21 0.11 * -0.21 0.11 † -0.01 0.09 
 Constant -8.27 0.31 ** -7.63 0.29 ** -8.16 0.31 ** -7.30 0.21 ** 
Cohort (Ref. = 1970-1990) 
            1950-59 0.56 0.05 ** 0.42 0.06 ** 0.66 0.08 ** 0.10 0.06 
 1960-69 0.40 0.05 ** 0.32 0.05 ** 0.40 0.06 ** 0.15 0.06 * 
Education (Ref.= Low educated with at 
least 2 years after leaving school) 
            Enrolled -0.29 0.07 ** -0.32 0.08 ** -0.44 0.09 ** -0.25 0.08 ** 
Low0-2 0.55 0.28 † 0.27 0.27 
 
0.15 0.30 
 
0.51 0.19 ** 
Medium0-2 0.04 0.10 
 
-0.02 0.10 
 
-0.09 0.12 
 
-0.08 0.10 
 Medium2+ 0.07 0.07 
 
0.01 0.08 
 
-0.07 0.09 
 
0.02 0.09 
 High0-2 -0.09 0.11 
 
-0.17 0.11 
 
-0.32 0.12 ** 0.10 0.12 
 High2+ 0.22 0.08 ** 0.11 0.09 
 
-0.01 0.11 
 
0.05 0.12 
 Unknown -0.21 0.26 
 
0.05 0.27 
 
-0.23 0.34 
 
0.13 0.24 
 Parents' education (Ref.=Both low) 
            Only father medium-high 0.06 0.06 
 
-0.03 0.07 
 
-0.08 0.08 
 
0.10 0.08 
 Only mother medium-high 0.03 0.07 
 
-0.04 0.07 
 
-0.06 0.09 
 
0.05 0.08 
 Both medium-high -0.07 0.06 
 
-0.10 0.07 
 
-0.21 0.08 * -0.08 0.08 
 Both unknown -0.17 0.09 † -0.24 0.13 † -0.40 0.14 ** -0.29 0.14 * 
Siblings (Ref.= No siblings) 
            1 0.05 0.10 
 
-0.07 0.10 
 
-0.02 0.14 
 
0.16 0.12 
 2 0.14 0.10 
 
-0.06 0.10 
 
0.05 0.14 
 
0.28 0.12 * 
3+ 0.23 0.10 * 0.08 0.10 
 
0.19 0.14 
 
0.24 0.12 * 
Partner's education (Ref.=Not in union) 
            Low 
   
2.40 0.11 ** 2.66 0.14 ** 
   Medium 
   
2.49 0.08 ** 2.70 0.11 ** 
   High 
   
2.42 0.07 ** 2.45 0.11 ** 
   Unknown 
   
1.76 0.07 ** 1.73 0.12 ** 
   Married (Ref. = Not married) 
   
0.70 0.05 ** 1.13 0.06 ** 
   Conception (Ref.=No conception) 
         
1.97 0.14 ** 
SigmaEps 
      
1.00 
  
1.00 
  SigmaDelta 
      
1.00 
  
1.00 
  Rho 
      
0.17 0.11 
 
0.17 0.11 
 ln-L -14563.96 -12961.55 -31692.67 
†p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01 
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Table 1.A9 Regression coefficients Poland, stepwise modeling 
 
 
Poland 
 
M1 M2 M3 First birth M3 First union 
 
Coef. se 
 
Coef. se 
 
Coef. se 
 
Coef. se 
 Duration splines 
            15-19 0.80 0.05 ** 0.78 0.05 **  0.75 0.05 ** 0.83 0.05 ** 
20-24 0.25 0.01 ** 0.03 0.02 *   0.07 0.02 ** 0.33 0.01 ** 
25-29 -0.10 0.01 ** -0.16 0.01 **  -0.13 0.02 ** -0.07 0.02 ** 
30-34 -0.15 0.02 ** -0.15 0.02 **  -0.13 0.02 ** -0.17 0.03 ** 
35-39 -0.21 0.05 ** -0.20 0.05 **  -0.18 0.05 ** -0.16 0.05 ** 
40+ -0.42 0.15 ** -0.42 0.15 **  -0.42 0.14 ** -0.15 0.10     
Constant -7.90 0.25 ** -7.65 0.26 **  -8.08 0.27 ** -8.45 0.25 ** 
Cohort (Ref. = 1970-1990) 
            1950-59 0.36 0.04 ** 0.18 0.06 **  0.25 0.07 ** 0.17 0.06 ** 
1960-69 0.30 0.05 ** 0.35 0.06 **  0.44 0.06 ** -0.06 0.06     
Education (Ref.= Low educated with at 
least 2 years after leaving school) 
            Enrolled -0.06 0.08    -0.23 0.09 **  -0.30 0.10 ** 0.14 0.10    
Low0-2 -0.57 0.59     -0.64 0.59      -0.85 0.64     0.68 0.35 †   
Medium0-2 0.26 0.10 ** 0.05 0.10      0.03 0.11     0.38 0.10 ** 
Medium2+ 0.40 0.06 ** 0.14 0.08 †    0.15 0.09     0.45 0.09 ** 
High0-2 0.14 0.11     -0.29 0.13 *   -0.48 0.14 ** 0.80 0.12 ** 
High2+ 0.81 0.09 ** 0.24 0.11 *   0.09 0.13     1.02 0.14 ** 
Unknown -0.01 0.31     -0.24 0.30      -0.43 0.36     0.26 0.39     
Parents' education (Ref.=Both low) 
            Only father medium-high 0.06 0.05    -0.09 0.07     -0.07 0.08    0.13 0.07 †   
Only mother medium-high -0.03 0.07     -0.10 0.08      -0.10 0.09     0.06 0.09     
Both medium-high 0.02 0.05     -0.14 0.06 *   -0.21 0.07 ** 0.24 0.06 ** 
Both unknown 0.01 0.09     -0.06 0.11      -0.15 0.15     0.22 0.12 †   
Siblings (Ref.= No siblings) 
            1 0.13 0.07 †   0.16 0.09 †    0.15 0.10    0.05 0.10    
2 0.25 0.07 ** 0.29 0.09 **  0.29 0.10 ** 0.16 0.10     
3+ 0.30 0.07 ** 0.36 0.09 **  0.43 0.10 ** 0.09 0.10     
Partner's education (Ref.=Not in union) 
            Low 
   
1.88 0.14 **  2.77 0.16 ** 
   Medium 
   
1.92 0.08 **  2.72 0.10 ** 
   High 
   
1.94 0.09 **  2.53 0.11 ** 
   Unknown 
   
1.40 0.58 *   2.20 0.83 ** 
   Married (Ref. = Not married) 
   
0.77 0.08 **  1.11 0.08 ** 
   Conception (Ref.=No conception) 
         
3.80 0.07 ** 
SigmaEps 
      
1.00 
  
1.00 
  SigmaDelta 
      
1.00 
  
1.00 
  Rho 
      
-0.59 0.05 ** -0.59 0.05 ** 
ln-L -20239.41 -17850.69 -37501.32 
†p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01 
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Table 1.A10 Regression coefficients Romania, stepwise modeling 
 
 
Romania 
 
M1 M2 M3 First birth M3 First union 
 
Coef. se 
 
Coef. se 
 
Coef. se 
 
Coef. se 
 Duration splines 
            15-19 0.66 0.06 ** 0.52 0.06 ** 0.51 0.06 ** 0.66 0.05 ** 
20-24 0.33 0.02 ** 0.03 0.02     0.03 0.02     0.37 0.02 ** 
25-29 -0.14 0.02 ** -0.19 0.02 ** -0.19 0.02 ** -0.05 0.02 *  
30-34 -0.11 0.03 ** -0.15 0.03 ** -0.14 0.03 ** -0.07 0.03 *  
35-39 -0.47 0.08 ** -0.46 0.08 ** -0.45 0.08 ** -0.22 0.07 ** 
40+ 0.00 0.16     -0.02 0.16     -0.02 0.16     -0.19 0.15     
Constant -7.20 0.30 ** -7.19 0.30 ** -7.74 0.31 ** -7.00 0.25 ** 
Cohort (Ref. = 1970-1990) 
            1950-59 0.24 0.06 ** 0.12 0.07 †   0.14 0.08 †   0.23 0.07 ** 
1960-69 0.36 0.06 ** 0.30 0.07 ** 0.35 0.08 ** 0.34 0.07 ** 
Education (Ref.= Low educated with at 
least 2 years after leaving school) 
            Enrolled -0.42 0.09 ** -0.12 0.11    -0.19 0.12    -0.53 0.10 ** 
Low0-2 -0.29 0.46     -0.22 0.48     -0.24 0.49     0.35 0.29     
Medium0-2 -0.04 0.12     0.07 0.12     0.02 0.13     -0.15 0.11     
Medium2+ 0.18 0.06 ** 0.01 0.08     -0.03 0.09     0.14 0.08 †   
High0-2 0.08 0.14     0.12 0.16     -0.04 0.18     0.38 0.15 ** 
High2+ 0.46 0.10 ** 0.54 0.14 ** 0.36 0.15 *  0.29 0.15 †   
Unknown - - 
 
- - 
 
- - 
 
- - 
 Parents' education (Ref.=Both low) 
            Only father medium-high -0.09 0.06    -0.01 0.08    -0.04 0.08    -0.05 0.08    
Only mother medium-high -0.29 0.13 *  -0.28 0.18     -0.31 0.18 †   -0.16 0.15     
Both medium-high -0.20 0.07 ** -0.29 0.09 ** -0.35 0.10 ** 0.05 0.09     
Both unknown 0.10 0.19     0.10 0.22     0.16 0.28     0.16 0.22     
Siblings (Ref.= No siblings) 
            1 0.07 0.07    0.12 0.09    0.16 0.10    -0.01 0.09    
2 0.21 0.07 ** 0.13 0.09     0.09 0.11     0.21 0.10 *  
3+ 0.32 0.07 ** 0.28 0.09 ** 0.28 0.10 ** 0.28 0.09 ** 
Partner's education (Ref.=Not in union) 
            Low 
   
3.59 0.11 ** 4.55 0.12 ** 
   Medium 
   
3.58 0.11 ** 4.47 0.12 ** 
   High 
   
3.14 0.15 ** 4.00 0.16 ** 
   Unknown 
   
2.35 0.13 ** 3.15 0.15 ** 
   Married (Ref. = Not married) 
   
0.11 0.09     0.33 0.09 ** 
   Conception (Ref.=No conception) 
         
3.73 0.11 ** 
SigmaEps 
      
1.00 
  
1.00 
  SigmaDelta 
      
1.00 
  
1.00 
  Rho 
      
-0.69 0.05 ** -0.69 0.05 ** 
ln-L -12898.79 -10527.22 -24242.41 
†p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01 
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Appendix 1.B 
In appendix 1.B we report the sensitivity of the correlation term in two cases: (1) fixed 
variance; (2) free variance estimated by the model. 
Table 1.B1 Sensitivity of correlation terms to the value of the variance, 10 countries 
 
 
Austria Belgium Bulgaria Estonia France 
 
Fixed Free Fixed Free Fixed Free Fixed Free Fixed Free 
Variance 
First birth 
(SigmaEps) 1 1.25** 1 1.02** 1 1.26** 1 1.12** 1 0.56** 
Variance 
First union 
(SigmaDelta) 1 1.34** 1 1.65** 1 2.23** 1 1.87** 1 1.86** 
Correlation 
(Rho) -0.22 0.06 0.35* 0.33** -0.56** -0.42** -0.53† 0.025 0.1 -0.27* 
 
Hungary Lithuania Norway Poland Romania 
 
Fixed Free Fixed Free Fixed Free Fixed Free Fixed Free 
Variance 
First birth 
(SigmaEps) 1 1.11** 1 1.03** 1 1.01** 1 1.11** 1 1.04** 
Variance 
First union 
(SigmaDelta) 1 1.09** 1 1.48** 1 1.97** 1 1.30** 1 1.91** 
Correlation 
(Rho) -0.66** -0.56** -0.89** -0.87** 0.17 0.32** -0.59** -0.48** -0.70** -0.58** 
†p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01 
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Chapter 2. Gender differences in the effect of education 
on fertility 
 
 
Abstract 
Micro-economic theories predict differential connections between education and fertility for 
men and women. In societies where women are expected to take the larger share of domestic 
work, the educational gradient in fertility is assumed to be negative for women and positive 
for men. Recent studies on the issue have highlighted some reversals that have occurred 
between women’s education and fertility, while little is known about patterns for men. We 
used data from the Generation and Gender surveys (1960-1987 cohorts) of Austria, Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Lithuania, Poland and Romania to analyze the gender 
differences in the effect of education on fertility. We particularly focused on the effect of the 
earning potential and gender composition of the study discipline as well as the level of 
educational attainment. We used European Labor Force Survey data to estimate the earning 
potential of study disciplines and Eurostat data to calculated the share of women within each 
field of study. Next, we modeled jointly the transition to first, second and third births for 
women and men by means of event history analysis. Our results show that the effect of 
educational attainment differs between genders mainly with regard to the transition to first 
birth and that an important role is played by the selection into union. The earning potential by 
field of study, instead, affects similarly all parities for men and women, i.e. a higher earning 
potential is associated with lower birth rates. Effects on births beyond the first child appear to 
be more similar between genders than expected. 
 
Keywords: education, gender differences, fertility, field of study, joint modeling 
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Introduction  
In many Western as well as non-Western countries, the number of highly educated women 
reaching the reproductive ages has been exceeding the number of highly educated men in 
recent decades (Vincent-Lancrin 2008). Given the many linkages between education and 
family behavior, this may have important consequences for fertility (Van Bavel 2012). A 
general and consistent finding relates to the postponement of parenthood and low total 
fertility rates due to the expansion of higher education especially among women  (Sobotka 
2004; Ní Bhrolcháin and Beaujouan 2012; Basten, Sobotka and Zeman. 2014). 
Education is an important determinant of fertility as an indicator of socioeconomic 
resources. Micro-economists distinguish two types of mechanisms which explain the 
relationship between education and fertility: the income effect and the price effect (Becker 
1991; Cigno 1991). The income effect accounts for the fact that the more educated people 
tend to earn a higher income and they are therefore more likely to afford the monetary costs 
of having (additional) children (positive effect). The price effect acts through opportunity 
costs: highly educated people have higher opportunity costs because they lose more once they 
devote extra time to non-paid activities after becoming a parent (negative effect). A 
specialization model within the household based on a gender-division of labor would predict 
opposite associations between education and fertility for men and women. The price effect 
characterizes the relationship between education and fertility for women, and the income 
effect for men (Becker 1991). 
Recently, two theoretical approaches in family demography, i.e. the multiple equilibria 
framework and the Gender Revolution Theory, have emphasized the role of gender 
egalitarianism both in society at large and within households as engine for fertility. More 
specifically, both frameworks have highlighted that the negative relationship between 
education and women’s fertility is weakening and in some contexts it is even turning positive 
(cf. Esping-Andersen and Billari 2015; Goldscheider et al. 2015). A reason for such change in 
the relationship between education and fertility may be that the earning potential of highly 
educated women may have become more important in their fertility decisions, such that a 
positive income effect may be showing up for them, while at the same time, as men engage 
more in raising children, the opportunity costs of parenthood may be becoming a more 
important factor for men (Huinink and Kohli 2014).  
In a way, the balance of positive income effects and negative price effects of human 
capital may be moving in a zero sum game dynamic. By this, we mean that at one point in 
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time, a negative relationship between education and fertility for women may be 
counterbalanced by a positive relationship for men, while at other times, when the 
relationship turns more positive for women, then it may become more negative for men. On 
one hand, with the diffusion of the dual-earner family, which is substituting the male-
breadwinner family model, women are expected to importantly contribute to the household 
income through activity in the paid labor market. This is why a positive income effect of 
education on fertility may show up. On the other hand, men are increasingly involved in the 
private sphere (household chores, childcare, etc.), this could lead to a weakening of the 
positive effect of men’s education on fertility, which is usually predicted by micro-economic 
theories of the family. Still, evidence which could help to understand the mechanisms that 
link gender-dynamics and fertility behaviors is lacking since most work on education and 
fertility concerns women. If men are included at all, it is typically in the context of their 
couple relationship (Trimarchi and Van Bavel 2015). 
As a growing and more diverse share of the female as well as the male population attains 
advanced levels of education, family and fertility behavior within the group of highly 
educated people may have become more heterogeneous. This is one reason why a growing 
body of the literature is focusing on the role of field of study on fertility (e.g., Cooney and 
Uhlberg 1989; Hoem et al. 2006a, 2006b; Van Bavel 2010). Moreover, there are at least two 
additional reasons why it is important to focus on the field of study when analyzing gender 
differences in fertility. First, the field of study is a good proxy for the economic potential of 
individuals’ over their life course, since it is related to the future occupation, labor market 
activity and income in general. By focusing on the field of study we avoid endogeneity 
problems that would arise if current income is included in the equation, since childbearing 
and childbearing intentions are known to affect income. Endogeneity issues are especially 
problematic when detailed time-varying information on employment status, occupation, 
income are not available (Xie et al. 2003). The second reason to focus on the field of study is 
that while female education expanded tremendously over time, gender segregation with 
regard to the field of study and ensuing occupation is strong and steady over time (Charles 
and Bradley 2009). This implies that education may have a different impact on fertility for 
men and women, since the choice of the field of study also embeds individuals’ family 
preferences, gender stereotypical behavior, opportunities and constraints in reconciling family 
and work (Van Bavel 2010; Ohlsson-Wijk 2015a). 
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Overall, we aim to make a twofold substantive contribution to the literature. First, since 
the bulk of earlier work is on women’s fertility, we aim to expand our knowledge on the 
relationship between men’s education and fertility. Second, we broaden our understanding of 
the effect of the field of study on higher order births both for women and men by estimating 
the earning potential of different fields of study and see how this, along with the gender 
composition of study disciplines, is associated with fertility. 
From a methodological point of view, it is worth noting that the observed positive 
relationship between women’s education and fertility is often specifically attributed to the 
effect on second births. However, previous studies have shown that it could be an artifact of 
the modeling approach, since a positive effect of the educational level on second and third 
births may be driven by the selection into parenthood (Kravdal 2001; 2007; Kreyenfeld 2002; 
Koytcheva 2006; Tesching 2012). Some highly educated women, for unobserved reasons, 
may be more likely to have a child, or have it at an earlier age, compared to other highly 
educated peers. Such selection makes them also more likely to have a second child. As a 
result, the positive effect of educational level on the transition to second births may be related 
to joint unobserved factors across parities that affect the selection into parenthood of the 
individuals. The positive association between education and fertility would then apply only to 
a selective subgroup. 
Since we also study higher order births, we control for the selectivity into parenthood by 
modeling first, second and third birth jointly. We follow the approach proposed by Kravdal 
(2001), nesting birth episodes within individuals. In this way, we can explore the effect of 
education on fertility after accounting for selection. This will enable us to assess whether the 
selection into parenthood affect also the relationship between men’s education and higher 
order births. 
We use data from the Generation and Gender surveys (1960-1987 cohorts) of Austria, 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Lithuania, Poland and Romania. These are the 
countries that collected information on the field of study that we need for this study. To have 
a direct measure of the earning potential by field of study and country, we apply OLS 
regression to European Labor Force Survey to predict potential income level at age 50-54. To 
obtain the share of women within a field by country and across level of educational 
attainment, we further used the joint UNESCO/OECD/Eurostat database on education, which 
is an administrative data collection that is administered jointly by the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization - Institute for Statistics (UNESCO-UIS), 
66 
 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the Statistical 
Office of the European Union (EUROSTAT). We estimate all models for women and men 
separately. Our results show that the effect of educational attainment differs between genders 
mainly with regard to the transition to first birth: a positive effect of attainment level 
primarily shows up for men while opportunity costs seem to dominate for women. In both 
cases, things crucially depend on union formation. The earning potential by field of study, 
instead, affects similarly all parities for men and women, i.e. a higher earning potential is 
associated with lower birth rates. Effects on births beyond the first child appear to be more 
similar between genders than expected. 
Education and fertility of women and men: similarities and 
differences 
Education affects fertility via several mechanisms, because fertility implies not only the birth 
of children but also the time and money invested to care for and raise them (Hobcraft and 
Kiernan 1995). As a result, scholars usually address the impact of education on fertility as 
“multifaceted,” more specifically considering the following dimensions: enrollment, level, 
and field of study (Kravdal and Rindfuss 2008; Lappegård and Rønsen 2005). In this paper, 
we will focus on two dimensions: the level of education and the field of study. 
Level of education 
The prominent theory about the effect of educational level on fertility and how it differs by 
gender stems from micro-economic approaches of the family (Cigno and Ermisch 1989; 
Becker 1991; Gustafsson 2001). Micro-economic theories predict opposite associations for 
men and women between education and fertility. Following the male-breadwinner model, the 
price effect, i.e., higher opportunity costs, is more characteristic for the relationship between 
education and fertility among women, since childbearing leads to a reduction of time spent in 
the paid labor market, particularly for women. The income effect, i.e., higher income to afford 
the monetary costs of having children, predominates among men, since they are supposed to 
be the main breadwinners. A family model that is built on specialization and gender-division 
of labor presupposes compensation in housework and paid work between partners; this is why 
opposite signs of the effect of education on fertility for men and women are expected. 
Scholars have also highlighted mechanisms that may not necessarily be specific for men 
or women. First of all, highly educated people may have more opportunities (e.g., more 
flexible jobs, bigger social-networks, capability to outsource childcare and housework) and 
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skills to better face higher opportunity costs (Kravdal 2007; Raz-Yurovich 2014). Moreover, a 
high level of education is also an important determinant of partnership rates. Highly educated 
men, for instance, are more attractive on the mating market and they tend to have higher 
union formation rates (Trimarchi and Van Bavel 2015). With the dual-earner model 
established, highly educated women also become more attractive on the mating market 
(Oppenheimer 1994; De Hauw et al. 2015; Goldscheider et al. 2015).  
Several empirical findings have corroborated the positive association between men’s 
fertility (in terms of total fertility rate and first, second, or third birth timing) and level of 
education in various contexts (Kravdal and Rindfuss 2008; Lappegård and Rønsen 2013; 
Niesen et al. 2014; Tragaki and Bagavos 2014; Trimarchi and Van Bavel 2015). For first birth 
timing, however, a negative effect of men’s education has also been found (Corijn and 
Klijzing 2001; Blossfeld et al. 2005; Martín-García 2009). For women, the effect of 
educational level is negative, particularly with regard to the first birth transition (Wood et al. 
2014). Recently, scholars have emphasized the fact that, for the most recent cohorts, the 
educational gradient of first birth is weakening in some countries (Wood et al. 2014; 
Goldscheider et al. 2015). With regard to women’s higher order births, the effect of education 
is more puzzling. A positive effect of educational level on second and third births may be 
driven by selection into the transition to first birth (Kravdal 2001, 2007; Kreyenfeld 2002; 
Koytcheva 2006; Tesching 2012). Furthermore, the positive assortative mating between 
highly educated men and women, the so-called “partner effect,” has been also considered 
another reason for the observed positive effect of education on women’s second births 
(Kreyenfeld 2002; Kreyenfeld and Konietzka 2008; Klesment et al. 2014), even if it has not 
always been corroborated (cf. Gerster et al. 2007; Bartus et al. 2013;). In general, with regard 
to the educational gradient in higher order births, a lot of variation across contexts has been 
found, posing the question of whether macro-level factors, such as family-friendly policies, 
diffusion of gender-egalitarian norms, and availability of childcare, may somehow be behind 
the positive effect of the educational level on second births (cf. Van Bavel and Rozanska-
Putek 2010; Klesment et al. 2014; Wood et al. 2014). 
Still, despite the overwhelming research on the relationship between educational and 
fertility, it is not possible to draw a general conclusion on gender differences in the effect of 
educational level on fertility since comparative studies between women and men are lacking. 
These kinds of studies are usually confined to the comparison of transitions into adulthood 
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(Corijn and Klijzing 2001; Winkler-Dworak and Toulemon 2007), rather than fertility 
histories (Kravdal and Rindfuss 2008). 
Field of study 
A growing strand of research focuses on the role of the field of study to understand the 
mechanisms that link education and fertility (Cooney and Uhlenberg 1989; Lappegård and 
Rønsen 2005; Hoem et al 2006a; 2006b; Martín-García 2009; Van Bavel 2010; Lappegård et 
al. 2011; Tesching 2012; Begall and Mills 2013; Oppermann 2014). The educational field 
may represent a more distinctive trait of an individual’s educational trajectory, especially 
since the expansion of higher education (Cooney and Uhlenberg 1989).  
The field of study has been considered in the literature for its close affinity to the 
individual’s future occupation (Ohlsson-Wijk 2015a). From an economic perspective, 
scholars have pinpointed several dimensions that the choice of a discipline may affect: (1) the 
income potential; (2) the job sector – private versus public; (3) the school-to-work transition, 
according to the individual’s aspirations; and (4) protection against skill depreciation (cf. 
Lappegård and Rønsen 2005; Hoem et al. 2006a; Van Bavel 2010; Tesching 2012). In order 
to examine how characteristics of the field of study may affect the transition into motherhood 
for different contexts, Van Bavel (2010) attempted to directly measure the earning profile. In 
line with micro-economic theories, the author found that women that graduated in disciplines 
with higher earning profiles tended to have higher likelihoods of postponing motherhood. 
The gender composition of the field of study is another dimension to be considered, since 
it may also affect fertility via the socialization process during the learning and (future) 
working environment. Women and men may socialize about (gender stereotypical) parenting 
roles with people of one’s own sex: “when there are many individuals of one’s own sex there 
may be larger possibilities of doing gender” (Ohlsson-Wijk 2015b:12). Van Bavel (2010) 
showed that women who graduated in a study discipline that is characterized by strong 
(gender)stereotypical family attitudes are less likely to postpone motherhood. Several studies 
have corroborated the positive association between the choice of female-dominated fields and 
first birth rates for women (Lappegård and Rønsen 2005; Martín-García and Baizan 2006; 
Van Bavel 2010; Tesching 2012; Begall and Mill 2013; Michelmore and Musick 2013), 
whereas mixed results have been found for higher order births and completed fertility (Hoem 
et al. 2006a; 2006b; Tesching 2012).  
In general, much less is known about the effect of a man’s field of study on his fertility. 
Data from Spain and Norway reinforce economic arguments that predict a positive relation 
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between high earning potential and fertility for men, if we assume that male-dominated fields 
have higher earning potentials than female-dominated fields (Martín-García 2009; Lappegård 
et al. 2011). These studies, however, did not directly account for the earning potential of study 
disciplines, and thus the results may be also in line with the argument that socialization 
processes among people of one’s own sex positively affect fertility. 
Research hypotheses  
Overall, it is not clear yet to what extent women and men face different opportunities and/or 
constraints to become parents given their level of education and field of study. We will test 
three main hypotheses that concern the effect of the level of education, the effect of earning 
potential, and the gender composition of a study discipline. 
Hypothesis 1a stems from micro-economic arguments of the differential relationship 
between education and fertility by sex. Once individuals have completed their education, we 
expect a positive gradient in attainment levels with regard to the transition into fatherhood, 
whereas we expect a negative educational gradient for the transition into motherhood. 
Hypothesis 1b concerns higher order births. Since recent findings showed that women’s 
educational levels have a positive effect on second births, even after accounting for 
partnership status, we expect a positive effect of education on higher order births for both 
women and men. 
Hypothesis 2 concerns the effect of field of study. We assume that individuals that 
graduated in disciplines with high income potentials may be in a position to sustain the 
economic burden of children. On the other hand, a higher earning potential is often translated 
into higher opportunity costs by investing time in caring and rearing the children. As a result, 
we expect a positive effect of earning potential for men (income effect) and a negative effect 
of higher earning potential for women (opportunity costs) with regard to all births. 
Hypothesis 3 is about the role of the gender composition of the field of study and ensuing 
socialization processes. This hypothesis is based on the assumption that individuals who 
graduated in disciplines with a higher share of one’s own sex may (self) reinforce gender 
stereotypical behaviors for what is normatively expected from a woman and a man within a 
couple. As a result, we may expect that a woman graduated in a typical female-dominated 
field would have a higher fertility rate than a woman that graduated in a male-dominated 
field. Similarly, we expect that a man that graduated in stereotypical masculine disciplines 
will have higher fertility than a man that graduated in female-dominated fields. 
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Data and methods 
Sample selection and dependent variables 
To test our hypotheses, we applied event history analyses for the transition to first, second, 
and third births to the Generation and Gender Surveys (GGS) of eight European countries that 
collected information on the field of study. These countries are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
the Czech Republic, France, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania. We focused on respondents 
born between 1960 and 1987 because the Austrian GGS does not include individuals born in 
the 1950s; therefore, we distinguished three birth cohorts in our models: 1960-1969, 1970-
1979, and 1980-1987. From an initial sample of 44690 respondents, we dropped individuals 
with missing information on the level of education (n=125).  
In this study, we examine the effect of educational level and educational field, rather than 
enrollment in education. As a consequence, our observation period starts at time of 
completion of the highest level of education attained, whatever the level of education. With 
regard to first birth, the process time is time spent since graduation until the conception of the 
first child (if that occurred), censoring (age 45), or interview, whichever came first. We used 
information about the month and year of births; if the month was missing, we randomly 
imputed it. The end of enrollment was based on the time of graduation as reported by the 
respondent (93.63%). If the information on graduation was missing, it was based on the 
standard age at graduation for the specific level of education and country (6.37% of the 
cases). For respondents attaining a tertiary level of education, where the study duration was 
more variable, this percentage was only 0.49%. We checked the robustness of our models to 
these assumptions by dropping the 6.37% with missing information on the actual age at 
graduation; the results were not affected.  
We dropped cases for which the age at graduation was negative or low, relative to the 
level of education attained (n=384)3. Next, we dropped respondents with missing information 
on the time to first birth (n=46) or if the conception of the child occurred before obtaining the 
degree (n=4749); the proportion of cases deleted for the latter reason varied by country. In the 
majority of countries, it was below 8%, with the exceptions of Bulgaria below 12%, Poland at 
15%, and Lithuania at 22%. As a robustness check, we re-ran our models, dropping one 
country at a time. While the uncertainties of the estimates increased because of the smaller 
                                                 
3 We dropped cases if: the age at graduation reported was negative (n=32); if the individual reported an upper 
secondary level before age 14 (n=122); and if the individual reported a tertiary level of education before age 20 
(n=230). 
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sample size, the main conclusions remained the same. Finally, 32 respondents were dropped 
by default because they reported an age at completion of education higher than 45, which was 
our censoring time4. After all the selections mentioned, the sample totaled 39380 respondents, 
18746 males and 20634 females. 
With regard to higher order births, the time process is given by the time spent from the 
previous birth until the subsequent conception and censoring occurred after 15 years (or 
interview time). The respondents at risk of having a second child were those who had a first 
child, then we dropped the respondents who did not experience a first child during our 
observational period (n=16936). Next, we dropped respondents with an invalid time to event 
for survival analysis (n=121). As a result, for the second birth analysis, the sample totaled of 
32658 individuals, 9186 males and 13137 females. 
The procedure for the third birth is the same as the one followed for the second birth. The 
respondents at risk were those who had a second child during the observational period. 
Overall, 8835 cases were deleted because they did not experience a second birth, and 63 cases 
were dropped because of a negative time to event. The total sample for the third birth analysis 
amounted to 13546 respondents, 5433 males and 8113 females. 
Independent variables 
The main independent variables are the level of education, the field of study, and its 
characteristics, i.e., the earning potential and the share of women within the field. We grouped 
respondents into three levels of education (low, medium, high), collapsing categories from the 
International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED 1997). The first group includes 
those who completed primary plus lower secondary school (at least 8 years of schooling, 
ISCED 0, 1, and 2). The medium category consists of respondents who completed the upper-
secondary and a post-secondary level (ISCED 3 and 4). Finally, highly educated respondents 
got a bachelor/master/PhD degree (ISCED 5 and 6). 
The field of study variable in GGS was collected as an open question and refers to the 
main discipline of the highest level of education attained. To harmonize the categories across 
countries and across surveys, since we needed to have a compatible variable with the 
European Labor Force Surveys (EU-LFS) too, we followed the indications of 
UNESCO/ISCED-F[2013]5 for the field of study. The variable consists of eight categories of 
disciplines: general/unspecified field (1); humanities and arts (2); social sciences/business/law 
                                                 
4 Results were not affected if we increased the age at censoring.   
5http://www.uis.unesco.org/Education/Pages/international-standard-classification-of-education.aspx accessed the 
14th  September 2015.  
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(3); science and technology (4); agriculture (5); education (6); health and welfare (7); and 
services (8). To keep the EU-LFS and GGS compatible, these categories are relative to 
respondents with a medium or high level of education only; for the low educated group 
(ISCED <= 2), the field of study was considered not applicable. A description of each 
category is available in Table 2.A1 of the Appendix 2.A. 
For each field, we also measured the earning potential, i.e., a latent, unobservable 
capacity to earn an income (Xie et al. 2003:356). We used the 2009-2013 EU-LFS of the eight 
countries in our sample, and by means of OLS regression models we estimated the earning 
potential (measured in income deciles) for 144 groups defined by the country, field of study 
(or low education if field is not applicable), and sex. The detailed procedure and the results of 
OLS regressions are presented in Appendix 2.A. Next, we predicted the earning potential for 
people aged 50-54 and we linked those values to the GGS respondents by country, field of 
study (education if field not applicable), and sex. In our models for birth rates, we included 
the earning potential as a deviation from the mean of the country, to indicate variations in 
earning potential within the country and across fields of study. 
We also included the share of graduated women as a characteristic of the field of study. 
Eurostat has a time series from 1998 until 2012 for the absolute number of graduates (both 
sexes) in each field of study, excluding the general/unspecified field6 . We extracted the 
number of females and the total number of graduates for each field and country from the 
Eurostat database, pooling data from level 3 to 6 of the ISCED 1997 classification, since we 
only had information about the field of study from the upper-secondary to the tertiary level. 
The share of women within the field was an average across the years (see Figure 2.1). To 
classify each field according to the share of women, we partly followed the categorization 
proposed by Oppermann (2014), who defined male-dominated fields as those with a share of 
women lower than 40% and female-dominated fields as those where the share was higher than 
85%. We used a symmetrical categorization, which allows more balanced categories: (1) 
male-dominated field of study (proportion of women lower than 40%); (2) balanced field of 
study (proportion of women between 40-60%); and (3) female-dominated (proportion of 
women higher than 60%). A separate category represents the low educated group. 
The effect of education on childbearing is related to the effect of education on union 
formation and partner’s characteristics. This is why we also ran models that account for a 
                                                 
6 Since Eurostat does not provide information on the general/unspecified field of study, we calculated the 
proportion of women in this category using the GGS data, considering all men and women born from 1960-1987 
with at least an upper secondary degree. 
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time-varying variable that indicated whether the respondent was in a union or not. If the 
respondent was in a union, we distinguished between those partnered with a low, medium, or 
highly educated partner. We added a category, “not available,” to account for individuals in 
union but with missing information about the partner’s education. We additionally included 
both the father’s and mother’s educational attainment and the number of each respondent’s 
siblings, since all these family background variables are relevant for individuals’ childbearing 
behavior (Rindfuss et al. 1988). With regard to the transition to first birth, we controlled for 
age at graduation, centered at age 24, and its square, whereas for higher order births, we 
controlled for age at first birth, centered at age 26, and its square. Table 2.1, Table 2.2 and 
Table 2.3 describe the sample in greater detail. 
 
Figure 2.1 Share of graduated women (ISCED 3 to 6) by field of study and country 1998-
2012 
 
 
Source: Own calculations on the UNESCO/OECD/Eurostat database on education [educ_grad5]. 
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Table 2.1 Description of the male sample by country  
 
 
Austria Belgium Bulgaria CzechR. France Lithuania Poland Romania Total 
Cohort(%) 
         1960-1969 31.24 41.21 35.68 29.43 42.76 36.17 31.84 41.99 35.91 
1970-1979 38.35 34.15 37.55 38.41 36.84 35.48 37.61 37.40 37.13 
1980-1987 30.41 24.64 26.77 32.16 20.40 28.35 30.55 20.61 26.96 
Mother's  
education(%) 
         Low 47.01 49.41 41.80 15.27 54.20 31.20 33.20 67.22 41.56
Medium 42.11 22.45 40.32 70.86 20.92 43.98 52.51 26.24 41.56 
High 5.50 19.45 13.22 7.49 11.18 14.30 9.29 3.85 10.23 
NA 5.38 8.69 4.67 6.37 13.70 10.52 5.00 2.68 6.65 
Father's  
education(%) 
         Low 26.22 39.59 40.80 7.41 42.40 33.51 26.23 49.57 33.03
Medium 55.91 23.51 39.77 64.24 25.09 32.09 53.90 36.04 42.68 
High 6.51 21.70 10.04 10.80 11.44 10.96 9.00 5.44 10.24 
NA 11.35 15.20 9.40 17.55 21.07 23.44 10.88 8.94 14.06 
Siblings 
         no siblings 10.81 10.01 13.03 18.71 7.01 17.35 8.47 15.90 12.72
1 31.66 31.33 56.34 52.15 28.95 44.47 32.05 33.36 39.78 
2 24.19 23.39 14.38 21.03 27.10 20.74 24.46 21.85 21.74 
3 (or more) 33.33 35.27 16.25 8.11 36.94 17.44 35.02 28.89 25.76 
Respondent's 
education(%) 
         Low 8.84 23.14 25.87 22.97 18.80 13.76 8.56 22.59 18.11
Medium 75.15 39.21 64.03 64.53 52.55 67.27 69.27 67.26 63.53 
High 16.01 37.65 10.10 12.50 28.65 18.97 22.17 10.15 18.37 
Respondent's  
field (%)a 
         General 8.36 19.07 10.68 12.17 1.34 26.68 8.06 7.47 11.23
Hum&Art 1.73 17.45 1.06 1.66 2.27 1.82 1.59 0.23 2.78 
SocScien& 
BusLaw 15.53 12.70 5.34 12.62 22.00 7.37 11.20 1.94 10.36 
Science&Tech 52.21 18.32 39.51 38.62 51.16 35.23 55.95 52.06 44.17 
Agriculture 5.68 1.63 4.44 4.26 4.43 6.00 6.09 5.40 4.89 
Education 1.37 4.82 1.74 2.07 0.00 0.59 1.18 2.49 1.71 
Health&Welf 0.48 2.69 0.48 2.03 0.00 1.82 1.29 7.04 2.01 
Services 5.79 0.19 10.88 3.60 0.00 6.73 6.09 0.78 4.74 
Type of field (%)a 
         Male-dominated 52.21 19.95 43.95 38.62 51.16 35.23 55.95 57.47 45.79
Balanced 21.21 31.77 10.88 20.03 4.43 32.68 6.09 8.24 15.23 
Female-
dominated 17.74 25.14 19.31 18.38 25.61 18.33 29.40 11.70 20.88 
Man's potential 
(mean) 6.03 6.56 5.34 5.46 6.00 4.93 6.88 4.89 5.76 
Age at graduation 
(mean) 20.28 20.54 18.09 18.63 19.65 20.60 20.16 18.42 19.42 
Age at first birth 
(mean) 27.97 28.83 25.01 25.83 28.20 25.97 26.70 25.93 26.60 
N 1674 1599 3108 2416 1941 2035 3401 2572 18746 
Notes: a) Low educated group is a separate category; Source: own calculations on GGS data 
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Table 2.2 Description of the female sample by country  
 
 
Austria Belgium Bulgaria CzechR. France Lithuania Poland Romania Total 
Cohort(%) 
         1960-1969 31.28 40.20 35.98 31.52 38.77 41.57 32.43 41.72 36.02 
1970-1979 40.00 34.29 38.90 38.06 35.63 32.79 37.58 39.99 37.50 
1980-1987 28.72 25.51 25.12 30.43 25.60 25.64 29.99 18.29 26.49 
Mother's  
education(%) 
         Low 45.84 45.05 40.25 17.14 51.12 34.76 34.96 68.59 41.61
Medium 43.83 26.30 41.79 70.24 24.46 43.53 53.44 24.60 42.32 
High 6.04 18.36 13.55 7.08 11.13 13.68 7.14 3.59 9.76 
NA 4.30 10.30 4.41 5.53 13.29 8.03 4.45 3.22 6.31 
Father's  
education(%) 
         Low 26.11 37.78 38.10 8.47 42.06 34.30 27.38 51.66 32.81
Medium 54.44 22.07 40.58 64.12 22.74 31.93 54.57 36.04 42.59 
High 8.17 21.57 10.58 10.23 12.74 10.45 6.41 5.08 10.09 
NA 11.28 18.58 10.74 17.18 22.46 23.33 11.65 7.22 14.52 
Siblings 
         no siblings 7.97 9.57 12.26 17.77 6.86 15.24 8.06 13.62 11.09
1 31.24 30.69 55.59 51.17 30.07 44.98 29.44 32.32 
      
38.57 
2 26.43 23.93 14.99 21.37 27.71 22.23 24.16 22.83 
      
22.62 
3 (or more) 34.36 35.81 17.16 9.68 35.36 17.55 38.34 31.23 
      
27.72 
Respondent's 
education(%) 
         Low 14.20 19.03 23.88 20.58 16.90 7.45 7.96 29.51 17.30
Medium 68.40 36.54 58.40 69.57 46.41 66.34 64.46 60.69 59.59 
High 17.40 44.43 17.71 9.85 36.69 26.21 27.58 9.80 23.11 
Respondent's  
field (%)a 
         General 10.30 19.82 16.67 10.18 1.41 24.54 11.07 7.67 12.18
Hum&Art 3.83 8.22 2.67 1.42 7.92 4.56 3.87 2.36 4.14 
SocScien& 
BusLaw 32.86 8.28 13.20 36.04 52.57 20.21 27.17 2.95 24.78 
Science&Tech 7.30 18.41 24.68 14.88 20.03 19.11 22.43 41.44 21.20 
Agriculture 1.66 7.77 2.09 2.98 1.18 3.52 5.94 5.86 3.75 
Education 8.44 11.94 5.45 6.54 0.00 6.70 5.34 7.35 6.12 
Health&Welf 5.80 6.42 2.89 5.11 0.00 8.66 4.79 1.68 4.16 
Services 15.62 0.11 8.46 2.26 0.00 5.25 11.44 1.18 6.36 
Type of field (%)a 
         Male-dominated 7.30 26.18 26.78 14.88 20.03 19.11 22.43 47.30 22.87
Balanced 34.52 28.10 8.46 15.42 1.18 28.06 5.94 8.85 14.48 
Female- 
dominated 43.98 26.69 40.88 49.12 61.90 45.38 63.67 14.34 45.36 
Women's potential 
(mean) 4.77 5.37 3.71 4.30 4.26 3.92 5.44 3.46 4.43 
Age at graduation 
 (mean) 19.77 20.30 18.28 18.47 19.88 20.94 20.45 18.19 19.47 
Age at first birth  
(mean) 25.55 26.82 22.20 23.29 25.95 24.69 24.42 22.92 24.28 
N 2535 1776 3630 2386 2551 1732 3821 2203 20634 
Notes: a) Low educated group is a separate category; Source: own calculations on GGS data 
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Table 2.3 Number of events by country 
 
Male Austria Belgium  Bulgaria CzechRep France Lithuania Poland Romania Total 
N at risk of first child 1674 1599 3108 2416 1941 2035 3401 2572 18746 
N first births 777 829 1475 816 890 1003 2030 1414 9234 
N second births 469 580 804 514 630 533 1229 705 5464 
N third births 141 198 133 109 210 103 385 151 1430 
Female Austria Belgium Bulgaria CzechRep France Lithuania Poland Romania Total 
N at risk of first child 2535 1776 3630 2386 2551 1732 3821 2203 20634 
N first births 1555 1186 2329 1300 1441 1051 2785 1564 13211 
N second births 1065 769 1361 782 1019 548 1775 831 8150 
N third births 351 268 234 183 388 98 627 205 2354 
Source: own calculations on GGS data. 
Analytical strategy 
We apply piecewise linear hazard models to estimate the effect of educational characteristics 
on first, second and third birth rates, separately for men and women, estimated using the aML 
software (Lillard and Panis 2003). When studying the effect of education on higher order 
births, several scholars argued that is important to account for the selection into parenthood 
(Kravdal 2001; 2007; Kreyenfeld 2002). Following Kravdal (2001), to a have a purer estimate 
of the effect of education on the birth rate of interest, we controlled for the selectivity into 
parenthood by modeling first, second and third birth jointly, where birth episodes are nested 
within individuals. The system of equations can be formally displayed as follows: 
lnh(t)1 = γ ′T(t) + β ′X(t) + ε 
lnh(t)2 = γ ′T(t) + β ′X(t) + ε 
lnh(t)3 = γ ′T(t) + β ′X(t) + ε 
The superscripts 1, 2 and 3 refer to the equation for the first, second and third birth, 
respectively and lnh(t) is the log-hazard of occurrence at time t. In the equation for first birth, γ 
′T(t) is a piecewise linear transformation of time since graduation, with nodes at 2, 4, 6, 10, 
and 15 years. For the second and third birth, γ ′T(t) is a piecewise linear transformation of 
time since previous birth, with nodes at 2, 4, 6 and 11 years. The covariate profile (both for 
fixed and time-varying covariates) is given by β′X (t), which shifts the baseline hazard up or 
down. The random variable ε represents an unobserved factor, which is assumed to be 
normally distributed with mean 0 and variance 2 which will be estimated (in our models it 
ranged between 0.65 and 0.82). The distribution of ε is approximated by ten integration points 
in our models. Separate modeling for each birth transition would consist in excluding ε in each 
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equation. The unobserved factors at individual level can be several things, such as physical 
attractiveness or fecundity. To take into account the unobserved factors related to the 
countries’ characteristics, instead, we used a country-fixed effect approach by estimating 
countries’ dummies in all our models (Wooldridge 2010; Bryan and Jenkins 2015). 
Results   
We first discuss the results for the transition to parenthood for men and women, followed by a 
discussion about the findings for higher order births. For each parity, we refer to five models. 
In the first model (M1) we assess the effect of the level of education, accounting for the 
control variables. Our control variables are: time since graduation (time since previous birth 
for models of higher order births); birth cohort; age at graduation and its square (age at first 
birth for higher order births); educational attainment of respondent’s parents; respondent’s 
number of siblings; and country of survey. Overall, the effects of control variables (showed in 
Appendix 2.B) tend to be in line with expectations, however, we only discuss in detail the 
variables of major interest for this paper, i.e. the level of education and characteristics of the 
field of study. 
In the second model (M2) we show the effect of the earning potential without educational 
level. Next, we include both educational level and earning potential in model three (M3). In 
order to address how the selection into union may affect the results, we included union status 
combined with the partner’s education in the fourth model (M4). Further, to test our 
hypothesis about the role of the type of field (hypothesis 3), we ran models without the low 
educated group (M5). We end up our result-section with a comparison between joint and 
separate models. In general, our results show that gender differences mainly concern first 
birth rates, whereas for higher order births, the effect of educational characteristics seems to 
be more similar between genders. 
First child 
The effect of educational level is positively associated with the transition to first birth for men 
(Table 2.3 – M1), as expected. Ceteris paribus, highly educated men have around a 17% 
higher hazard of first birth compared to medium educated men, our reference category. The 
effect of educational level remains even after controlling for the earning potential by field of 
study; however, once we include the variable of union formation in the equation, the 
educational level is no longer significant. With regard to the first birth of women, we initially 
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do not find any educational gradient (Table 2.4 – M1); the expected negative gradient shows 
up only once we controlled for partnership formation. Highly educated women turned out to 
have a 17% lower hazard of first birth than medium educated women.  
The earning potential by field of study, instead, does not seem to play a role with regard 
to first birth. We observe that without including the level of education (M2), the earning 
potential has a positive sign for men, despite not being statistically significant. This means 
that fields of study with higher earning potentials, compared to the mean of the country, tend 
to have higher rates of fatherhood. Once we control for union status and partner’s education, 
the earning potential turns out to be negatively associated with men’s first birth rates.  
 
Table 2.3 Regression coefficients from estimated joint model, men’s first birth 
 
 
M1   M2 M3   M4   M5   
Education (Ref. Medium) 
         Low -0.124 ** 
 
-0.162 ** -0.260 *** 
  
 
(0.047) 
  
(0.061) 
 
(0.063) 
   Higher 0.163 ** 
 
0.168 ** -0.051 
 
-0.046 
 
 
(0.057) 
  
(0.057) 
 
(0.057) 
 
(0.061) 
 Earning potential 
  
0.017 -0.032 
 
-0.072 * -0.053 
 
   
(0.025) (0.033) 
 
(0.033) 
 
(0.039) 
 Partnership status  
(Ref. Not in union) 
         Low edu partner 
     
3.390 *** 3.256 *** 
      
(0.050) 
 
(0.067) 
 Medium edu partner 
     
3.097 *** 3.044 *** 
      
(0.034) 
 
(0.036) 
 Highly edu partner 
     
2.968 *** 2.939 *** 
      
(0.045) 
 
(0.047) 
 In union missing edu partner 
     
1.391 *** 1.245 *** 
      
(0.072) 
 
(0.083) 
           Type field (Ref. Male-dominated) 
         Balanced 
       
0.030 
 
        
(0.042) 
 Female-dominated 
       
-0.063 
          (0.043)   
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; Significance: '*'=5%;  '**'=1%;  '***'=0.1%. Additional controls: duration splines, age at 
completion of education, cohorts, father’s and mother’s education, number of siblings, country dummies. 
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Table 2.4 Regression coefficients from estimated joint model, women’s first birth 
 
 
M1 
 
M2 
 
M3 
 
M4 
 
M5 
 Education (Ref. Medium) 
          Low 0.043 
   
0.020 
 
0.070 
   
 
(0.038) 
   
(0.045) 
 
(0.049) 
   Higher -0.021 
   
-0.020 
 
-0.188 ***  -0.161 *** 
 
(0.044) 
   
(0.044) 
 
(0.044) 
 
    (0.047) 
 Earning potential 
  
-0.027
 
-0.022 
 
-0.016 
 
-0.012 
 
   
(0.018) 
 
(0.020) 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.026) 
 Partnership status  
(Ref. Not in a union) 
          Low edu partner 
      
2.481 *** 2.318 *** 
       
(0.044) 
 
(0.061) 
 Medium edu partner 
      
2.407 *** 2.395 *** 
       
(0.027) 
 
(0.030) 
 Highly edu partner 
      
2.440 *** 2.440 *** 
       
(0.040) 
 
(0.041) 
 In union missing edu partner 
      
1.749 *** 1.675 *** 
       
(0.049) 
 
(0.057) 
 Type of field 
(Ref. Male-dominated) 
          Balanced 
        
-0.023
 
         
(0.042) 
 Female-dominated 
        
0.001 
           (0.037)   
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; Significance: '*'=5%;  '**'=1%;  '***'=0.1%. Additional controls: duration splines, age at 
completion of education, cohorts, father’s and mother’s education, number of siblings, country dummies. 
 
Higher order births 
For men’s transition to higher order births, i.e., second and third births, we found a different 
educational gradient than first birth rates. Before controlling for the earning potential (Table 
2.5 M1), low educated men have higher second- and third birth rates compared to the medium 
educated men, which is in contrast with our hypothesis 1b, according to which a higher level 
of education positively affects higher order birth rates via an income effect. Once we control 
for the earning potential (Table 2.5 M3), a positive effect of education shows up on second 
birth rates and it remains once we control for partnership status (Table 2.5 M4). The earning 
potential of the field, unexpectedly, has a negative effect on the transition to second birth, 
even when we do not consider the low educated group in our model (Table 2.5 M5). 
These results suggest that a higher earning potential for men is not conducive to fertility 
and that opportunity costs show up for men too. On one hand, it is possible that the positive 
income effect for men, which we expected, is embedded in the level of education (M3 and 
M4), since some fields of study may have different, education level-dependent earning 
potentials (cf. Figure 2.A1 in the Appendix). On the other hand, it is plausible that the positive 
effect of educational level that we observed in M3 and M4 indicates other aspects of 
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education. For instance, a cultural dimension of education, according to which highly 
educated men tend to show more gender egalitarian attitudes and are more willing to share 
housework with their partners, may have positive effects for fertility (Sullivan et al. 2014). 
With regard to men’s third birth rates, the results do not support our hypotheses 1b and 2, 
according to which a higher level of education and a higher level of earning potential are 
positively associated with higher order birth rates. Our findings show that low educated men 
tend to have higher third birth rates than medium educated men. Furthermore, we found that 
men that graduated in balanced fields of study (40-60% share of women) have higher third 
birth rates than men who choose male-dominated fields; this finding is not in line with our 
third hypothesis, according to which men that graduated in male-dominated fields have higher 
birth rates than their counterparts that graduated in female-dominated fields or balanced fields 
of study. This is probably because the group of men in balanced fields of study mostly 
graduated from agriculture-related disciplines. Lappegård et al. (2011) speculated that men 
who choose to study agriculture have a more traditional life style and tend to be more family-
prone. 
Concerning the results for women, we found that the educational gradient in second-birth 
rates follows a U-shaped effect, since both low and highly educated women have higher 
fertility than medium educated women (Table 2.6 M1). When we include the earning 
potential, which has a negative effect, highly educated women have higher second birth rates 
than the reference category (Table 2.6 M3). As shown in M4, this positive effect is probably a 
result of assortative mating, i.e., a “partner effect.” Since educational homogamy is very 
strong, a positive effect of education for men drives the positive effect of education for 
women if we do not control for partnership status. As expected, a higher-than average earning 
potential has a strong negative effect on the transition to second and third births, which is 
consistent across all models. Finally, we found no evidence that would support the third 
hypothesis, which was about the role of the field of study’s gender composition for women.  
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Table 2.5 Regression coefficients from joint model, men’s higher order births 
 
Second birth M1   M2   M3   M4   M5   
Education (Ref. Medium) 
          Low 0.184 *** 
  
-0.012 
 
-0.029 
   
 
(0.048) 
   
(0.070) 
 
(0.071) 
   Higher 0.075 
   
0.108 * 0.113 * 0.049 
 
 
(0.054) 
   
(0.055) 
 
(0.058) 
 
(0.059) 
 Earning potential 
  
-0.158 *** -0.167 *** -0.149 *** -0.181 *** 
   
(0.030) 
 
(0.043) 
 
(0.043) 
 
(0.050) 
 Partnership status  
(Ref. Not in a union) 
          Low edu partner 
      
1.960 *** 1.810 *** 
       
(0.110) 
 
(0.131) 
 Medium edu partner 
      
1.668 *** 1.620 *** 
       
(0.104) 
 
(0.118) 
 Highly edu partner 
      
1.696 *** 1.624 *** 
       
(0.111) 
 
(0.125) 
 In union missing edu 
partner 
      
0.610 *** 0.502 ** 
       
(0.139) 
 
(0.160) 
            Type of field  
(Ref. Male-dominated) 
        
0.026 
 Balanced 
        
(0.052) 
 
         
-0.034 
 Female-dominated 
        
(0.053) 
 Third birth M1   M2   M3   M4   M5   
Education (Ref. Medium) 
          Low 0.601 *** 
  
0.481 *** 0.274 * 
  
 
(0.076) 
   
(0.127) 
 
(0.130) 
   Higher 0.089 
   
0.105 
 
0.185 
 
0.071 
 
 
(0.101) 
   
(0.102) 
 
(0.109) 
 
(0.112) 
 Earning potential 
  
-0.374 *** -0.103 
 
-0.107 
 
-0.162 
 
   
(0.055) 
 
(0.087) 
 
(0.090) 
 
(0.104) 
 Partnership status (Ref. Not 
in a union) 
          Low edu partner 
      
1.512 *** 1.337 *** 
       
(0.202) 
 
(0.239) 
 Medium edu partner 
      
0.841 *** 0.756 *** 
       
(0.198) 
 
(0.224) 
 Highly edu partner 
      
0.847 *** 0.707 ** 
       
(0.215) 
 
(0.239) 
 In union missing edu 
partner 
      
0.494 
 
0.499 
 
       
(0.264) 
 
(0.290) 
 Type of field 
 (Ref. Male-dominated) 
          Balanced 
        
0.219 * 
         
(0.098) 
 Female-dominated 
        
-0.011 
   
        
(0.101) 
 ln-L -95277 
 
-95286 
 
-95267 
 
-87787 
 
-71699 
  
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; Significance: '*'=5%;  '**'=1%;  '***'=0.1%. Additional controls: duration splines, age at first 
birth, cohorts, father’s and mother’s education, number of siblings, country effects.  
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Table 2.6 Regression coefficients from joint model, women’s higher order births 
 
Second birth M1   M2   M3   M4   M5   
Education (Ref. Medium) 
          Low 0.172 *** 
  
0.051
 
0.126 * 
  
 
(0.039) 
   
(0.048) 
 
(0.050) 
   Higher 0.129 ** 
  
0.148 ** 0.049 
 
-0.005
 
 
(0.045) 
   
(0.045) 
 
(0.048) 
 
(0.050) 
 Earning potential 
  
-0.114 *** -0.105 *** -0.111 *** -0.119 *** 
   
(0.020) 
 
(0.025) 
 
(0.025) 
 
(0.031) 
 Partnership status (Ref. Not 
in a union) 
          Low edu partner 
      
1.493 *** 1.447 *** 
       
(0.064) 
 
(0.085) 
 Medium edu partner 
      
1.418 *** 1.523 *** 
       
(0.056) 
 
(0.068) 
 Highly edu partner 
      
1.537 *** 1.620 *** 
       
(0.067) 
 
(0.077) 
 In union missing edu 
partner 
      
0.694 *** 0.738 *** 
       
(0.079) 
 
(0.095) 
 Type of field (Ref. Male-
dominated) 
          Balanced 
        
0.046
 
         
(0.051) 
 Female-dominated 
        
0.013 
   
        
(0.045) 
 Third birth M1   M2   M3   M4   M5   
Education (Ref. Medium) 
          Low 0.684 *** 
  
0.545 *** 0.464 *** 
  
 
(0.059) 
   
(0.079) 
 
(0.081) 
   Higher 0.036 
   
0.056 
 
-0.011 
 
-0.113
 
 
(0.082) 
   
(0.083) 
 
(0.089) 
 
(0.095) 
 Earning potential 
  
-0.344 *** -0.124 ** -0.128 ** -0.162 ** 
   
(0.038) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.047) 
 
(0.058) 
 Partnership status 
(Ref. Not in a union) 
          Low edu partner 
      
1.124 *** 1.093 *** 
       
(0.109) 
 
(0.159) 
 Medium edu partner 
      
0.560 *** 0.768 *** 
       
(0.100) 
 
(0.135) 
 Highly edu partner 
      
0.799 *** 1.009 *** 
       
(0.119) 
 
(0.151) 
 In union missing edu 
partner 
      
0.289 * 0.455 * 
       
(0.146) 
 
(0.188) 
 Type of field (Ref. Male-
dominated) 
          Balanced 
        
0.015
 
         
(0.090) 
 Female-dominated 
        
0.096 
   
        
(0.083) 
 ln-L -132307 
 
-132325 
 
-132295 
 
-125571 
 
-97817 
  
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; Significance: '*'=5%;  '**'=1%;  '***'=0.1%. Additional controls: duration splines, age at first 
birth, cohorts, father’s and mother’s education, number of siblings, country effects.  
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The role of unobserved heterogeneity 
In Appendix 2.C we report a comparison of the main joint models (M 4) with the full models 
which do not include the unobserved heterogeneity term. In line with previous findings 
(Kravdal 2001; 2007; Kreyenfeld 2002), our results showed that selection into parenthood is 
an important factor to consider when studying the effect of education on higher order births. 
The selection into parenthood also needs to be considered when men are the unit of analysis. 
If we failed to control for constant-unobserved factors, such as physical attractiveness or 
fecundity, we would have overestimated the positive effect of high education on second and 
third birth rates for men as well as for women. For the latter, the separate modeling hides the 
negative educational gradient in second birth rates, which shows up once we include the 
partnership status. 
It is likely that for some unobserved reasons, some highly educated individuals had their 
first birth earlier and had more time to get into the second birth. On the other hand, some of 
the medium-educated group may have had their first child later than average, having less time 
for the second birth compared to their highly educated peers. Controlling for this selection 
process means that we accounted for exceptional highly educated individuals who leave the 
group at risk earlier than the average for their group, and exceptional medium educated 
individuals who stay longer than average at risk of first birth. 
Furthermore, accounting for unobserved heterogeneity of the population at risk had some 
repercussions with regard to the earning potential but to a lesser extent than education. 
Concerning men’s birth rates, we found that separate modeling would have underestimated 
the negative effect of earning potential for the transition into fatherhood. Regarding women’s 
birth rates, the absence of unobserved heterogeneity would have led to underestimating the 
negative effect of earning potential for the transition to third birth. 
Discussion 
The aim of this paper was to analyze gender differences in the effect of education on fertility. 
We have considered education as a multi-dimensional concept, accounting for the level of 
education, the field of study, and its characteristics. We ran separate models for men and 
women, and we estimated the effect of education on the transition to first, second, and third 
births jointly, pooling eight European countries together. 
We especially aimed to test predictions derived from micro-economic theories of the 
family, according to which opposite effects link education to fertility for men and women. 
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Our results showed that traditional differences between genders describe the dynamics related 
to the effect of education, especially on first births, rather than higher order births. However, 
to a lesser extent, this dynamic can be applied to the role of earning potential by field, since 
the effect for men and women pointed in the same direction. According to our first hypothesis 
(1a), a positive effect of education, driven by an income effect, is expected for men’s 
transition into parenthood, whereas a negative effect, driven by opportunity costs, is expected 
for the transition into motherhood. In line with our hypothesis, we found a positive 
educational gradient in men’s first birth rates; in contrast, we found an unexpected flat 
gradient in women’s rates.  
A key variable to understand the results regarding the transition into parenthood is 
partnership status. Once we control for union status and partner’s education, the effect of the 
educational level is not statistically significant anymore for men. For women, the association 
with first birth rates turns negative, as expected. These results highlight the importance of the 
selection into union for men and, expectedly, for women (cf. Trimarchi and Van Bavel 2015). 
Highly educated men are more likely to enter into a union, perhaps because they are more 
attractive on the mating market; this, in turn, accelerates their transition to first birth. For 
women, it is possible that the role of assortative mating emerges, since highly educated 
women tend to be partnered with highly educated men. If we do not include union status in 
the model, the estimates of women’s education may embed the positive effect of men’s 
education and, as a result, we get a flat educational gradient. However, it is also plausible that, 
at least in some of the contexts considered, the selection-into-union hypothesis holds for 
women as well: a topic that deserves further investigation in the future. 
The so-called partner effect stands out stronger for women’s second birth rates, in line 
with previous studies (Kreyenfeld 2002). After controlling for partner’s education, the 
positive effect of women’s education on second births disappears. With regard to third births, 
instead, we observed a negative educational gradient, both for women and men. Overall, these 
results are in contrast with our hypothesis 1b about the effect of educational level on higher 
order births. We expected a positive effect of educational level for higher order births for both 
women and men, according to which highly educated individuals may be in a better position 
to face the cost of children. We found support for this hypothesis only with regard to men’s 
transition to second births, since the positive effect of education on women’s second birth 
rates is mostly driven by partnership status. It remains unclear, however, to what extent the 
positive effect of education on men’s second-birth rates can be interpreted as an income effect 
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or if it is rather driven by attitudes towards the egalitarian gender roles of the more educated 
(cf. Kravdal and Rindfuss 2008; Sullivan et al. 2014). 
Next, we found only partial evidence for our second hypothesis, which concerns the role 
of the earning potential by field of study. According to hypothesis 2, a higher earning 
potential is associated with higher fertility for men but lower fertility for women. Our findings 
are in line with our hypothesis with regard to women, but not with regard to men. 
Unexpectedly, we found a negative effect of earning potential on men’s birth rates, which is 
particularly stronger for second order births. We speculate that men who desire a second child 
are more inclined to be more involved in housework. Since both the economic burden and the 
time invested in childrearing increase with a second child, both women and men need to be 
involved in housework, this is why opportunity costs show up for men too. 
Finally, we did not find strong evidence for our third hypothesis. According to hypothesis 
3, study disciplines with a higher share of one’s own sex would enhance fertility. We tested 
this hypothesis by focusing on the sample which did not include the low educated 
respondents. In general, the signs of the effects are in line with our third hypothesis; however, 
the effects were not significant for either men or women. 
We should mention some limitations of this study. First, due to the smaller sample size of 
the higher order births, we could not estimate the effect of education and field of study on 
fertility separately by country. Moreover, due to the low number of countries, we were not 
able to run multilevel models, which would have improved our knowledge on the role of 
different contexts for the relationship between education and fertility. As previous studies 
have shown, the presence of childcare facilities enhances second birth rates, particularly for 
highly educated women (Van Bavel and Różańska-Putek 2010). On the other hand, our 
findings are not limited to one country or only a couple of countries, which is an improvement 
over previous studies (cf. Oppermann 2014). 
Finally, given the limitations of the data, we had to proceed from rather broad categories 
of fields of study. A particularly unfortunate example of this is that we had to group 
individuals who graduated in business and management in the same category as those who 
followed cultural studies, even though these groups tend to have diverging earning potentials. 
Still, previous studies have rarely been able to estimate the earning potential of study 
disciplines at all. Following Van Bavel (2010), we have been able to do so while at the same 
time accounting for differences by country and sex. 
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Overall, it is clear that studying the effect of education on fertility without considering 
union status is problematic. As shown by Trimarchi and Van Bavel (2015), the selection into 
union strongly affects the role of education on childbearing for men and, expectedly, for 
women. The selection into union may even affect the role of educational field on 
childbearing, since the field of study may be associated with the probability of being in a 
union (Cooney and Ulhberg 1989; Martín-García et al. 2016). Future research may focus on 
ways to better estimate the effect of education on correlated processes, i.e., childbearing, 
union formation, and dissolution. In particular, the ideal would be to jointly analyze fertility 
and partnership histories by taking into account those factors (observed and unobserved) that 
commonly affect family formation behavior. Next, it is also desirable that future studies on 
fertility (re)consider the role of men. While scholars have kept track of women’s family 
behavior and how things have changed for women because of their increasing involvement in 
higher education and ensuing labor force participation, much less is known about men’s 
family behavior. To some extent, as also shown from this study, men’s and women’s family 
behavior is more similar than we may expect. Scholars have suggested that the societal 
changes that occurred in the last three decades may lead to a stronger role for men in fertility 
decision-making (Van Bavel 2012; Huinink and Kohli 2014), which we may not notice if we 
keep focusing only on women. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 2.A Estimation of the earning potential: OLS regressions results 
We estimated the earning potential by field of study, country, and sex using European Labor 
Force Survey (EU-LFS) data. The EU-LFS is a large household survey that collects 
information about the labor participation of people aged 15 years and older living in private 
households. We used data from 2009-2013 surveys because only since 2009 the information 
about the income is collected in the EU-LFS. The income variable is categorized in income 
deciles and is not applicable to all the respondents. Income is gathered only for individuals 
that in the reference week declared that they were employees. The field of study variable, 
instead, was collected only for those individuals who reached an upper secondary level of 
educational attainment (ISCED >=3). 
To estimate the earning potential by field of study, we selected only individuals without 
missing values for the income variable. We considered individuals in the age group 20-64. 
Moreover, we only included those who declared that they were working full-time. The 
variable of field of study refers to the main discipline of the highest level of education 
attained (declared at interview); Table 2.A1 describes each category. By means of OLS 
regressions, we estimated the average income deciles of each group defined by field – country 
and sex. The following equation shows the estimated model: 
 
𝑦(𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑠) =  𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑎𝑔𝑒) + 𝛽2(𝑎𝑔𝑒
2) + 𝛽3(𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘)
+ 𝛽4(𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙) + 𝛽5(𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑦) 
 
All the OLS regressions were estimated pooling the EU-LFS data from 2009-20137. The 
tables that follow show the results of the OLS regressions for each combination of country, 
field of study, and sex. The age was centered at age 22, which is the midpoint of the youngest 
age group, α represents the constant of the equation, i.e., people aged 20-24 years old with a 
medium level of education, who were surveyed in 2009, and who started current work in the 
same year of the survey. In our analyses, we used the predicted values of earning potential for 
people aged 50-54 years old:  
𝑦 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑎𝑔𝑒) + 𝛽2(𝑎𝑔𝑒
2) 
 
Figure 2.A1 shows the predicted values of income deciles for the age group of 50-54, 
according to the level of education.   
                                                 
7 Austria and Czech Republic; only 2009-2012, since 2013 was not available.  
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Table 2.A1 Categorization of the field of study 
 
Categories Description 
General/unspecified field General programmes, basic/broad programmes; 
literacy and numeracy; personal skills; unknown and 
unspecified 
Humanities and Arts Humanities, languages and arts;  Fine Arts; Music 
and performing arts; Audio-visual techniques and 
media production; Design; Craft skills; Religion; 
Foreign languages; Mother tongue; History, 
philosophy and related subjects; History and 
archaeology; Philosophy and ethics 
Education Teacher training and education science; Teaching and 
training; Education science; Training for pre-school 
teachers; Training for teachers at basic levels; 
Training for teachers with subject specialization; 
Training for teachers of vocational subjects 
Social Sciences/Business/Law 
 
 
Social and behavioral sciences; Psychology; 
Sociology and cultural studies; Political sciences and 
civics; Economics; Journalism and information; 
Journalism and reporting; Library, information and 
archive; Business and administration; Wholesale and 
retail sales; Marketing and advertising; Finance, 
banking and insurance; Accounting and taxation; 
Management and administration; Secretarial and 
office work; Working life; Law 
Science and Technology 
 
Science, mathematics and computing; Life science; 
Biology and biochemistry; Environmental science; 
Physical science; Physics; Chemistry; Earth science; 
Mathematics and statistics; Computing; Computer 
science; Computer use; Engineering, manufacturing 
and construction; Engineering and engineering trades; 
Mechanics and metal work; Electricity and energy; 
Electronics and automation; Chemical and process; 
Motor vehicles, ships and aircraft; Manufacturing and 
processing; Food processing; Textiles, clothes, 
footwear, leather; Materials (wood, paper, plastic, 
glass); Mining and extraction; 
Architecture and building; Architecture and town 
planning; Building and civil engineering 
Agriculture Agriculture and veterinary; Agriculture, forestry and 
fishery; Crop and livestock production; Horticulture; 
Forestry; Fisheries; Veterinary 
Health and Welfare Health and welfare; Health Medicine; Medical 
services; Nursing and caring; Dental studies; Medical 
diagnostic and treatment technology; Therapy and 
rehabilitation; Pharmacy; Social services;  Child care 
and youth services; Social work and counseling 
Services Personal services; Hotel, restaurant and catering; 
Travel, tourism and leisure; Sports; Domestic 
services; Hair and beauty services; Transport 
services; Environmental protection; Environmental 
protection technology; Natural environments and 
wildlife; Community sanitation services; Security 
services; Protection of persons and property; 
Occupational health and safety; Military and defense 
Not applicable (Low educated) People with highest level of education: ISCED <= 2  
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Table 2.A2 Austria, OLS coefficients estimates 
 
 
Males 
  General  Hum&Art Education 
Soc. Sciences 
Business&Law Sciences&Tech Agriculture Health&Welf Services Low edu 
Variables                   
Age 0.182 0.131 0.186 0.229 0.101 0.183 0.203 0.141 0.131 
Age squared -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 -0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 
Start current work 0.109 0.075 0.042 0.069 0.069 0.084 0.079 0.101 0.091 
High education 2.061 1.054 1.224 1.649 1.438 0.987 1.715 1.363 
 Year -0.065 -0.011 -0.081 0.002 0.027 -0.076 -0.033 0.012 -0.022 
Constant α 4.573 4.642 4.335 4.474 5.263 3.538 4.609 4.069 3.454 
          Observations 1155 628 570 4270 16070 638 592 1533 2814 
R-squared 0.35 0.23 0.42 0.39 0.23 0.33 0.41 0.27 0.28 
 
 
Females 
  General  Hum&Art Education 
Soc. Sciences 
Business&Law Sciences&Tech Agriculture Health&Welf Services Low edu 
Variables                   
Age 0.170 0.079 0.106 0.138 0.036 0.076 0.076 0.125 0.113 
Age squared -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 
Start current work 0.117 0.096 0.067 0.087 0.093 0.088 0.067 0.072 0.062 
High education NA 2.188 0.888 2.136 2.483 1.959 1.536 1.405 
 Year -0.056 0.127 0.065 0.051 0.036 0.251 0.091 -0.030 0.015 
Constant α 3.729 3.010 4.303 3.929 4.101 3.040 4.935 3.760 2.450 
          Observations 860 487 1399 4887 1037 191 1353 2331 1959 
R-squared 0.35 0.46 0.51 0.32 0.34 0.32 0.25 0.16 0.20 
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Table 2.A3 Belgium, OLS coefficients estimates 
 
 
Males 
 
General  Hum&Art Education 
Soc. Sciences 
Business&Law Sciences&Tech Agriculture Health&Welf Services Low edu 
Variables                   
Age 0.185 0.182 0.241 0.214 0.167 0.150 0.185 0.151 0.146 
Age squared -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 
Start current work 0.044 0.035 0.010 0.016 0.030 0.031 0.020 0.045 0.029 
High education 2.052 1.726 1.183 2.025 2.338 2.414 1.790 1.968 
 Year 0.004 -0.059 -0.002 -0.021 0.032 -0.017 0.001 0.058 0.043 
Constant α 3.854 3.824 3.379 3.828 3.884 3.353 3.831 3.687 3.386 
          Observations 9145 2993 2309 11051 31792 1415 2515 2808 18259 
R-squared 0.38 0.38 0.50 0.43 0.46 0.47 0.48 0.38 0.20 
 
 
Females 
 
General  Hum&Art Education 
Soc. Sciences 
Business&Law Sciences&Tech Agriculture Health&Welf Services Low edu 
Variables                   
Age 0.164 0.193 0.195 0.179 0.147 0.192 0.152 0.132 0.070 
Age squared -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
Start current work 0.041 0.027 0.033 0.026 0.029 0.020 0.026 0.024 0.035 
High education 2.305 2.624 1.612 2.414 3.372 2.943 2.042 2.233 
 Year 0.055 -0.063 0.025 -0.032 -0.018 -0.069 -0.018 0.035 0.039 
Constant α 2.995 2.633 2.626 2.987 2.744 2.494 3.266 2.746 2.765 
          Observations 6086 3198 5632 12043 4158 268 7249 2492 5504 
R-squared 0.32 0.45 0.50 0.39 0.46 0.48 0.44 0.38 0.13 
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Table 2.A4 Bulgaria, OLS coefficients estimates 
 
 
Males 
 
General  Hum&Art Education 
Soc. Sciences 
Business&Law Sciences&Tech Agriculture Health&Welf Services Low edu 
Variables                   
Age 0.043 0.073 0.118 0.106 0.065 0.039 0.006 0.099 0.071 
Age squared -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 
Start current work 0.051 0.027 0.030 0.032 0.060 0.062 0.048 0.071 0.060 
High education 1.662 0.909 -0.441 1.564 1.809 1.838 2.574 1.434 
 Year -0.130 -0.202 0.178 -0.172 -0.042 0.030 0.167 -0.076 -0.199 
Constant α 5.869 5.886 5.154 5.753 5.588 4.788 4.856 5.368 4.334 
          Observations 4365 256 409 1344 13155 825 278 1242 3637 
R-squared 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.15 0.04 
 
 
Females 
 
General  Hum&Art Education 
Soc. Sciences 
Business&Law Sciences&Tech Agriculture Health&Welf Services Low edu 
Variables                   
Age 0.010 0.022 0.072 0.074 -0.009 0.047 0.078 -0.029 0.002 
Age squared -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.0002 -0.002 -0.002 0.0001 -0.001 
Start current work 0.032 0.007 0.014 0.031 0.043 0.044 -0.005 0.015 0.022 
High education 2.241 2.213 2.027 2.118 2.702 3.199 1.699 2.277 
 Year 0.019 -0.062 0.139 -0.062 -0.006 -0.049 0.090 -0.079 -0.084 
Constant α 4.118 4.923 2.717 4.122 4.138 3.240 3.621 4.855 3.077 
          Observations 6174 525 2014 4301 6334 475 1523 541 2618 
R-squared 0.02 0.13 0.04 0.14 0.18 0.33 0.03 0.15 0.02 
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Table 2.A5 Czech Republic, OLS coefficients estimates 
 
 
Males 
 
General  Hum&Art Education 
Soc. Sciences 
Business&Law Sciences&Tech Agriculture Health&Welf Services Low edu 
Variables                   
Age 0.146 0.067 0.037 0.162 0.086 0.085 0.113 0.117 0.017 
Age squared -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 
Start current work 0.051 0.036 0.028 0.005 0.037 0.025 0.030 0.063 0.041 
High education NA 1.398 0.891 2.085 2.485 1.925 2.642 2.432 
 Year -0.044 0.074 -0.136 -0.063 -0.043 -0.167 -0.074 -0.073 -0.068 
Constant α 5.205 5.122 6.434 5.048 4.905 5.362 5.220 4.310 4.101 
          Observations 681 504 538 2296 23361 1694 438 2606 1287 
R-squared 0.07 0.13 0.04 0.22 0.12 0.11 0.41 0.16 0.03 
 
 
Females 
 
General  Hum&Art Education 
Soc. Sciences 
Business&Law Sciences&Tech Agriculture Health&Welf Services Low edu 
Variables                   
Age 0.029 0.097 0.072 0.041 0.024 0.016 0.101 0.035 -0.035 
Age squared -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.0005 -0.002 -0.001 0.001 
Start current work 0.052 0.039 0.022 0.046 0.041 0.065 0.034 0.061 0.021 
High education     NA 2.788 1.708 2.772 3.253 3.404 0.915 2.885 
 Year 0.029 -0.100 -0.074 -0.075 -0.009 -0.102 0.021 -0.133 -0.013 
Constant α 4.379 3.652 4.657 3.968 3.524 3.768 5.242 3.623 3.513 
          Observations 1464 746 2253 8667 6403 1389 3051 2777 1951 
R-squared 0.03 0.30 0.21 0.16 0.18 0.23 0.10 0.10 0.01 
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Table 2.A6 France, OLS coefficients estimates 
 
 
Males 
 
General  Hum&Art Education 
Soc. Sciences 
Business&Law Sciences&Tech Agriculture Health&Welf Services Low edu 
Variables                   
Age 0.186 0.177 0.131 0.244 0.161 0.113 0.203 0.197 0.119 
Age squared -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.002 
Start current work 0.060 0.080 0.058 0.056 0.054 0.061 0.034 0.085 0.055 
High education 1.931 0.811 1.216 1.644 2.134 1.626 2.134 1.549 
 Year -0.080 0.017 0.240 -0.045 -0.002 -0.063 -0.001 -0.048 -0.003 
Constant α 4.187 3.498 4.033 3.565 4.078 3.773 3.314 3.587 3.686 
          Observations 665 2147 276 9833 30596 2099 1267 2040 14060 
R-squared 0.23 0.29 0.38 0.35 0.32 0.31 0.47 0.32 0.14 
 
 
Females 
 
General  Hum&Art Education 
Soc. Sciences 
Business&Law Sciences&Tech Agriculture Health&Welf Services Low edu 
Variables                   
Age 0.072 0.125 0.103 0.141 0.114 0.129 0.092 0.112 0.038 
Age squared -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
Start current work 0.075 0.111 0.095 0.079 0.087 0.088 0.064 0.054 0.070 
High education 2.019 1.327 2.053 2.118 2.888 2.155 2.497 1.993 
 Year -0.111 -0.053 0.162 -0.054 0.002 -0.036 0.022 0.008 -0.004 
Constant α 3.829 3.318 3.037 2.820 3.029 2.646 3.224 2.816 3.001 
          Observations 558 4388 579 18356 5198 465 6193 2442 8827 
R-squared 0.22 0.37 0.47 0.31 0.39 0.28 0.49 0.26 0.15 
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Table 2.A7 Lithuania, OLS coefficients estimates 
 
 
Males 
 
General  Hum&Art Education 
Soc. Sciences 
Business&Law Sciences&Tech Agriculture Health&Welf Services Low edu 
Variables                   
Age 0.024 0.001 -0.059 0.105 0.050 0.027 0.091 0.033 -0.061 
Age squared -0.001 0.0003 0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 
Start current work 0.095 0.042 0.066 0.108 0.083 0.096 -0.025 0.070 0.100 
High education NA 1.157 1.194 1.150 1.756 1.683 1.242 1.502 
 Year -0.009 -0.253 -0.026 -0.059 -0.085 0.210 -0.421 0.090 -0.049 
Constant α 5.274 5.796 6.752 5.433 5.207 4.339 6.207 4.709 4.552 
          Observations 1553 139 151 500 4465 309 96 1146 354 
R-squared 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.13 0.20 0.09 0.08 0.05 
 
 
Females 
 
General  Hum&Art Education 
Soc. Sciences 
Business&Law Sciences&Tech Agriculture Health&Welf Services Low edu 
Variables                   
Age -0.028 0.128 0.119 0.090 0.027 0.016 0.030 -0.014 0.078 
Age squared 0.0001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 0.0004 0.0001 0.0001 -0.002 
Start current work 0.052 0.066 0.061 0.059 0.063 0.065 -0.001 0.056 0.017 
High education NA 2.176 2.678 2.440 2.504 2.350 1.103 2.449 
 Year 0.056 -0.093 -0.133 -0.039 0.030 0.201 -0.005 -0.040 -0.075 
Constant α 4.119 2.838 3.177 3.253 3.640 2.979 4.891 3.790 3.312 
          Observations 1733 428 1156 2603 2159 428 1162 619 220 
R-squared 0.03 0.15 0.18 0.18 0.24 0.21 0.05 0.18 0.04 
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Table 2.A8 Poland, OLS coefficients estimates 
 
 
Males 
 
General  Hum&Art Education 
Soc. Sciences 
Business&Law Sciences&Tech Agriculture Health&Welf Services Low edu 
Variables                   
Age 0.146 0.160 0.241 0.222 0.095 0.102 0.224 0.172 0.035 
Age squared -0.004 -0.003 -0.006 -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 -0.004 -0.001 
Start current work 0.076 0.032 0.040 0.032 0.053 0.063 0.019 0.050 0.055 
High education NA 1.298 1.203 1.440 2.126 1.859 1.752 1.735 
 Year -0.309 -0.133 -0.187 -0.278 -0.235 -0.144 -0.153 -0.280 -0.292 
Constant α 6.624 5.674 5.164 5.948 6.261 5.791 5.371 5.915 5.725 
          Observations 3083 541 964 3585 26657 1951 503 1865 3095 
R-squared 0.14 0.15 0.19 0.26 0.17 0.18 0.34 0.24 0.07 
 
 
Females 
 
General  Hum&Art Education 
Soc. Sciences 
Business&Law Sciences&Tech Agriculture Health&Welf Services Low edu 
Variables                   
Age 0.051 0.125 0.260 0.142 0.035 0.069 0.181 0.076 0.011 
Age squared -0.001 -0.003 -0.005 -0.003 0.0005 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 
Start current work 0.077 0.062 0.023 0.065 0.061 0.073 0.023 0.055 0.037 
High education NA 2.457 1.958 2.660 3.369 2.590 1.639 2.478 
 Year -0.312 -0.194 -0.240 -0.291 -0.281 -0.340 -0.387 -0.332 -0.256 
Constant α 5.031 4.408 3.363 4.072 4.325 4.010 5.200 4.351 4.126 
          Observations 3752 1371 3743 10877 7422 1844 3225 2876 1599 
R-squared 0.15 0.20 0.33 0.32 0.36 0.28 0.24 0.20 0.07 
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Table 2.A9 Romania, OLS coefficients estimates 
 
 
Males 
 
General  Hum&Art Education 
Soc. Sciences 
Business&Law Sciences&Tech Agriculture Health&Welf Services Low edu 
Variables                   
Age 0.006 0.050 0.119 0.084 0.049 0.067 0.145 0.082 0.056 
Age squared 0.0002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 
Start current work 0.045 0.036 0.082 0.017 0.065 0.043 0.004 0.066 0.048 
High education NA 0.457 0.885 1.574 2.430 2.240 1.397 1.164 
 Year -0.004 -0.014 -0.343 -0.126 0.018 0.098 -0.124 -0.026 0.039 
Constant α 5.594 5.225 4.779 5.297 4.629 3.888 5.482 5.340 3.179 
          Observations 5266 723 203 3290 23570 1581 598 2801 3245 
R-squared 0.02 0.04 0.22 0.08 0.15 0.15 0.11 0.09 0.03 
 
 
Females 
 
General  Hum&Art Education 
Soc. Sciences 
Business&Law Sciences&Tech Agriculture Health&Welf Services Low edu 
Variables                   
Age -0.030 0.054 0.176 0.072 0.017 -0.005 0.083 0.075 -0.008 
Age squared 0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 0.0004 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.0001 
Start current work 0.049 0.056 0.050 0.028 0.062 0.058 0.042 0.053 0.033 
High education NA 1.680 0.280 2.318 3.417 2.802 1.312 1.595 
 Year 0.044 -0.146 -0.155 -0.105 -0.007 0.011 -0.013 0.002 0.011 
Constant α 4.249 3.920 4.036 3.770 3.207 3.241 4.685 3.278 2.707 
          Observations 5220 1304 1105 7140 11912 1057 2564 933 2521 
R-squared 0.02 0.14 0.17 0.16 0.25 0.17 0.08 0.10 0.01 
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Figure 2.A1 Model-predicted values of income deciles (age group 50-54)  
 
Source: own estimation on EU-LFS data 2009-2013 
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Appendix 2.B The effects of control variables 
Table 2.B1 Regression coefficients for the transition to men’s first births, control variables 
 
 
M1 
 
M2 
 
M3 
 
M4 
 
M5 
            DurationSplines 
          0-2 0.355 *** 0.359 *** 0.356 *** 0.178 *** 0.166 *** 
 
(0.042) 
 
(0.042) 
 
(0.042) 
 
(0.043) 
 
(0.044) 
 2-4 0.366 *** 0.371 *** 0.367 *** 0.193 *** 0.197 *** 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.030) 
 4-6 0.211 *** 0.216 *** 0.211 *** 0.069 ** 0.052 * 
 
(0.023) 
 
(0.023) 
 
(0.023) 
 
(0.023) 
 
(0.025) 
 6-10 0.045 *** 0.050 *** 0.046 *** -0.030 * -0.041 ** 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.013) 
 10-15 -0.093 *** -0.090 *** -0.093 *** -0.105 *** -0.105 *** 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.015) 
 15+ -0.157 *** -0.156 *** -0.157 *** -0.163 *** -0.174 *** 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.021) 
 Constant -3.947 *** -3.881 *** -3.937 *** -4.745 *** -4.681 *** 
 
(0.096) 
 
(0.094) 
 
(0.096) 
 
(0.100) 
 
(0.109) 
 Cohort (Ref. 1970 - 79) 
          1960-69 0.264 *** 0.269 *** 0.263 *** 0.343 *** 0.409 *** 
 
(0.029) 
 
(0.029) 
 
(0.029) 
 
(0.030) 
 
(0.033) 
 1980-87 -0.499 *** -0.509 *** -0.498 *** -0.515 *** -0.592 *** 
 
(0.049) 
 
(0.050) 
 
(0.049) 
 
(0.052) 
 
(0.060) 
 Age at graduation 0.039 *** 0.053 *** 0.039 *** -0.025 ** -0.030 *** 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 Age at graduation2 -0.006 *** -0.006 *** -0.006 *** -0.003 *** -0.004 *** 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 Father's education (Ref. Low) 
          Medium -0.006 
 
-0.003 
 
-0.006 
 
-0.024 
 
-0.034 
 
 
(0.036) 
 
(0.036) 
 
(0.036) 
 
(0.038) 
 
(0.041) 
 High -0.230 *** -0.211 ** -0.228 *** -0.241 *** -0.263 *** 
 
(0.067) 
 
(0.068) 
 
(0.068) 
 
(0.067) 
 
(0.069) 
 Unknown -0.071 
 
-0.077 
 
-0.070 
 
-0.086 
 
-0.099 
 
 
(0.050) 
 
(0.050) 
 
(0.050) 
 
(0.051) 
 
(0.059) 
 Mother's education (Ref. Low) 
          Medium -0.029 
 
-0.023 
 
-0.029 
 
-0.085 * -0.086 * 
 
(0.037) 
 
(0.037) 
 
(0.037) 
 
(0.039) 
 
(0.041) 
 High -0.073 
 
-0.054 
 
-0.074 
 
-0.115 
 
-0.088 
 
 
(0.068) 
 
(0.068) 
 
(0.068) 
 
(0.067) 
 
(0.069) 
 Unknown -0.028 
 
-0.028 
 
-0.029 
 
-0.075 
 
-0.041 
 
 
(0.062) 
 
(0.063) 
 
(0.062) 
 
(0.065) 
 
(0.074) 
 N siblings (Ref. None) 
          1 0.144 ** 0.145 ** 0.144 ** 0.105 * 0.096 
 
 
(0.047) 
 
(0.048) 
 
(0.047) 
 
(0.049) 
 
(0.052) 
 2 0.412 *** 0.417 *** 0.411 *** 0.290 *** 0.273 *** 
 
(0.050) 
 
(0.051) 
 
(0.051) 
 
(0.052) 
 
(0.055) 
 3+ 0.391 *** 0.393 *** 0.390 *** 0.334 *** 0.302 *** 
 
(0.050) 
 
(0.051) 
 
(0.050) 
 
(0.052) 
 
(0.056) 
 Country (Ref. Bulgaria) 
          France -0.593 *** -0.591 *** -0.598 *** -0.846 *** -0.836 *** 
 
(0.054) 
 
(0.054) 
 
(0.054) 
 
(0.052) 
 
(0.059) 
 Romania -0.100 * -0.104 * -0.102 * -0.226 *** -0.261 *** 
 
(0.047) 
 
(0.047) 
 
(0.047) 
 
(0.050) 
 
(0.057) 
 Austria -0.502 *** -0.520 *** -0.511 *** -1.017 *** -1.024 *** 
 
(0.058) 
 
(0.059) 
 
(0.058) 
 
(0.061) 
 
(0.065) 
 Belgium -0.489 *** -0.498 *** -0.493 *** -0.716 *** -0.689 *** 
 
(0.057) 
 
(0.057) 
 
(0.057) 
 
(0.057) 
 
(0.065) 
 Lithuania 0.070 
 
0.046 
 
0.064 
 
0.055 
 
0.055 
 
 
(0.058) 
 
(0.059) 
 
(0.059) 
 
(0.060) 
 
(0.065) 
 Poland 0.031 
 
0.032 
 
0.023 
 
0.158 ** 0.203 *** 
 
(0.045) 
 
(0.047) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.050) 
 
(0.054) 
 CzechRep -0.490 *** -0.499 *** -0.492 *** -0.450 *** -0.392 *** 
 
(0.056) 
 
(0.056) 
 
(0.056) 
 
(0.063) 
 
(0.068) 
 Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; Significance: '*'=5%;  '**'=1%;  '***'=0.1%. 
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Table 2.B2 Regression coefficients for the transition to women’s first births, control variables 
 
 
M1 
 
M2 
 
M3 
 
M4 
 
M5 
 DurationSplines 
          0-2 0.330 *** 0.333 *** 0.332 *** 0.145 *** 0.122 *** 
 
(0.024) 
 
(0.024) 
 
(0.024) 
 
(0.024) 
 
(0.026) 
 2-4 0.160 *** 0.163 *** 0.162 *** 0.049 * 0.036 
 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.021) 
 4-6 0.066 *** 0.069 *** 0.067 *** 0.008 
 
-0.005 
 
 
(0.020) 
 
(0.020) 
 
(0.020) 
 
(0.020) 
 
(0.022) 
 6-10 -0.014 
 
-0.012 
 
-0.013 
 
-0.034 ** -0.024 
 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.014) 
 10-15 -0.124 *** -0.123 *** -0.124 *** -0.111 *** -0.145 *** 
 
(0.015) 
 
(0.015) 
 
(0.015) 
 
(0.015) 
 
(0.018) 
 15+ -0.194 *** -0.194 *** -0.194 *** -0.201 *** -0.236 *** 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.031) 
 Constant -2.631 *** -2.639 *** -2.625 *** -3.516 *** -3.465 *** 
 
(0.070) 
 
(0.065) 
 
(0.071) 
 
(0.073) 
 
(0.081) 
 Cohort (Ref. 1970 - 79) 
          1960-69 0.065 ** 0.066 ** 0.065 ** 0.167 *** 0.248 *** 
 
(0.023) 
 
(0.023) 
 
(0.023) 
 
(0.025) 
 
(0.028) 
 1980-87 -0.526 *** -0.528 *** -0.527 *** -0.475 *** -0.516 *** 
 
(0.034) 
 
(0.034) 
 
(0.034) 
 
(0.036) 
 
(0.042) 
 Age at graduation -0.048 *** -0.050 *** -0.047 *** -0.071 *** -0.070 *** 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 Age at graduation2 -0.008 *** -0.008 *** -0.008 *** -0.006 *** -0.003 ** 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 Father's education (Ref. Low) 
          Medium -0.019 
 
-0.020 
 
-0.019 
 
-0.015 
 
0.000 
 
 
(0.030) 
 
(0.030) 
 
(0.030) 
 
(0.032) 
 
(0.035) 
 High -0.160 ** -0.164 ** -0.160 ** -0.105 * -0.093 
 
 
(0.053) 
 
(0.053) 
 
(0.053) 
 
(0.054) 
 
(0.055) 
 Unknown -0.052 
 
-0.052 
 
-0.052 
 
-0.061 
 
-0.062 
 
 
(0.040) 
 
(0.040) 
 
(0.040) 
 
(0.044) 
 
(0.049) 
 Mother's education (Ref. Low) 
          Medium -0.092 ** -0.092 ** -0.091 ** -0.107 *** -0.104 ** 
 
(0.030) 
 
(0.030) 
 
(0.030) 
 
(0.032) 
 
(0.034) 
 High -0.236 *** -0.238 *** -0.235 *** -0.190 *** -0.172 ** 
 
(0.055) 
 
(0.055) 
 
(0.055) 
 
(0.054) 
 
(0.056) 
 Unknown -0.007 
 
-0.005 
 
-0.006 
 
-0.056 
 
-0.046 
 
 
(0.053) 
 
(0.054) 
 
(0.053) 
 
(0.057) 
 
(0.066) 
 N siblings (Ref. None) 
          1 0.175 *** 0.175 *** 0.175 *** 0.119 ** 0.106 * 
 
(0.041) 
 
(0.041) 
 
(0.041) 
 
(0.042) 
 
(0.044) 
 2 0.294 *** 0.295 *** 0.294 *** 0.230 *** 0.211 *** 
 
(0.043) 
 
(0.043) 
 
(0.043) 
 
(0.044) 
 
(0.047) 
 3+ 0.380 *** 0.382 *** 0.380 *** 0.325 *** 0.309 *** 
 
(0.042) 
 
(0.042) 
 
(0.042) 
 
(0.044) 
 
(0.047) 
 Country (Ref. Bulgaria) 
          France -0.736 *** -0.748 *** -0.742 *** -0.914 *** -0.983 *** 
 
(0.043) 
 
(0.043) 
 
(0.043) 
 
(0.042) 
 
(0.049) 
 Romania -0.260 *** -0.259 *** -0.260 *** -0.378 *** -0.480 *** 
 
(0.042) 
 
(0.042) 
 
(0.042) 
 
(0.044) 
 
(0.054) 
 Austria -0.717 *** -0.726 *** -0.724 *** -1.029 *** -1.140 *** 
 
(0.042) 
 
(0.042) 
 
(0.043) 
 
(0.044) 
 
(0.051) 
 Belgium -0.648 *** -0.661 *** -0.656 *** -0.856 *** -0.857 *** 
 
(0.045) 
 
(0.045) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.047) 
 
(0.053) 
 Lithuania -0.155 ** -0.160 ** -0.160 ** 0.006 
 
-0.014 
 
 
(0.054) 
 
(0.054) 
 
(0.054) 
 
(0.054) 
 
(0.057) 
 Poland -0.066 
 
-0.074 
 
-0.073 
 
0.099 * 0.047 
 
 
(0.038) 
 
(0.039) 
 
(0.039) 
 
(0.042) 
 
(0.046) 
 CzechRep -0.368 *** -0.371 *** -0.370 *** -0.352 *** -0.380 *** 
 
(0.045) 
 
(0.045) 
 
(0.045) 
 
(0.050) 
 
(0.056) 
 Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; Significance: '*'=5%;  '**'=1%;  '***'=0.1%. 
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Table 2.B3 Regression coefficients for the transition to men’s second births, control variables 
 
 
M1 
 
M2 
 
M3 
 
M4 
 
M5 
 Duration Splines 
          0-2 0.645 *** 0.653 *** 0.646 *** 0.655 *** 0.673 *** 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.032) 
 2-4 -0.180 *** -0.175 *** -0.179 *** -0.164 *** -0.160 *** 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.031) 
 4-6 -0.121 *** -0.119 *** -0.121 *** -0.113 ** -0.117 ** 
 
(0.034) 
 
(0.034) 
 
(0.034) 
 
(0.034) 
 
(0.038) 
 6-11 -0.188 *** -0.186 *** -0.188 *** -0.189 *** -0.199 *** 
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.024) 
 11+ 0.014 
 
0.015 
 
0.015 
 
0.011 
 
0.026 
 
 
(0.052) 
 
(0.052) 
 
(0.052) 
 
(0.052) 
 
(0.057) 
 Constant -3.512 *** -3.507 *** -3.466 *** -5.075 *** -5.226 *** 
 
(0.100) 
 
(0.099) 
 
(0.100) 
 
(0.142) 
 
(0.162) 
 Cohort (Ref. 1970 - 79) 
          1960-69 0.177 *** 0.182 *** 0.176 *** 0.206 *** 0.241 *** 
 
(0.037) 
 
(0.037) 
 
(0.037) 
 
(0.036) 
 
(0.040) 
 1980-87 -0.391 *** -0.395 *** -0.386 *** -0.423 *** -0.454 *** 
 
(0.091) 
 
(0.092) 
 
(0.091) 
 
(0.092) 
 
(0.110) 
 Age at first birth -0.006 
 
0.001 
 
-0.005 
 
-0.020 ** -0.007 
 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.008) 
 Age at first birth2 0.001 * 0.001 
 
0.001 * 0.001 
 
0.000 
 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 Father's education (Ref. Low) 
          Medium -0.091 
 
-0.086 
 
-0.087 
 
-0.072 
 
-0.075 
 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.047) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.047) 
 
(0.051) 
 High -0.197 * -0.173 * -0.191 * -0.179 * -0.182 * 
 
(0.086) 
 
(0.086) 
 
(0.086) 
 
(0.085) 
 
(0.088) 
 Unknown -0.242 *** -0.242 *** -0.238 *** -0.220 *** -0.261 *** 
 
(0.061) 
 
(0.062) 
 
(0.061) 
 
(0.061) 
 
(0.070) 
 Mother's education (Ref. Low) 
          Medium -0.177 *** -0.175 *** -0.178 *** -0.142 ** -0.118 * 
 
(0.048) 
 
(0.048) 
 
(0.048) 
 
(0.048) 
 
(0.051) 
 High -0.267 ** -0.248 ** -0.264 ** -0.217 * -0.171 
 
 
(0.089) 
 
(0.090) 
 
(0.089) 
 
(0.088) 
 
(0.091) 
 Unknown -0.113 
 
-0.120 
 
-0.117 
 
-0.068 
 
-0.011 
 
 
(0.077) 
 
(0.078) 
 
(0.077) 
 
(0.078) 
 
(0.091) 
 N siblings (Ref. None) 
          1 0.162 * 0.162 * 0.159 * 0.124 
 
0.131 
 
 
(0.063) 
 
(0.064) 
 
(0.064) 
 
(0.064) 
 
(0.068) 
 2 0.369 *** 0.373 *** 0.365 *** 0.308 *** 0.284 *** 
 
(0.067) 
 
(0.068) 
 
(0.067) 
 
(0.067) 
 
(0.072) 
 3+ 0.497 *** 0.498 *** 0.491 *** 0.418 *** 0.397 *** 
 
(0.066) 
 
(0.067) 
 
(0.066) 
 
(0.067) 
 
(0.072) 
 Country (Ref. Bulgaria) 
          France 0.370 *** 0.348 *** 0.351 *** 0.549 *** 0.795 *** 
 
(0.067) 
 
(0.068) 
 
(0.067) 
 
(0.066) 
 
(0.078) 
 Romania -0.356 *** -0.369 *** -0.366 *** -0.388 *** -0.276 *** 
 
(0.065) 
 
(0.066) 
 
(0.066) 
 
(0.066) 
 
(0.078) 
 Austria 0.171 * 0.121 
 
0.127 
 
0.215 ** 0.461 *** 
 
(0.076) 
 
(0.077) 
 
(0.077) 
 
(0.078) 
 
(0.085) 
 Belgium 0.516 *** 0.515 *** 0.506 *** 0.716 *** 1.044 *** 
 
(0.074) 
 
(0.074) 
 
(0.074) 
 
(0.074) 
 
(0.089) 
 Lithuania -0.062 
 
-0.092 
 
-0.091 
 
-0.006 
 
0.184 * 
 
(0.070) 
 
(0.071) 
 
(0.070) 
 
(0.071) 
 
(0.080) 
 Poland 0.272 *** 0.224 *** 0.221 *** 0.270 *** 0.476 *** 
 
(0.060) 
 
(0.060) 
 
(0.061) 
 
(0.061) 
 
(0.069) 
 CzechRep 0.200 ** 0.177 * 0.183 ** 0.252 *** 0.445 *** 
 
(0.070) 
 
(0.071) 
 
(0.071) 
 
(0.072) 
 
(0.080) 
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Table 2.B4 Regression coefficients for the transition to women’s second births, control variables 
 
 
M1 
 
M2 
 
M3 
 
M4 
 
M5 
 DurationSplines 
          0-2 0.661 *** 0.664 *** 0.664 *** 0.700 *** 0.753 *** 
 
(0.023) 
 
(0.023) 
 
(0.023) 
 
(0.023) 
 
(0.026) 
 2-4 -0.229 *** -0.228 *** -0.228 *** -0.188 *** -0.191 *** 
 
(0.023) 
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.023) 
 
(0.023) 
 
(0.025) 
 4-6 -0.159 *** -0.158 *** -0.158 *** -0.136 *** -0.136 *** 
 
(0.029) 
 
(0.029) 
 
(0.029) 
 
(0.029) 
 
(0.032) 
 6-11 -0.196 *** -0.195 *** -0.196 *** -0.185 *** -0.174 *** 
 
(0.018) 
 
(0.018) 
 
(0.018) 
 
(0.018) 
 
(0.021) 
 11+ 0.000 
 
0.002 
 
0.001 
 
0.002 
 
-0.036 
 
 
(0.040) 
 
(0.041) 
 
(0.041) 
 
(0.041) 
 
(0.048) 
 Constant -3.398 *** -3.344 *** -3.381 *** -4.817 *** -5.138 *** 
 
(0.074) 
 
(0.074) 
 
(0.075) 
 
(0.094) 
 
(0.112) 
 Cohort (Ref. 1970 - 79) 
          1960-69 0.115 *** 0.113 *** 0.117 *** 0.144 *** 0.212 *** 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.029) 
 
(0.032) 
 1980-87 -0.350 *** -0.354 *** -0.351 *** -0.363 *** -0.380 *** 
 
(0.056) 
 
(0.056) 
 
(0.056) 
 
(0.058) 
 
(0.070) 
 Age at first birth -0.029 *** -0.023 *** -0.027 *** -0.026 *** -0.025 *** 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.006) 
 Age at first birth2 0.001 
 
0.001 
 
0.001 
 
0.001 
 
-0.001 
 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 Father's education (Ref. Low) 
          Medium -0.163 *** -0.159 *** -0.161 *** -0.150 *** -0.116 ** 
 
(0.036) 
 
(0.036) 
 
(0.036) 
 
(0.038) 
 
(0.042) 
 High -0.072 
 
-0.039 
 
-0.069 
 
-0.064 
 
-0.051 
 
 
(0.070) 
 
(0.070) 
 
(0.070) 
 
(0.072) 
 
(0.075) 
 Unknown -0.296 *** -0.302 *** -0.297 *** -0.249 *** -0.218 *** 
 
(0.049) 
 
(0.050) 
 
(0.050) 
 
(0.052) 
 
(0.060) 
 Mother's education (Ref. Low) 
          Medium -0.130 *** -0.119 ** -0.124 *** -0.133 *** -0.137 *** 
 
(0.036) 
 
(0.036) 
 
(0.036) 
 
(0.038) 
 
(0.041) 
 High -0.212 ** -0.164 * -0.202 ** -0.190 * -0.193 * 
 
(0.074) 
 
(0.074) 
 
(0.075) 
 
(0.075) 
 
(0.078) 
 Unknown 0.099 
 
0.107 
 
0.104 
 
0.104 
 
0.034 
 
 
(0.064) 
 
(0.064) 
 
(0.064) 
 
(0.067) 
 
(0.079) 
 N siblings (Ref. None) 
          1 0.211 *** 0.208 *** 0.210 *** 0.171 ** 0.215 *** 
 
(0.052) 
 
(0.053) 
 
(0.053) 
 
(0.054) 
 
(0.059) 
 2 0.443 *** 0.436 *** 0.440 *** 0.414 *** 0.424 *** 
 
(0.055) 
 
(0.055) 
 
(0.055) 
 
(0.057) 
 
(0.062) 
 3+ 0.536 *** 0.528 *** 0.532 *** 0.513 *** 0.530 *** 
 
(0.055) 
 
(0.055) 
 
(0.055) 
 
(0.057) 
 
(0.063) 
 Country (Ref. Bulgaria) 
          France 0.351 *** 0.354 *** 0.343 *** 0.540 *** 0.789 *** 
 
(0.052) 
 
(0.052) 
 
(0.052) 
 
(0.053) 
 
(0.063) 
 Romania -0.262 *** -0.258 *** -0.255 *** -0.271 *** -0.313 *** 
 
(0.053) 
 
(0.053) 
 
(0.053) 
 
(0.056) 
 
(0.071) 
 Austria 0.422 *** 0.393 *** 0.407 *** 0.433 *** 0.667 *** 
 
(0.051) 
 
(0.052) 
 
(0.052) 
 
(0.054) 
 
(0.064) 
 Belgium 0.351 *** 0.346 *** 0.333 *** 0.522 *** 0.853 *** 
 
(0.059) 
 
(0.060) 
 
(0.060) 
 
(0.063) 
 
(0.074) 
 Lithuania -0.164 ** -0.197 ** -0.189 ** 0.010 
 
0.163 * 
 
(0.061) 
 
(0.062) 
 
(0.062) 
 
(0.065) 
 
(0.070) 
 Poland 0.365 *** 0.331 *** 0.341 *** 0.369 *** 0.527 *** 
 
(0.045) 
 
(0.045) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.048) 
 
(0.055) 
 CzechRep 0.181 *** 0.160 ** 0.176 *** 0.246 *** 0.419 *** 
 
(0.053) 
 
(0.053) 
 
(0.053) 
 
(0.056) 
 
(0.063) 
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Table 2.B5 Regression coefficients for the transition to men’s third births, control variables 
 
 
M1 
 
M2 
 
M3 
 
M4 
 
M5 
 DurationSplines 
          0-2 0.485 *** 0.485 *** 0.486 *** 0.495 *** 0.502 *** 
 
(0.058) 
 
(0.058) 
 
(0.058) 
 
(0.058) 
 
(0.069) 
 2-4 -0.271 *** -0.271 *** -0.271 *** -0.266 *** -0.245 *** 
 
(0.055) 
 
(0.055) 
 
(0.055) 
 
(0.055) 
 
(0.065) 
 4-6 -0.134 * -0.134 * -0.134 * -0.128 * -0.122 
 
 
(0.064) 
 
(0.064) 
 
(0.064) 
 
(0.064) 
 
(0.073) 
 6-11 -0.110 ** -0.109 ** -0.110 ** -0.106 ** -0.084 * 
 
(0.035) 
 
(0.035) 
 
(0.035) 
 
(0.035) 
 
(0.040) 
 11+ -0.018 
 
-0.019 
 
-0.018 
 
-0.019 
 
-0.035 
 
 
(0.077) 
 
(0.077) 
 
(0.077) 
 
(0.077) 
 
(0.088) 
 Constant -5.636 *** -5.474 *** -5.604 *** -6.447 *** -7.241 *** 
 
(0.193) 
 
(0.189) 
 
(0.195) 
 
(0.270) 
 
(0.346) 
 Cohort (Ref. 1970 - 79) 
          1960-69 -0.044 
 
-0.055 
 
-0.044 
 
-0.055 
 
-0.021 
 
 
(0.070) 
 
(0.070) 
 
(0.070) 
 
(0.069) 
 
(0.082) 
 1980-87 -0.107 
 
-0.106 
 
-0.108 
 
-0.147 
 
-0.213 
 
 
(0.209) 
 
(0.209) 
 
(0.209) 
 
(0.206) 
 
(0.260) 
 Age at first birth -0.003 
 
0.001 
 
-0.003 
 
-0.008 
 
0.015 
 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.014) 
 Age at first birth2 0.007 *** 0.007 *** 0.007 *** 0.005 *** 0.002 
 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 Father's education (Ref. Low) 
          Medium -0.109 
 
-0.117 
 
-0.106 
 
-0.091 
 
-0.099 
 
 
(0.083) 
 
(0.083) 
 
(0.083) 
 
(0.083) 
 
(0.093) 
 High 0.025 
 
0.034 
 
0.027 
 
0.048 
 
0.051 
 
 
(0.158) 
 
(0.155) 
 
(0.158) 
 
(0.157) 
 
(0.163) 
 Unknown -0.001 
 
0.020 
 
0.002 
 
-0.028 
 
-0.028 
 
 
(0.105) 
 
(0.105) 
 
(0.105) 
 
(0.106) 
 
(0.134) 
 Mother's education (Ref. Low) 
          Medium -0.099 
 
-0.107 
 
-0.099 
 
-0.017 
 
0.008 
 
 
(0.086) 
 
(0.086) 
 
(0.086) 
 
(0.086) 
 
(0.096) 
 High -0.173 
 
-0.159 
 
-0.171 
 
-0.092 
 
-0.021 
 
 
(0.181) 
 
(0.183) 
 
(0.182) 
 
(0.183) 
 
(0.187) 
 Unknown -0.154 
 
-0.170 
 
-0.158 
 
-0.079 
 
0.013 
 
 
(0.131) 
 
(0.131) 
 
(0.132) 
 
(0.132) 
 
(0.162) 
 N siblings (Ref. None) 
          1 0.198 
 
0.188 
 
0.194 
 
0.128 
 
0.142 
 
 
(0.134) 
 
(0.134) 
 
(0.134) 
 
(0.135) 
 
(0.147) 
 2 0.560 *** 0.557 *** 0.557 *** 0.494 *** 0.527 *** 
 
(0.136) 
 
(0.136) 
 
(0.136) 
 
(0.136) 
 
(0.149) 
 3+ 0.994 *** 1.003 *** 0.989 *** 0.870 *** 0.804 *** 
 
(0.130) 
 
(0.130) 
 
(0.130) 
 
(0.130) 
 
(0.144) 
 Country (Ref. Bulgaria) 
          France 1.086 *** 1.021 *** 1.069 *** 1.228 *** 2.227 *** 
 
(0.126) 
 
(0.127) 
 
(0.126) 
 
(0.126) 
 
(0.214) 
 Romania 0.317 * 0.238 
 
0.303 * 0.215 
 
0.889 *** 
 
(0.130) 
 
(0.132) 
 
(0.130) 
 
(0.131) 
 
(0.228) 
 Austria 0.965 *** 0.792 *** 0.932 *** 0.985 *** 1.857 *** 
 
(0.133) 
 
(0.136) 
 
(0.136) 
 
(0.137) 
 
(0.219) 
 Belgium 0.850 *** 0.827 *** 0.838 *** 0.979 *** 2.028 *** 
 
(0.131) 
 
(0.131) 
 
(0.131) 
 
(0.132) 
 
(0.225) 
 Lithuania 0.333 * 0.184 
 
0.305 * 0.424 ** 1.164 *** 
 
(0.142) 
 
(0.144) 
 
(0.143) 
 
(0.145) 
 
(0.226) 
 Poland 0.982 *** 0.792 *** 0.943 *** 0.979 *** 1.910 *** 
 
(0.115) 
 
(0.116) 
 
(0.118) 
 
(0.118) 
 
(0.204) 
 CzechRep 0.589 *** 0.487 *** 0.572 *** 0.627 *** 1.475 *** 
 
(0.140) 
 
(0.142) 
 
(0.141) 
 
(0.143) 
 
(0.226) 
 SigmaEps 0.785 *** 0.823 *** 0.788 *** 0.779 *** 0.781 *** 
 
(0.034) 
 
(0.032) 
 
(0.034) 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.021) 
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Table 2.B6 Regression coefficients for the transition to women’s third births, control variables 
 
 
M1 
 
M2 
 
M3 
 
M4 
 
M5 
 DurationSplines 
          0-2 0.508 *** 0.508 *** 0.510 *** 0.529 *** 0.587 *** 
 
(0.045) 
 
(0.045) 
 
(0.045) 
 
(0.045) 
 
(0.057) 
 2-4 -0.327 *** -0.327 *** -0.327 *** -0.315 *** -0.351 *** 
 
(0.043) 
 
(0.043) 
 
(0.043) 
 
(0.043) 
 
(0.054) 
 4-6 -0.108 * -0.109 * -0.108 * -0.098 
 
-0.088 
 
 
(0.051) 
 
(0.051) 
 
(0.051) 
 
(0.051) 
 
(0.063) 
 6-11 -0.155 *** -0.155 *** -0.155 *** -0.151 *** -0.118 *** 
 
(0.027) 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.027) 
 
(0.027) 
 
(0.033) 
 11+ 0.031 
 
0.030 
 
0.030 
 
0.030 
 
-0.007 
 
 
(0.059) 
 
(0.059) 
 
(0.059) 
 
(0.059) 
 
(0.071) 
 Constant -5.312 *** -5.185 *** -5.294 *** -6.087 *** -7.142 *** 
 
(0.151) 
 
(0.150) 
 
(0.151) 
 
(0.183) 
 
(0.261) 
 Cohort (Ref. 1970 - 79) 
          1960-69 -0.079 
 
-0.080 
 
-0.076 
 
-0.052 
 
-0.019 
 
 
(0.050) 
 
(0.050) 
 
(0.050) 
 
(0.051) 
 
(0.063) 
 1980-87 -0.013 
 
0.006 
 
-0.017 
 
-0.022 
 
0.182 
 
 
(0.123) 
 
(0.122) 
 
(0.123) 
 
(0.125) 
 
(0.168) 
 Age at first birth -0.009 
 
-0.011 
 
-0.006 
 
-0.004 
 
-0.007 
 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.010) 
 Age at first birth2 0.006 *** 0.007 *** 0.006 *** 0.004 *** 0.004 ** 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 Father's education (Ref. Low) 
          Medium -0.054 
 
-0.076 
 
-0.053 
 
0.011 
 
0.029 
 
 
(0.060) 
 
(0.060) 
 
(0.060) 
 
(0.063) 
 
(0.073) 
 High 0.049 
 
0.034 
 
0.047 
 
0.055 
 
-0.002 
 
 
(0.120) 
 
(0.120) 
 
(0.120) 
 
(0.125) 
 
(0.135) 
 Unknown -0.033 
 
-0.040 
 
-0.034 
 
0.023 
 
0.028 
 
 
(0.081) 
 
(0.081) 
 
(0.081) 
 
(0.084) 
 
(0.105) 
 Mother's education (Ref. Low) 
          Medium -0.121 
 
-0.124 * -0.115 
 
-0.102 
 
-0.160 * 
 
(0.062) 
 
(0.062) 
 
(0.063) 
 
(0.065) 
 
(0.073) 
 High 0.002 
 
0.024 
 
0.013 
 
0.009 
 
-0.005 
 
 
(0.136) 
 
(0.136) 
 
(0.136) 
 
(0.141) 
 
(0.148) 
 Unknown 0.092 
 
0.108 
 
0.099 
 
0.097 
 
0.002 
 
 
(0.098) 
 
(0.098) 
 
(0.098) 
 
(0.102) 
 
(0.131) 
 N siblings (Ref. None) 
          1 0.092 
 
0.084 
 
0.090 
 
0.091 
 
0.300 * 
 
(0.108) 
 
(0.109) 
 
(0.108) 
 
(0.111) 
 
(0.134) 
 2 0.338 ** 0.338 ** 0.335 ** 0.330 ** 0.487 *** 
 
(0.108) 
 
(0.109) 
 
(0.108) 
 
(0.111) 
 
(0.134) 
 3+ 0.644 *** 0.658 *** 0.638 *** 0.627 *** 0.749 *** 
 
(0.106) 
 
(0.106) 
 
(0.106) 
 
(0.108) 
 
(0.132) 
 Country (Ref. Bulgaria) 
          France 1.278 *** 1.292 *** 1.271 *** 1.427 *** 2.177 *** 
 
(0.097) 
 
(0.097) 
 
(0.097) 
 
(0.100) 
 
(0.171) 
 Romania 0.303 ** 0.321 ** 0.305 ** 0.343 ** 0.764 *** 
 
(0.104) 
 
(0.105) 
 
(0.104) 
 
(0.107) 
 
(0.188) 
 Austria 1.015 *** 0.973 *** 1.001 *** 1.057 *** 1.912 *** 
 
(0.096) 
 
(0.097) 
 
(0.096) 
 
(0.099) 
 
(0.168) 
 Belgium 1.102 *** 1.087 *** 1.083 *** 1.152 *** 2.068 *** 
 
(0.107) 
 
(0.108) 
 
(0.107) 
 
(0.110) 
 
(0.177) 
 Lithuania 0.322 * 0.198 
 
0.297 * 0.395 ** 1.133 *** 
 
(0.130) 
 
(0.131) 
 
(0.130) 
 
(0.133) 
 
(0.184) 
 Poland 1.166 *** 1.015 *** 1.133 *** 1.190 *** 1.866 *** 
 
(0.087) 
 
(0.089) 
 
(0.088) 
 
(0.090) 
 
(0.156) 
 CzechRep 0.689 *** 0.638 *** 0.683 *** 0.739 *** 1.400 *** 
 
(0.106) 
 
(0.107) 
 
(0.107) 
 
(0.110) 
 
(0.170) 
 SigmaEps 0.646 *** 0.663 *** 0.655 *** 0.748 *** 0.737 *** 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.024) 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.018) 
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Appendix 2.C: Full models: joint versus separate modeling 
Table 2.C1 Regression coefficients for the transition to first birth, joint versus separate modeling 
 
 
Men Women 
 
Joint  Separate  Joint  Separate  
 
Coef. se 
 
Coef. se 
 
Coef. se 
 
Coef. se 
 0-2 0.178 (0.043) *** 0.154 (0.042) *** 0.145 (0.024) *** 0.077 (0.023) *** 
2-4 0.193 (0.028) *** 0.145 (0.027) *** 0.049 (0.019) * -0.021 (0.018) 
 4-6 0.069 (0.023) ** 0.010 (0.022) 
 
0.008 (0.020) 
 
-0.064 (0.019) ***
6-10 -0.030 (0.012) * -0.077 (0.011) *** -0.034 (0.013) ** -0.089 (0.012) *** 
10-15 -0.105 (0.013) *** -0.139 (0.012) *** -0.111 (0.015) *** -0.151 (0.015) *** 
15+ -0.163 (0.016) *** -0.173 (0.016) *** -0.201 (0.021) *** -0.209 (0.021) *** 
Constant -4.745 (0.100) *** -4.462 (0.094) *** -3.516 (0.073) *** -3.216 (0.066) *** 
Cohort (Ref. 1970 - 79) 
            1960-69 0.343 (0.030) *** 0.265 (0.027) *** 0.167 (0.025) *** 0.111 (0.023) ***
1980-87 -0.515 (0.052) *** -0.456 (0.047) *** -0.475 (0.036) *** -0.408 (0.032) *** 
Age at graduation -0.025 (0.008) ** -0.042 (0.007) *** -0.071 (0.008) *** -0.073 (0.007) *** 
Age at graduation2 -0.003 (0.001) *** -0.002 (0.001) * -0.006 (0.001) *** -0.003 (0.001) *** 
Father's education (Ref. Low) 
            Medium -0.024 (0.038)
 
-0.030 (0.035)
 
-0.015 (0.032)
 
-0.007 (0.029)
 High -0.241 (0.067) *** -0.211 (0.060) *** -0.105 (0.054) * -0.073 (0.047) 
 Unknown -0.086 (0.051) 
 
-0.097 (0.048) * -0.061 (0.044) 
 
-0.070 (0.039) 
 Mother's education (Ref. Low) 
            Medium -0.085 (0.039) * -0.061 (0.036)
 
-0.107 (0.032) *** -0.090 (0.029) ** 
High -0.115 (0.067) 
 
-0.087 (0.061) 
 
-0.190 (0.054) *** -0.138 (0.048) ** 
Unknown -0.075 (0.065) 
 
-0.052 (0.058) 
 
-0.056 (0.057) 
 
-0.059 (0.050) 
 N siblings (Ref. None) 
            1 0.105 (0.049) * 0.084 (0.045)
 
0.119 (0.042) ** 0.092 (0.037) * 
2 0.290 (0.052) *** 0.245 (0.047) *** 0.230 (0.044) *** 0.179 (0.039) *** 
3+ 0.334 (0.052) *** 0.281 (0.047) *** 0.325 (0.044) *** 0.254 (0.038) *** 
Country (Ref. Bulgaria) 
            France -0.846 (0.052) *** -0.598 (0.047) *** -0.914 (0.042) *** -0.665 (0.038) ***
Romania -0.226 (0.050) *** -0.152 (0.048) ** -0.378 (0.044) *** -0.300 (0.041) *** 
Austria -1.017 (0.061) *** -0.797 (0.055) *** -1.029 (0.044) *** -0.790 (0.039) *** 
Belgium -0.716 (0.057) *** -0.508 (0.052) *** -0.856 (0.047) *** -0.628 (0.042) *** 
Lithuania 0.055 (0.060) 
 
0.059 (0.057) 
 
0.006 (0.054) 
 
0.020 (0.050) 
 Poland 0.158 (0.050) ** 0.136 (0.048) ** 0.099 (0.042) * 0.066 (0.039) 
 CzechRep -0.450 (0.063) *** -0.423 (0.057) *** -0.352 (0.050) *** -0.321 (0.045) ***
Education (Ref. Medium) 
            Low -0.260 (0.063) *** -0.237 (0.058) *** 0.070 (0.049)
 
0.030 (0.044)
 High -0.051 (0.057) 
 
0.009 (0.051) 
 
-0.188 (0.044) *** -0.089 (0.039) * 
Earning potential -0.072 (0.033) * -0.045 (0.030) 
 
-0.016 (0.021) 
 
0.003 (0.019) 
 In union (Ref. Not in union) 
            Low 3.390 (0.050) *** 2.977 (0.047) *** 2.481 (0.044) *** 2.143 (0.042) ***
Medium 3.097 (0.034) *** 2.769 (0.033) *** 2.407 (0.027) *** 2.102 (0.026) *** 
High 2.968 (0.045) *** 2.713 (0.042) *** 2.440 (0.040) *** 2.169 (0.036) *** 
Missing 1.391 (0.072) *** 1.247 (0.066) *** 1.749 (0.049) *** 1.541 (0.044) *** 
             ln-L 
   
-49556 
     
-67724 
  Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; Significance: '*'=5%;  '**'=1%;  '***'=0.1%. 
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Table 2.C2 Regression coefficients for the transition to second birth, joint versus separate modeling 
 
 
Men Women 
 
Joint  Separate  Joint  Separate  
 
Coef. se 
 
Coef. se 
 
Coef. se 
 
Coef. se 
 0-2 0.655 (0.028) *** 0.541 (0.027) *** 0.700 (0.023) *** 0.585 (0.022) *** 
2-4 -0.164 (0.028) *** -0.246 (0.027) *** -0.188 (0.023) *** -0.272 (0.022) *** 
4-6 -0.113 (0.034) ** -0.152 (0.034) *** -0.136 (0.029) *** -0.178 (0.028) *** 
6-11 -0.189 (0.022) *** -0.209 (0.022) *** -0.185 (0.018) *** -0.205 (0.018) *** 
11+ 0.011 (0.052) 
 
-0.001 (0.052) 
 
0.002 (0.041) 
 
-0.009 (0.041) 
 Constant -5.075 (0.142) *** -4.128 (0.121) *** -4.817 (0.094) *** -4.145 (0.081) ***
Cohort (Ref. 1970 - 79) 
            1960-69 0.206 (0.036) *** 0.097 (0.030) ** 0.144 (0.029) *** 0.078 (0.024) ** 
1980-87 -0.423 (0.092) *** -0.272 (0.078) *** -0.363 (0.058) *** -0.229 (0.050) *** 
Age at first birth -0.020 (0.006) ** -0.052 (0.005) *** -0.026 (0.005) *** -0.069 (0.003) *** 
Age at first birth2 0.001 (0.001) 
 
0.002 (0.001) ** 0.001 (0.001) 
 
0.002 (0.000) *** 
Father's education (Ref. Low) 
            Medium -0.072 (0.047)
 
-0.051 (0.039)
 
-0.150 (0.038) *** -0.120 (0.031) ***
High -0.179 (0.085) * -0.107 (0.071) 
 
-0.064 (0.072) 
 
-0.035 (0.060) 
 Unknown -0.220 (0.061) *** -0.160 (0.050) ** -0.249 (0.052) *** -0.196 (0.043) ***
Mother's education (Ref. Low) 
            Medium -0.142 (0.048) ** -0.103 (0.040) ** -0.133 (0.038) *** -0.072 (0.031) * 
High -0.217 (0.088) * -0.141 (0.075) 
 
-0.190 (0.075) * -0.109 (0.064) 
 Unknown -0.068 (0.078) 
 
-0.061 (0.064) 
 
0.104 (0.067) 
 
0.067 (0.055) 
 N siblings (Ref. None) 
            1 0.124 (0.064)
 
0.094 (0.054)
 
0.171 (0.054) ** 0.135 (0.046) ** 
2 0.308 (0.067) *** 0.209 (0.056) *** 0.414 (0.057) *** 0.314 (0.048) *** 
3+ 0.418 (0.067) *** 0.308 (0.055) *** 0.513 (0.057) *** 0.370 (0.048) *** 
Country (Ref. Bulgaria) 
            France 0.549 (0.066) *** 0.547 (0.055) *** 0.540 (0.053) *** 0.615 (0.045) ***
Romania -0.388 (0.066) *** -0.285 (0.054) *** -0.271 (0.056) *** -0.171 (0.047) *** 
Austria 0.215 (0.078) ** 0.270 (0.064) *** 0.433 (0.054) *** 0.517 (0.045) *** 
Belgium 0.716 (0.074) *** 0.635 (0.061) *** 0.522 (0.063) *** 0.556 (0.053) *** 
Lithuania -0.006 (0.071) 
 
0.017 (0.059) 
 
0.010 (0.065) 
 
0.092 (0.054) 
 Poland 0.270 (0.061) *** 0.239 (0.050) *** 0.369 (0.048) *** 0.358 (0.040) ***
CzechRep 0.252 (0.072) *** 0.311 (0.059) *** 0.246 (0.056) *** 0.289 (0.046) *** 
Education (Ref. Medium) 
            Low -0.029 (0.071)
 
-0.042 (0.059)
 
0.126 (0.050) * -0.026 (0.041)
 High 0.113 (0.058) * 0.217 (0.048) *** 0.049 (0.048) 
 
0.239 (0.040) ***
Earning potential -0.149 (0.043) *** -0.118 (0.036) *** -0.111 (0.025) *** -0.075 (0.021) *** 
In union (Ref. Not in union) 
            Low 1.960 (0.110) *** 1.482 (0.096) *** 1.493 (0.064) *** 1.127 (0.056) ***
Medium 1.668 (0.104) *** 1.303 (0.092) *** 1.418 (0.056) *** 1.098 (0.049) *** 
High 1.696 (0.111) *** 1.338 (0.098) *** 1.537 (0.067) *** 1.208 (0.058) *** 
Missing 0.610 (0.139) *** 0.604 (0.126) *** 0.694 (0.079) *** 0.541 (0.071) *** 
             ln-L 
   
-29441 
     
-43386 
  Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; Significance: '*'=5%;  '**'=1%;  '***'=0.1%. 
  
 106 
 
Table 2.C3 Regression coefficients for the transition to third birth, joint versus separate modeling 
 
 
Men Women 
 
Joint  Separate  Joint  Separate  
 
Coef. se 
 
Coef. se 
 
Coef. se 
 
Coef. se 
 0-2 0.495 (0.058) *** 0.446 (0.058) *** 0.529 (0.045) *** 0.479 (0.045) *** 
2-4 -0.266 (0.055) *** -0.298 (0.055) *** -0.315 (0.043) *** -0.349 (0.043) *** 
4-6 -0.128 (0.064) * -0.141 (0.064) * -0.098 (0.051) 
 
-0.115 (0.051) * 
6-11 -0.106 (0.035) ** -0.110 (0.035) ** -0.151 (0.027) *** -0.158 (0.028) *** 
11+ -0.019 (0.077) 
 
-0.014 (0.077) 
 
0.030 (0.059) 
 
0.032 (0.059) 
 Constant -6.447 (0.270) *** -5.236 (0.251) *** -6.087 (0.183) *** -5.230 (0.168) *** 
Cohort  
(Ref. 1970 - 79) 
            1960-69 -0.055 (0.069)
 
-0.158 (0.064) * -0.052 (0.051)
 
-0.098 (0.047) * 
1980-87 -0.147 (0.206) 
 
0.054 (0.194) 
 
-0.022 (0.125) 
 
0.157 (0.116) 
 Age at first birth -0.008 (0.010) 
 
-0.038 (0.009) *** -0.004 (0.008) 
 
-0.042 (0.007) *** 
Age at first birth2 0.005 (0.001) *** 0.006 (0.001) *** 0.004 (0.001) *** 0.006 (0.001) *** 
Father's education 
(Ref. Low) 
            Medium -0.091 (0.083)
 
-0.058 (0.076)
 
0.011 (0.063)
 
0.016 (0.057)
 High 0.048 (0.157) 
 
0.123 (0.146) 
 
0.055 (0.125) 
 
0.114 (0.113) 
 Unknown -0.028 (0.106) 
 
0.015 (0.098) 
 
0.023 (0.084) 
 
0.036 (0.076) 
 Mother's education  
(Ref. Low) 
            Medium -0.017 (0.086)
 
0.006 (0.080)
 
-0.102 (0.065)
 
-0.047 (0.059)
 High -0.092 (0.183) 
 
-0.078 (0.171) 
 
0.009 (0.141) 
 
0.057 (0.128) 
 Unknown -0.079 (0.132) 
 
-0.090 (0.122) 
 
0.097 (0.102) 
 
0.093 (0.091) 
 N siblings (Ref. None) 
            1 0.128 (0.135)
 
0.107 (0.126)
 
0.091 (0.111)
 
0.032 (0.103)
 2 0.494 (0.136) *** 0.360 (0.126) ** 0.330 (0.111) ** 0.209 (0.102) * 
3+ 0.870 (0.130) *** 0.691 (0.121) *** 0.627 (0.108) *** 0.443 (0.100) *** 
Country (Ref. Bulgaria) 
            France 1.228 (0.126) *** 1.048 (0.118) *** 1.427 (0.100) *** 1.355 (0.092) *** 
Romania 0.215 (0.131) 
 
0.297 (0.121) * 0.343 (0.107) ** 0.467 (0.099) *** 
Austria 0.985 (0.137) *** 0.931 (0.127) *** 1.057 (0.099) *** 1.068 (0.091) *** 
Belgium 0.979 (0.132) *** 0.828 (0.122) *** 1.152 (0.110) *** 1.129 (0.101) *** 
Lithuania 0.424 (0.145) ** 0.453 (0.135) *** 0.395 (0.133) ** 0.517 (0.124) *** 
Poland 0.979 (0.118) *** 0.897 (0.110) *** 1.190 (0.090) *** 1.153 (0.084) *** 
CzechRep 0.627 (0.143) *** 0.646 (0.134) *** 0.739 (0.110) *** 0.775 (0.102) *** 
Education (Ref. Medium) 
            Low 0.274 (0.130) * 0.232 (0.118) * 0.464 (0.081) *** 0.322 (0.075) *** 
High 0.185 (0.109) 
 
0.297 (0.100) ** -0.011 (0.089) 
 
0.161 (0.082) 
 Earning potential -0.107 (0.090) 
 
-0.064 (0.082) 
 
-0.128 (0.047) ** -0.079 (0.045) 
 In union  
(Ref. Not in union) 
            Low 1.512 (0.202) *** 1.031 (0.190) *** 1.124 (0.109) *** 0.763 (0.100) *** 
Medium 0.841 (0.198) *** 0.500 (0.186) ** 0.560 (0.100) *** 0.311 (0.092) *** 
High 0.847 (0.215) *** 0.483 (0.202) * 0.799 (0.119) *** 0.525 (0.110) *** 
Missing 0.494 (0.264) 
 
0.521 (0.251) * 0.289 (0.146) * 0.258 (0.136) 
 SigmaEps 0.779 (0.019) ***
   
0.748 (0.016) *** 
                ln-L -87787 
  
-9276 
  
-125571 
  
-15040 
  Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; Significance: '*'=5%;  '**'=1%;  '***'=0.1%. 
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Chapter 3. Educational assortative mating and couples’ 
fertility 
 
 
Abstract  
Assuming that partners mate assortatively, scholars usually have approached fertility from a 
woman’s perspective. However, omitting partners’ characteristics may lead to biased results. 
The effect of women’s education on fertility may also embed the effect of the partner’s 
education. This study aims to extend the literature about the effect of partners’ educational 
characteristics on fertility, i.e., the level of education and the field of study. The analytical 
strategy comes in two steps. First, we estimate the earning potential by field of study, country, 
and sex with European Labor Force Surveys. Second, we link the results of these estimations 
with the Generation and Gender Surveys of eight European countries, and we model couples’ 
transition to first and higher order parities jointly, accounting for couples’ unobserved 
characteristics. The findings suggest that both men and women face opportunity costs of 
fertility with an increasing earning potential in terms of both higher educational level and 
more profitable field of study. Next, we found that traditional pairings, characterized by an 
imbalance of education and earning potential in favor of the man, are more conducive to 
fertility compared to non-traditional pairings, i.e., where the woman is more educated than the 
man. However, it also emerges that a highly educated woman is more likely to go beyond the 
first child if she partnered with a highly educated man.  
 
Keywords: assortative mating, education, fertility, joint modeling  
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Introduction 
Fertility studies have typically investigated characteristics of one parent, usually the mother. 
To justify this approach, scholars have pointed to the fact that people tend to mate 
assortatively, i.e., partners share similar characteristics, values, and lifestyles (Corijn et al. 
1996). Since the majority of births occur within unions, failing to control for the partner’s 
characteristics leads to an omitted variable bias: the results based on the individual may 
reflect the effect of the partner (Gustafsson and Worku 2006). The omitted variable bias is 
bigger insofar as the role of partners’ characteristics differs. Paradoxically, assortative mating 
is both a justification and a criticism to focus on only one partner when studying fertility. 
In particular, educational assortative mating has been widely documented (Blossfeld and 
Timm 2003), and omitting the partner has important consequences when studying the 
relationship between education and fertility. Kreyenfeld (2002) suggested that a positive 
association between education and fertility for women could reflect the fact that highly 
educated women mostly mate with highly educated men. In fact, micro-economic theories of 
the family predict a positive association between education and fertility for men due to 
income effects, whereas they predict a negative association for women due to opportunity 
costs (Becker 1991). Because of these gender differences in the effect of education on 
fertility, the focus on only one partner muddles the interpretation of results: it becomes 
unclear whether his or her education matters (Trimarchi and Van Bavel 2015). 
Given that patterns of educational assortative mating are changing, it is interesting to look 
at couples’ behaviors instead of individual behavior (Van Bavel 2012). Even if educational 
homogamy remains strong, traditionally, hypergamy was prevailing: if there was a difference 
in educational attainment, the husband tended to have more education than his wife. However, 
in more recent cohorts, hypogamy has become more common than hypergamy: more often the 
woman has more education than the man (Esteve et al. 2012; Grow and Van Bavel 2015). The 
changes in patterns of educational assortative mating are linked to increasing female 
participation in higher education. Since the 1990s, the number of highly educated women 
reaching reproductive ages exceeds the number of highly educated men (DiPrete and 
Buchmann 2006). 
While gender inequalities in higher education are disappearing, the gender segregation 
with regard to the field of study has remained stable over time (Charles and Bradley 2009). 
The gender segregation of fields of study reflects inequalities on the labor market, including 
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ensuing differences concerning the earning potential of men and women given the same level 
of education (Van de Werfhorst 2001; Blau and Khan 2016). Since educational expansion, 
medium and highly educated people are more heterogeneous groups, and the field of study 
has been considered a good distinctive trait for labor market outcomes and cultural resources 
(Van de Werfhorst 2001; Reimer, Noelke and Kucel 2008). In the last decade, field of study 
has been considered a relevant determinant of fertility timing and quantum: it helps in 
differentiating fertility behavior for those with an education higher than the upper-secondary 
level (Hoem et al. 2006a; Hoem et al. 2006b; Martín-García 2009; Bagavos 2010; Van Bavel 
2010; Tesching 2012; Begall and Mills 2013).  
The strand of research that focuses on the role of partners’ relative socioeconomic 
resources for fertility mainly paid attention to the level of education, employment, and income 
of partners (Corijn et al. 1996; Kreyenfeld 2002; Gustafsson and Worku 2006; Dribe and 
Stanfors 2010; Begall 2013; Jalovaara and Miettinen 2013; Vignoli et al. 2012; Nitsche et al. 
2015). The use of employment, occupation, and income as independent variables is especially 
problematic when studying fertility because of their endogenous nature, which could bias the 
results. In contrast, the main field of study, which characterizes the highest level of education 
attained, tends to be fixed over the life course. Still, the role of the field of study for both 
partners has not been explored. In this study, we contribute to this strand of research by 
proposing a way to estimate the earning potential for each partner without incurring in 
endogeneity issues that are typical when using current earnings (Xie et al. 2003). 
We used the European Labor Force Surveys (EU-LFS) and OLS regressions to estimate 
earning potential by field of study. Next, we linked the results of these estimations with the 
Generations and Gender Surveys (GGS) of eight European countries given the information on 
the level of education, field of study, sex and country of residence. By means of a 
simultaneous equations approach, we estimated the effect of pairing by educational level, 
earning potential, and type of field on first, second, and third birth rates. The joint model of 
all birth parities allows us to account for the selection into parenthood, i.e., we account for 
those unobserved characteristics of the couple that affect their fertility, such as fecundity or 
characteristics of the family of origin. Previous studies, in contrast, focused on either first 
birth only or higher order births without accounting for selection effects (Dribe and Stanfors 
2010; Jalovaara and Miettinen 2013; Nitsche et al. 2015).  
Overall, the findings suggest that both men and women face opportunity costs of fertility 
with an increasing earning potential in terms of both higher educational level and more 
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profitable field of study. We found that traditional pairings, characterized by an imbalance of 
education and earning potential in favor of the man, are more conducive to fertility compared 
to non-traditional pairings, i.e., where the woman is more educated than the man. However, it 
emerges that a highly educated woman is more likely to go beyond the first child if she 
partnered with a highly educated man. 
Fertility from a couple’s perspective: the role of education 
An influential strand of research in couple’s fertility looks at the interaction between partners’ 
desires, intentions, and preferences to determine who dominates in fertility decision-making 
(Thomson 1990; Thomson, McDonald and Bumpass 1990, Thomson 1997; Bauer and Kneip 
2013). These studies aim to generate a framework of decision-making rules for fertility 
outcomes. For instance, the “sphere of interest rule” predicts that a woman’s influence is 
stronger because the birth of a child is seen as a woman’s matter. The “power rule”, instead, 
predicts that the partner with more economic resources prevails in case of divergence. The 
majority of those studies concluded that it is important to also consider a man’s preferences; 
however, studies for older cohorts (1940-1960) found that women had a stronger influence 
(Stein et al. 2014). Studies focusing on much younger cohorts found that both partners equally 
influenced the decision: both were able to impose a veto, eventually leading to childlessness 
(see the review of Stein et al. 2014). In this framework, education, if considered at all, is often 
seen as a means to bargaining power: those with more education have more power to impose 
their preferences (Lundberg and Pollack 1996; Testa et al. 2014). 
Another strand focuses on the effect of partners’ relative socioeconomic resources on the 
actual fertility behavior without considering partners’ preferences, intentions, and desires. The 
aim is to examine how the effect of individual’s characteristics is altered once accounting for 
the other partner’s characteristics (Blossfeld and Huinik 1991; Kreyenfeld 2002; Köppen 
2006; Gerster et al. 2007; Vignoli et al. 2012; Bartus et al. 2012; Begall 2013; Jalovaara and 
Miettinen 2013; Klesment et al. 2014). When feasible, the interaction between partners’ 
characteristics is also considered, that is, the partnership context becomes the main unit of 
interest (Corijn et al. 1996; Gustafsson and Worku 2006; Naz, Nilsen and Vagstad 2006; 
Bauer and Jacob 2009; Dribe and Stanfors 2010; Nitsche et al. 2015). In this latter case, the 
focus shifts from the individual to the couple itself, aiming to explore the pairings that are 
more prone to childbearing. Within this strand of research, education, broadly speaking, is 
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one of the most important determinants since it affects individual economic potential and also 
individuals’ tastes, preferences, and lifestyles (Van de Werfhorst 2001; Blossfeld 2009). 
In this study, we consider enrollment in education as a control variable, and we focus on 
two dimensions of educational attainment: level of education and field of study. These two 
dimensions can be seen as expressions of an individual’s earning potential. According to the 
Human Capital Theory, a higher level of education leads—after some time—to higher income 
(Becker 1964). Next, given the educational expansion, the focus on the field of study is 
justified by the fact that it represents a more distinctive trait of an individual educational 
trajectory (Cooney and Uhlenberg 1989). Given the level of education, the field of study has 
become an important predictor of the earning potential due to its close connection with future 
occupation (Ohlsson-Wijk 2015a). The persistent gender segregation in the field of study 
reflects the gender segregation in the labor market, which has profound consequences for 
income inequalities between sexes (DiPrete and Buchannan 2006; Blau and Khan 2016). 
Beyond the tight connection with earning potential, both the level of education and the field 
of study indicate a cultural endowment manifested in preferences, tastes, and attitudes, which, 
in turn, may affect childbearing behavior (Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 1998; Hakim 2003; 
Sobotka 2008; Van Bavel 2010). In the next section, we highlight the mechanisms that link 
education and couples’ fertility and discuss both economic and cultural aspects. 
Educational assortative mating and fertility 
The specialization family model versus the pooling of resources 
Parsons (1949) argued that sex-role segregation is functional to family stability and the 
overall well-being of society. In times when women’s participation in the labor market was 
still scarce, the author claimed that the division of labor between husbands (i.e., the 
breadwinners) and wives (i.e., the homemakers) was fundamental to increase marital 
solidarity. In line with Parsons, an extension of micro-economic theory to family behavior, 
the New Home Economics, assumes that members of a family allocate efficiently and 
rationally their resources between household chores and labor market jobs (Becker 1991). 
Partners tend to specialize for efficiency reasons: the specialization strategy increases the 
interdependency between the partners, and it contributes to the value of the marriage.  
 Within the New Home Economics framework men and women have different 
comparative advantages in household and market activities. Marriage may be seen as a 
contract between sexes: women trade their “expertise” in household activities, whereas men 
trade their income and market activities. According to Becker (1991), positive assortative 
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mating in non-market traits (e.g., similar intelligence, similar attractiveness) maximizes the 
utility of marriage in combination with negative assortative mating in earning potential, i.e., 
different income. For instance, if both partners are intelligent (positive assortative mating in 
nonmarket traits) and the man has a higher earning potential than the woman (negative 
assortative mating in market traits), partners maximize the gains from marriage. However, 
with increasing women’s human capital and participation in the labor market, Becker himself 
acknowledged that the division of labor may be detached from sex roles: “husbands would be 
more specialized in household work and wives to market activities in half marriages and the 
reverse would occur in the other half” (Becker 1991:78). 
As a result of Becker’s specialization model, it is possible to distinguish between two 
types of mechanisms that drive the relationship between market traits, e.g., earning potential, 
and fertility: the income effect and the price effect. The price effect is typical for those 
partners that specialize in household activities, traditionally the women, since a higher income 
means greater opportunity costs, i.e., the time spent in unpaid work substitutes the time spent 
in the market. The income effect characterizes the relationship between earning potential and 
fertility for partners who specialize in labor market activities, typically men, since a higher 
income will allow them to afford more children. Traditionally, a pairing would be conducive 
to fertility if the woman has a lower earning potential than her partner. Given the societal 
changes that occurred in the early 1970s, a specialization model is not necessarily established 
on traditional gender roles: the overall imbalance in earning potential between partners can be 
conducive to childbearing. 
Specialization, however, may not be the most efficient family model. The specialization 
of partners in paid and unpaid work can be troublesome, especially in times of crisis, divorce, 
or death of the partner (Oppenheimer 1988; 1994). After the Second World War, the desire to 
achieve and maintain a higher standard of living increased, and families with exclusively stay-
at-home women were penalized (Blossfeld and Drobnič 2001). Oppenheimer (1994) 
suggested that given the structural changes in a globalized world, the pooling of resources 
between partners is a more efficient family model compared to specialization. Women’s 
employment may be an adaptive strategy that permits to diversify the family resources and to 
raise the economic living standards. If partners are interchangeable in their roles, they can 
adapt more quickly and efficiently to the needs of the family. Oppenheimer (1988) argues that 
the gains from marriage would derive from the possibilities to increase the standards of living 
by marrying a partner with higher earning potential than herself or himself. However, the 
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consequences for fertility in a dual-earner society are not straightforward. First, a high level of 
earning potential at couples’ disposal helps when facing the costs of children. Nevertheless, 
the costs of children are not fixed for every couple since people desire that their own children 
have a similar or higher standard of living than themselves (Oppenheimer 1994; Hobcraft and 
Kiernan 1995). As a consequence, higher earning potential also means higher costs of 
children.  
Independently of who is the partner with the highest earning potential, a higher level of 
earning potential may be functional to meet a two-child family ideal. The ideal number of 
children that couples would like to have, especially in low-fertility contexts, is an increasingly 
studied topic of research. Sobotka and Beaujouan (2014) showed that a two-child family ideal 
is persistent across time and contexts, while findings have been unclear on the role of 
education and gender differences in shaping fertility intentions (Puur et al. 2008; Beaujouan et 
al. 2013; Testa 2014). The underlying assumption is that the two-child ideal is not dependent 
on the level of education or field of study, but, as we will see in the next section, this may not 
be the case. 
The cultural endowment of education 
As already mentioned, the cultural endowment of education may also affect fertility, either 
positively or negatively. The proponents of the Second Demographic Transition (SDT) stress 
that a high level of education is associated with post-materialist values, i.e., self-fulfillment 
and autonomy. In particular, more highly educated individuals would hold more liberal and 
anti-conformist behaviors and would be more inclined to non-traditional family forms 
(Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 1998), which would result in lower fertility rates. The intensive 
student role, with ensuing postponement of family formation, could lead to a loss of interest 
in forming a family due to other priorities, such as having a good career, that are generated 
while being in education (Rindfuss et al. 1988). 
While the scholars of SDT did not keep a gender perspective, Bernhardt (2004:26) 
suggested that values such as autonomy and self-actualization gained more emphasis in 
women’s lives rather than men’s lives, since for the former being economically independent 
was a new achievement, whereas for the latter, it was the norm. According to Bernhardt 
(2004), the central concepts of the SDT are not gender neutral, but rather they have different 
meanings for men and women. This is also linked to the fact that the changes in women’s and 
men’s lives with regard to the balance between public (institutions) and private sphere 
(family) did not occur synchronically (England 2010; Goldscheider et al. 2015). In the first 
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phase, women’s lives were changed from being a homemaker to participating in tertiary 
education and working full time. The fact that during this phase men and women were 
unequally sharing domestic and economic tasks has contributed to what the SDT made its 
features: cohabitation and divorce. In the second phase, instead, men’s lives change by 
accepting to be more involved in the private sphere. An equal share of domestic tasks as well 
as economic responsibilities would be conducive to fertility (Esping-Andersen and Billari 
2015; Goldscheider et al. 2015). Still, when that gender equity will be achieved depends on 
men’s attitudes towards the family, i.e., the partnership, childbearing, and childrearing 
(Goldscheider 2012). 
A higher level of education is associated with gender egalitarian attitudes, especially 
concerning men’s behavior within the household (Kravdal and Rindfuss 2008; Esping-
Andersern 2009; Sullivan et al. 2014). An equal share of domestic and economic 
responsibilities would help in reducing the opportunity costs of childbearing, which otherwise 
would be concentrated only on one of the partners (Torr and Short 2004; Kravdal and 
Rindfuss 2008; Goldscheider et al. 2013). 
The choice of the field of study, like the level of education, may also reflect attitudes and 
preferences that affect fertility behavior. The gender composition of the field of study may be 
the result of pre-determined choices about parenthood. Perhaps women (but also men) may 
choose their field of study according to their attitudes about traditional gender roles (Van 
Bavel 2010). Men who choose a typically male-dominated field and women who self-select 
themselves in female-represented fields may have gender-stereotypical norms about the role 
of mother and father. On top of the self-selection, the field of study may affect attitudes about 
gender roles via a socialization process during enrollment and future occupation (Ohlsson-
Wijk 2015a). For instance, women enrolled in health studies or in teaching may be inclined to 
socialize about more typical feminine roles, such as caregivers (Hoem et al. 2006a; Begall and 
Mills 2013; Ohlsson-Wijk 2015a). Similarly, men enrolled in service studies (e.g., security, 
environmental protection) may socialize about more typically masculine roles, such as 
breadwinners. 
In a partnership context, the fields of study of the partners relate to each other. We could 
define a “stereotypical couple” as one constituted of a man who graduated in a male-
dominated field and a woman who graduated in a female-dominated field. This definition 
reflects the argument that socialization about parenting roles with people of their own sex 
enhances traditional gender roles and expectations about fathering and mothering (i.e., being 
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the breadwinner and the caregiver, respectively). Within a stereotypical couple, traditional 
gender identities may not be questioned, even if the earning potential of the partners is similar 
or even imbalanced in favor of the woman. 
Previous empirical findings  
Previous findings related to different countries showed that if both partners are highly 
educated, the transition rate to the second and third birth is higher compared to couples where 
both partners have a medium level of education (Dribe and Stanfors 2010; Nitsche et al. 
2015). For the first birth, studies on the Netherlands and Finland showed that models-fit 
improved when male’s partner characteristics were included; however, woman’s 
characteristics were more relevant to predict first birth rates. Moreover, these studies on first 
births did not find an effect of the educational pairing, i.e., the interaction between his and her 
education (Begall 2013; Jaloovara and Mittienen 2013). Focusing on Flemish and Dutch 
couples formed in the 1980s, Corijn et al. (1996) showed that couples with a highly educated 
woman tended to postpone parenthood compared to less educated homogamous couples. In 
line with this finding, Nitsche et al. (2015) found that in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the UK, homogamous highly educated couples were more 
likely to postpone the first birth compared to other pairings. In Italy, a more traditional 
context was found with regard to gender roles: Vignoli et al. (2012) found that men’s income 
potential was more important than women’s in predicting a first birth. The authors, however, 
noted that having a permanent type of contract increased the likelihood of first birth for both 
women and men. 
Concerning the field of study, several studies showed that women graduated in a typical 
female-dominated field of study have a higher rate of first birth compared to their 
counterparts who graduated in fields with lower presence of women (Lappegård and Rønsen 
2005; Martín-García and Baizan 2006; Van Bavel 2010; Tesching 2012; Begall and Mill 
2013; Michelmore and Musick 2013), while mixed results have been found for higher order 
births and completed fertility (Hoem et la. 2006a; 2006b; Tesching 2012). Martín-García 
(2009) and Lappegård et al. (2011) showed that female-dominated fields were not conducive 
to childbearing for men in Spain and Norway, respectively. Overall, the interpretation of 
results pointed towards the fact that female-dominated fields are typically less profitable in 
terms of earnings, they tend to have a lower risk of skill depreciation but good compatibility 
between work and family. 
 117 
 
Among those studies, only Van Bavel (2010) distinguished the effects of two important 
characteristics of the field of study, controlling for the gender composition: earning profile 
and attitude towards gender roles. The author found that women who graduated in disciplines 
with higher earning profile tend to have a higher likelihood to postpone motherhood. Some 
typically female-dominated fields, e.g., health and welfare, were among those fields with a 
high earning profile. Moreover, women graduated in disciplines where attitudes towards 
gender roles were more progressive also tended to postpone motherhood. The fields of study 
with a higher inclination towards traditional gender-role attitudes, however, were not 
necessarily concentrated among the female-dominated fields, since variations across 
educational levels and across countries were found. 
Research hypotheses 
Based on the theoretical arguments and previous findings, we formulate four hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1 builds on the general argument that specialization within the household is an 
efficient family model, and as such it is conducive to childbearing. The basic assumption is 
that an imbalance of earning potential between partners leads towards a division of labor: the 
partner with higher earning potential specializes in paid labor market activities, whereas the 
partner with lower earning potential specializes in unpaid work. Focusing on two 
dimensions—level of education and earning potential by field of study—we expect that 
couples where one of the partners is more educated than the other will have higher birth rates 
than homogamous couples, i.e., partners have the same level of education. Similarly, we 
expect that couples where one partner graduated in a field of study with a higher earning 
potential than the field of study of his/her partner will have higher birth rates than couples 
where both partners have the same earning potential.  
Hypothesis 2 is a more specific version of the previous one, and it based on the Beckerian 
argument, according to which an imbalance of earning potential in favor of the man leads to a 
division of labor based on sex-roles; in turn, this division of labor may be conducive to 
childbearing. To find evidence for this hypothesis, we should observe that hypergamous 
couples (i.e., where the man is more educated than the woman) have higher birth rates than 
couples where the woman is more educated than the man or in homogamous couples. 
Accordingly, we expect that couples where the man has a higher earning potential than the 
woman will have higher birth rates compared to couples where both partners have a similar 
earning potential or couples where the woman earns more than the man.  
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Hypothesis 3, in contrast, is based on the pooling of resources argument, according to 
which a higher combined earning potential may lead to higher birth rates since those with 
higher earning potential may more easily afford the costs of children. Overall, we expect that 
couples where both partners are highly educated have higher fertility rates than other pairings. 
We also expect that a higher earning potential of the partners, given their field of study, 
enhances fertility.  
Finally, given that a socialization processes with people of their own sex may enhance 
stereotypical attitudes towards gender roles as long as traditional gender roles are conducive 
to childbearing, we expect that gender-stereotypical couples have higher fertility compared to 
other pairings, after accounting for level of education, and earning potential (hypothesis 4). 
Data and methods 
Sample selection and dependent variables 
We used Generation and Gender Surveys (GGS) of eight European countries, which collected 
information on the field of study, and we focused on respondents born between 1960-1987. 
The countries included are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Lithuania, 
Poland, and Romania. In order to have information about both partners’ characteristics, we 
had to select only those who were in a co-residential union at the time of interview; from an 
initial sample of 44690 respondents, we dropped 16302 respondents who were not living with 
a partner at the time of the interview. Despite this selection, additional inspections of the data 
showed that we were able to include a high proportion of first, second, and third births 
(~90%), which occur in the whole sample. We acknowledge, however, the selective nature of 
our sample, and we discuss the consequences of this in the conclusion section.   
We also dropped couples without information on partners’ education (n=244) and same-
sex couples. To keep the sample homogenous, we excluded couples in which one of the 
partners had a child from a previous relationship (n=3077). Since the focus of the study is 
fertility, we selected couples in which the woman was 15-45 years old at the beginning of the 
co-residential union. We start our observational period at the time of co-residential union, and 
we censor the couple after 15 years or at the time of the interview, whichever comes first. We 
dropped couples who had missing information about the timing of union formation (n=99) 
and first birth (n=28). Since we apply event history analyses, we need to exclude couples with 
a negative time to event, that is, couples who had their first child before the start of the co-
residential union (n=1219); the final sample totaled of 23363 couples.  
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With regard to higher order births, the time process is given by the time spent from the 
previous birth till the subsequent conception, and censoring occurred after 15 years (or 
interview time). The couples at risk of having a second child were those who had a first child. 
We dropped respondents with an invalid time to event for survival analysis (n=88), and we 
obtained a total sample of 19225 couples. The procedure for the third birth is the same as the 
one followed for the second birth. The respondents at risk were those who had a second child 
during the observational period. Overall, 7386 cases were deleted because they did not 
experience a second birth, and 51 cases were excluded because of a negative time to event. 
The total sample for the third birth amounted to 11876 couples. See Table 3.A1 in Appendix 
3.A for details regarding the sample selection.  
Main independent variables 
Pairing by level of education 
The educational pairing is defined as the combined educational attainment of the partners. 
Collapsing categories from the international standard classification of education (ISCED 
1997), we grouped individuals into three levels of attainment: low, medium, and high. The 
first group includes those who completed primary plus lower secondary school (at least 8 
years of schooling, ISCED 0, 1, 2). The medium category consists of individuals who attained 
the upper-secondary and post-secondary level (ISCED 3, 4). Finally, respondents and their 
partners were defined highly educated if they received a bachelor/master/PhD degree (ISCED 
5, 6). Next, we used a compound measure which interacts partners’ educational levels, and we 
distinguished three categories: couples where men and women have the same educational 
attainment, i.e., homogamous couples (“both low” (1); “both medium” (2), “both high” (3)); 
two categories for hypergamy (couples in which man is highly educated and the woman 
medium or low educated (4), and couples in which men are medium educated and women low 
educated (5)); two categories for hypogamy (couples in which the woman is highly educated 
and the man medium or low educated (6), and couples in which women are medium educated 
and men low educated (7)). 
Pairing by earning potential given the field of study  
The field of study variable in GGS was collected as an open question, and it refers to the main 
discipline of the highest level of education attained. To harmonize the categories across 
countries and across surveys, since we needed a compatible variable between GGS and the 
 120 
 
European Labor Force Surveys (EU-LFS), we followed UNESCO/ISCED guidelines8 for the 
field of study. The variable consists of nine categories, including general/unspecified field (1); 
humanities and arts (2); social sciences/business/law (3); science and technology (4); 
agriculture (5); education (6); health and welfare (7); services (8). A detailed description of 
each category is available in Table 2.A1 of Appendix 2.A (cf. Chapter 2). These categories 
refer to respondents with a medium or high level of education only,  since the field of study in 
EU-LFS surveys is not applicable for low educated individuals (ISCED <= 2), this group 
represents a separate category. 
We used the 2009-2013 EU-LFS data and by means of OLS regressions, we estimated 
the earning potential (measured in income deciles). Overall, we estimated 144 OLS 
regressions, one for each cluster defined by three variables: field of study (9 categories), 
country (8 categories), and sex (2 categories). Appendix 2.A explains the procedure in the 
detail (cf. Chapter 2). Next, given the OLS estimations, we predicted the income deciles for 
the age group 50-54 in the year 2009, these values were linked to the GGS respondents based 
on their country, field of study, and sex. We finally included in our models the earning 
potential of each partner as deviation from the mean of the country to indicate variation in 
earning potential within the country, i.e., across fields of study.  
In all models, we kept the earning potential indicator as a continuous variable. In order to 
construct an indicator of partners’ combined earning potential, we categorized the earning 
potential in three groups: low (deviation lower or equal -0.5), medium (deviation comprised 
between -0.5 and 0.5), and high (deviation higher or equal 0.5). Next, we constructed an 
indicator of relative partners’ earning potential: homogamous couples, i.e., both partners are 
in the same category of earning potential; hypergamous couples, i.e., the man has a higher 
earning potential than his partner; and hypogamous couples, i.e., the woman has a higher 
earning potential than her partner. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show the deviation from the mean of 
the country, i.e. the earning potential, in both a continuous and categorical scale for men and 
women, respectively. 
                                                 
8  http://www.uis.unesco.org/Education/Pages/international-standard-classification-of-education.aspx accessed 
the 14th  September 2015. 
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Figure 3.1 Deviation from the mean of the country: men 
 
Sources: Own calculations on EU-LFS and GGS data 
Notes: Education, Services and Health & Welfare are not available categories in French GGS data 
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Figure 3.2 Deviation from the mean of the country: women 
 
Sources: Own calculations on EU-LFS and GGS data 
Notes: Education, Services and Health & Welfare are not available categories in French GGS data 
 
Pairing by type of field 
We further used the UNESCO/OECD/Eurostat database on education—which is an 
administrative data collection that is administered jointly by the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific, and Cultural Organization - Institute for Statistics (UNESCO-UIS), the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the Statistical 
Office of the European Union (EUROSTAT)—to obtain the share of women within a field by 
country and across levels of education. This database has time series from 1998 till 2012 for 
the absolute number of graduates (both sexes) in each field of study, excluding the 
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general/unspecified field9 . We extracted the number of females and the total number of 
graduates for each field and country, pooling data of ISCED 1997 from level 3 to 6 to 
calculate the proportion of women by country and field. We calculated the proportion of 
women by field, country, and year, and we averaged over the years available10 for each 
country (see Chapter 2, Figure 2.1 that shows the share of women by field of study and 
country).  
To classify each field according to the share of women, we partly followed the 
categorization proposed by Oppermann (2014), who defined male-dominated fields with a 
share of women lower than 40% and female-dominated fields if the share was higher than 
85%. We used a symmetrical categorization, instead, to obtain more balanced categories: (1) 
male-dominated fields of study (proportion of women lower than 40%); (2) balanced 
(proportion of women between 40-60%); (3) female-dominated (proportion of women higher 
than 60%); a missing category (low educated group). Then, we created a variable that 
represents the pairing by type of field; overall, there would be 16 categories, but we will only 
focus on categories that do not include a low educated partner.  
Other control variables 
In all models, we controlled for the age difference between partners: age difference of 0 or 1 
(age homogamy); if the woman is older than the man; the man is older than the woman 
between 2-4 years; or the man is older than the woman 5 years or more. Furthermore, we 
included the respondent’s sex, respondent’s enrollment in education (time varying); union’s 
order of the respondent, and the type of union as time varying covariate. In models of first 
birth, we accounted for the woman’s age at union formation (centered at age 22) and its 
square. For higher order births, we included the woman’s age at first birth centered at age 25 
and its square. Table 3.1 gives detailed information on the composition of total sample and 
descriptive statistics about the independent variables. 
 
  
                                                 
9 Since Eurostat does not provide information on the general/unspecified field of study, we calculated the 
proportion of women in this category using GGS data themselves, considering all men and women born between 
1960-1987 with at least upper secondary degree. 
10 We dropped year 2003 for Romania because of inconsistency in the data: the number of graduated women in 
two fields of study, Humanities-Arts and Social Sciences-Business, was higher than the total number of 
graduates. 
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Table 3.1 Detailed description of the sample 
 
  Austria Belgium Bulgaria CzechR. France Lithuania Poland Romania Total 
Respondent's sex (%) 
         Male 37.97 45.74 36.83 44.93 42.24 52.18 42.93 49.07 43.99 
Female 62.03 54.26 63.17 55.07 57.76 47.82 57.07 50.93 56.01 
Union's cohort (%) 
         1975-1989 18.73 24.34 39.85 27.80 27.20 28.46 21.48 33.89 27.72 
1990-1999 41.68 36.75 44.32 39.67 46.13 38.75 34.94 48.50 41.34 
2000-2010 39.59 38.91 15.83 32.53 26.67 32.79 43.57 17.60 30.94 
Educational pairings (%) 
         Both low educated 3.49 8.83 13.93 2.79 5.38 2.78 1.56 12.12 6.36 
Both medium educated 52.32 17.46 45.18 64.69 29.95 48.80 52.13 52.09 45.33 
Both highly educated 11.11 35.70 13.15 8.09 26.02 16.41 18.75 9.13 17.29 
He high she lower 13.58 8.10 3.50 9.25 7.48 8.82 5.00 3.61 7.42 
He medium she low 8.30 6.05 5.45 3.99 7.56 3.06 3.28 15.23 6.62 
He lower she high 7.92 16.30 13.23 5.62 15.65 14.62 15.25 3.58 11.52 
He low she medium 3.28 7.57 5.55 5.57 7.96 5.51 4.02 4.24 5.46 
Union's order (%) 
         First union 84.33 65.56 98.67 94.11 87.41 97.51 97.77 98.54 90.49 
Higher order 15.67 34.44 1.33 5.89 12.59 2.49 2.23 1.46 9.51 
Age difference (%) 
         Age homogamy 21.97 26.92 19.38 23.59 26.80 26.01 25.02 18.60 23.54 
Woman older 2+ 12.35 12.57 6.90 7.72 12.59 10.45 10.27 8.29 10.14 
Man older 2-4 37.63 37.12 37.80 41.04 37.04 42.87 39.02 36.20 38.59 
Man older 5+ 28.05 23.40 35.92 27.64 23.57 20.66 25.68 36.92 27.73 
Pairing earning potential(%) 
         Homogamy 46.49 59.10 63.26 40.41 58.20 51.29 43.46 60.84 52.88 
Hypergamy 28.91 19.56 9.58 45.93 31.18 31.40 42.85 23.15 29.07 
Hypogamy 24.61 21.35 27.15 13.66 10.63 17.31 13.69 16.01 18.05 
Pairing by gender  
composition of the field (%) 
         Both male 5.02 6.26 18.18 10.14 11.85 10.00 14.12 38.94 14.31 
Both balanced 9.62 10.94 1.88 7.09 0.66 11.64 1.11 3.08 5.75 
Both female 10.26 11.99 13.18 16.08 19.41 15.31 23.73 4.24 14.28 
She male/He balanced 1.06 7.10 3.84 3.15 0.92 4.29 1.52 1.96 2.98 
She male/He female 1.36 6.10 3.48 1.68 5.29 2.82 3.38 5.86 3.75 
She male/He low 0.30 4.47 2.05 0.89 1.36 1.39 1.52 3.55 1.94 
She balanced/He male 20.60 5.42 4.90 6.36 0.48 8.78 3.54 3.30 6.67 
She balanced/He female 4.34 6.83 0.82 2.79 0.17 3.84 0.68 1.12 2.57 
She balanced/He low 1.58 4.63 1.28 1.42 0.09 2.41 0.51 0.44 1.55 
She female/He male 22.78 9.15 21.94 26.96 35.11 19.84 39.10 8.38 22.91 
She female/He balanced 8.60 8.62 6.54 13.24 2.49 10.58 3.63 1.34 6.88 
She female/He low 1.75 2.05 2.46 3.31 8.44 3.18 2.30 0.34 2.98 
She low/He male 6.30 1.21 3.14 2.21 6.43 1.22 2.60 12.90 4.50 
She low/He balanced 1.40 3.52 1.21 1.26 0.35 1.59 0.35 0.75 1.30 
She low/He female 1.53 2.89 1.18 0.63 1.57 0.33 0.33 1.68 1.27 
Both low 3.49 8.83 13.93 2.79 5.38 2.78 1.56 12.12 6.36 
Her earning potential (mean) 4.79 5.43 3.78 4.55 4.30 3.95 5.56 3.47 4.48 
His earning potential (mean) 6.06 6.59 5.40 5.69 6.04 5.02 6.90 4.96 5.83 
Woman's age at  
union formation (mean) 22.72 23.81 20.84 22.14 22.84 22.14 22.98 21.44 22.36 
Number of events 
         First births 1736 1515 3738 1409 1769 1966 4414 2751 19298 
Second births 1193 1056 2164 896 1312 1058 2833 1408 11920 
Third births 322 322 242 153 412 177 844 284 2767 
N 2349 1902 4143 1903 2287 2449 5120 3210 23363 
Source: Own calculations on GGS data 
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Analytical strategy 
We apply piecewise linear hazard models to estimate the effect of pairing by education and 
field of study on first, second, and third birth rates, using the aML software (Lillard and Panis 
2003). When studying the effect of education on higher order births, several studies argued 
that is important to account for the selection into parenthood (Kravdal 2001; Kravdal 2007; 
Kreyenfeld 2002). Following Kravdal (2001), we controlled for the selectivity into 
parenthood by modeling first, second, and third births jointly, where birth episodes are nested 
within couples. The system of equations can be formally displayed as follows: 
lnh(t)1 = γ ′T(t) + β ′X(t) + ε 
lnh(t)2 = γ ′T(t) + β ′X(t) + ε 
lnh(t)3 = γ ′T(t) + β ′X(t) + ε 
The superscripts 1, 2, and 3 refer to the equation for the first, second, and third birth, 
respectively, and lnh(t) is the log-hazard of occurrence at time t. In the equation for first birth, 
γ ′T(t) is a piecewise linear transformation of time since household formation, with nodes at 2, 
3, 5, 7, and 10 years. For the second and third birth, γ ′T(t) is a piecewise linear 
transformation of time since previous birth, with nodes at 2, 4, 6 and 11 years. The covariate 
profile (both for fixed and time-varying covariates) is given by β′X (t), which shifts the 
baseline hazard up or down. The random variable ε represents the unobserved heterogeneity 
term, which is assumed to be normally distributed with mean 0 and variance 2, which will be 
estimated. The distribution of ε is approximated by ten integration points in our models. 
Separate modeling for each birth transition consists of excluding ε in each equation. To take 
into account the unobserved factors related to countries’ characteristics, we used a country-
fixed effect approach by estimating countries’ dummies in all of our models (Wooldridge 
2010; Bryan and Jenkins 2015).  
We proceeded by estimating models based on two different samples. A first set of models 
included the low educated partners. In order to test the effect of pairing by type of field, 
which is not available for the low educated group, we opted to run analyses only with a 
sample of medium and highly educated partners. Thus, in the latter case, we will have 
pairings that are constituted by only medium and highly educated people. 
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Results 
In this section we show and discuss the results concerning the main independent variables, the 
estimates of the control variables can be found in Appendix 3.B. Overall, we found that the 
effect of earning potential is the same for both partners: a higher earning potential tends to 
slow down the transition to first and higher order births. The role of education, depending on 
the birth order, differs between partners. In the following sections, we discuss in detail the 
results for the first and higher order births by showing both models with and without the 
group of low educated partners. The last section deals with deviations from the general 
pattern.  
First births  
The results for first births point towards a more traditional pattern of the role of educational 
resources within the couple. The first model (Table 3.2 - M1) shows the effect of educational 
pairing after accounting for the control variables. Couples with one highly educated woman or 
two highly educated partners tend to have a lower first birth rates compared to the 
hypergamous couples with a highly educated man. This is in line with our second hypothesis 
according to which an imbalance of education in favor of the man, i.e., the man is more 
educated than the woman, is conducive to fertility. However, these hypergamous couples do 
not have higher first birth rates overall: low and medium educated homogamous couples have 
higher first birth rates. The low educated homogamous couples have even higher first birth 
rates compared to their medium educated counterpart.  
Once we include the earning potential by field of study (Table 3.2 – M2, M3, M4), the 
educational gradient is weakened only to some extent. The earning potential has a negative 
sign for both partners, indicating that fields with higher deviation from the country mean 
delay the transition to parenthood overall. However, only the male partner’s earning potential 
is significant. Findings indicate that even after controlling for the earning potential, 
hypogamous and hypergamous couples differ. The difference between the hypergamous and 
hypogamous couples with a highly educated partner is more marked. In general, a higher level 
of woman’s education negatively affects the transition to first birth. Still, even if 
hypergamous couples have higher rates than hypogamous couples, we found that hypogamous 
couples with a highly educated woman have 17% higher first birth rates than couples where 
both partners are highly educated (t-statistic=4.83). We do not find, instead, any statistically 
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significant difference between hypergamous and hypogamous couples concerning the 
differential in earning potential (M5). 
The gradient in first births points towards the fact that a higher earning potential in terms 
of profitable field of study leads to a postponement of first birth, which is in contrast with our 
third hypothesis, according to which a higher earning potential enhances fertility. Similarly, a 
high level of education tend to delay the transition to first birth overall. This effect is 
particularly strong if the partner with the highest level of education is the woman. The 
findings are more in line with the second hypothesis: a high level of education for the man is 
associates with higher first birth rates only if the man is not partnered with a highly educated 
woman. 
Only medium and highly educated partners 
To test our fourth hypothesis about the effect of pairing by type of field, we ran models 
considering a sample comprised of medium and highly educated partners only (Table 3.2 - 
M6). The results for the effect of educational pairings are in line with those obtained by 
including all the levels of education.  
We tested our fourth hypothesis by comparing the gender stereotypical couples, i.e., the 
man graduated in a male-dominated field and the woman graduated in a female-dominated 
field, with all the other pairings by type of field. As expected, gender-stereotypical couples 
tend to have higher first birth rates overall. However, only in two cases is there a statistical 
significant difference, i.e., when both partners graduated in a balanced field or female-
dominated field. Namely, fields with more women do not necessarily lead towards higher 
fertility for both partners, at least with regard to first births. 
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Table 3.2 Regression coefficients for the transition to first birth: joint model 
 
 
M1 
 
M2 
 
M3 
 
M4 
 
M5 
 
M6 
 Educational pairing  
(Ref. He high she lower) 
            Both low 0.337 *** 0.311 *** 0.232 *** 0.217 *** 0.217 *** 
  
 
(0.055) 
 
(0.058) 
 
(0.061) 
 
(0.063) 
 
(0.063) 
   Both medium 0.096 * 0.094 * 0.077 * 0.076 * 0.076 * 0.093 * 
 
(0.038) 
 
(0.038) 
 
(0.038) 
 
(0.038) 
 
(0.038) 
 
(0.040) 
 Both high -0.320 *** -0.317 *** -0.317 *** -0.315 *** -0.315 *** -0.326 *** 
 
(0.041) 
 
(0.041) 
 
(0.041) 
 
(0.041) 
 
(0.041) 
 
(0.043) 
 He medium she low 0.284 *** 0.258 *** 0.263 *** 0.246 *** 0.243 *** 
  
 
(0.052) 
 
(0.056) 
 
(0.053) 
 
(0.056) 
 
(0.057) 
   He lower she high -0.132 ** -0.127 ** -0.155 *** -0.151 *** -0.152 *** -0.143 ** 
 
(0.044) 
 
(0.044) 
 
(0.044) 
 
(0.044) 
 
(0.044) 
 
(0.046) 
 He low she medium 0.107 
 
0.104 
 
-0.007 
 
-0.006 
 
-0.011 
   
 
(0.055) 
 
(0.055) 
 
(0.062) 
 
(0.062) 
 
(0.064) 
   earning potential woman 
  
-0.019 
   
-0.013 
 
-0.020 
 
0.005
 
   
(0.015) 
   
(0.015) 
 
(0.024) 
 
(0.028) 
 earning potential man 
    
-0.078 *** -0.076 *** -0.070 * -0.087 ** 
     
(0.020) 
 
(0.020) 
 
(0.027) 
 
(0.033) 
 Pairing by earning potential 
 (Ref. He higher potential 
than she) 
            Both similar earning 
potential 
        
0.004 
 
-0.048 
 
         
(0.031) 
 
(0.035) 
 She higher potential than 
he 
        
0.021 
 
-0.076 
 
         
(0.056) 
 
(0.065) 
 Pairing by gender 
composition of field (Ref. 
She female-He male) 
            Both male  
          
-0.036
 
           
(0.036) 
 Both balanced 
          
-0.109 * 
           
(0.052) 
 Both female  
          
-0.061 † 
           
(0.034) 
 She male he balanced 
          
-0.093 
 
           
(0.060) 
 She male he female 
          
-0.018 
 
           
(0.054) 
 She balanced he male 
          
-0.087 
 
           
(0.046) 
 She balanced he female 
          
-0.075 
 
           
(0.068) 
 She female he balanced 
          
-0.025 
   
          
(0.041) 
 ln-L -165418 
 
-165407 
 
-165398 
 
-165386 
 
-165374 
 
-128196 
  
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; Significance: '†'=10%;'*'=5%; '**'=1%; '***'=0.1%. All models 
include: duration splines, woman’s age at union formation and its square, union’s cohorts, respondent’s sex, 
respondent’s enrollment, union order of the respondent, type of union, age difference between partners, country 
dummies. 
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Higher order births  
The results concerning higher order births (displayed in Table 3.3 and Table 3.4) follow a 
slightly different pattern compared to first births. We found a U-shaped effect of educational 
pairing on second and third birth rates: both low and highly educated homogamous couples 
have a higher rate compared to medium homogamous couples. Hypergamous couples, despite 
having higher birth rates than medium homogamous educated couples, do not statistically 
differ from the highly educated homogamous couples. Hypogamous couples with a highly 
educated woman have a lower risk of second and third births compared to the hypergamous 
couples with a highly educated man (M1 in Table 3.3 and Table 3.4).  
After controlling for the earning potential of male and female partners, both types of 
hypogamous couples have lower second birth rates than hypergamous couples (Table 3.3 – 
M4). Our findings suggest that hypogamous couples are those with the lowest second and 
third birth rates, which is in line with the second hypothesis about the role of educational 
imbalance in favor of the man. Still, hypergamous couples and couples where both partners 
are highly educated do not differ statistically.  
Overall, these findings do not completely fit any of our hypotheses: a highly educated 
woman has higher second and third birth rates only if she mates with a highly educated 
partner. This is in line with theoretical arguments according to which highly educated men, 
who also tend to show gender egalitarian attitudes, may boost fertility, since it is likely that 
they are more willing to equally share the domestic work with their partners. 
Next, similarly to the results for first birth, we found that both partners’ earning potential 
is negatively associated with second and third birth rates, a finding which highlights the role 
of opportunity costs for both men and women (M4 in Table 3.3 and Table 3.4). We found that 
hypergamous couples – in terms of earning potential – have higher second birth rates than 
homogamous and hypogamous couples. This finding is pretty much in line with the second 
hypothesis according to which traditional imbalance in the earning potential is conducive to 
fertility.  
Only medium and highly educated partners 
The effect of pairing by level of education does not differ between the two sets of analyses. 
Also, the interaction between partners’ earning potential leads to the same findings, i.e., 
hypergamous couples having higher second birth rates compared to hypogamous and 
homogamous couples. With regard to either educational pairing or earning potential, we 
found support for our second hypothesis (M6 in Table 3.3 and Table 3.4).  
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After inspecting the data, we found that hypergamous couples where the man has a 
higher potential than the woman are mostly characterized by partners who are graduated in 
the same field of study; these fields include Science and Technology, Social Sciences, 
Business and Law, which are not typically conducive to fertility for women according to 
previous studies (Martín-García and Baizan 2006; Begall 2013; Van Bavel 2010). This 
finding highlights that assortative mating by earning potential and field of study may lead to 
different outcomes than those expected based on theories relative to women only.  
The gender composition does not explain this finding: after including the pairing by 
gender composition of the field in the model, we still found that hypergamous couples have 
higher second birth rates than hypogamous and homogamous couples (Table 3.3 - M6). The 
pattern of coefficients of the pairing by type of field is in line with our fourth hypothesis 
regarding the role of gender-stereotypical couples, but there are not significant effects. 
Moreover, we found that couples composed of a woman who graduated in a female 
dominated field and a man who graduated in a balanced field have higher birth rates, both for 
second and third births (M6 in Table 3.3 and Table 3.4), compared to stereotypical couples. 
These couples with the highest second and third birth rates are composed of women who 
graduated in typical feminine studies and men who graduated in Agriculture, since in some 
countries (i.e., Austria, Czech Republic, France, Poland, and Lithuania), Agriculture is 
considered a balanced field of study. Lappegård et al. (2011) speculated that men in 
Agriculture tend to be more traditional in terms of family size, in the sense that they are more 
inclined to have bigger families. 
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Table 3.3 Regression coefficients for the transition to second birth: joint model 
 
 
M1 
 
M2 
 
M3 
 
M4 
 
M5 
 
M6 
 Educational pairing 
 (Ref. He high she lower) 
            Both low 0.550 *** 0.451 *** 0.355 *** 0.283 *** 0.311 *** 
  
 
(0.064) 
 
(0.069) 
 
(0.072) 
 
(0.075) 
 
(0.076) 
   Both medium -0.056 
 
-0.065 
 
-0.089 
 
-0.095 * -0.093 * -0.055
 
 
(0.047) 
 
(0.047) 
 
(0.047) 
 
(0.047) 
 
(0.047) 
 
(0.049) 
 Both high 0.026 
 
0.039 
 
0.032 
 
0.043 
 
0.034 
 
0.017 
 
 
(0.052) 
 
(0.052) 
 
(0.052) 
 
(0.052) 
 
(0.052) 
 
(0.054) 
 He medium she low 0.202 ** 0.102 
 
0.167 ** 0.085 
 
0.086 
   
 
(0.062) 
 
(0.066) 
 
(0.062) 
 
(0.066) 
 
(0.068) 
   He lower she high -0.190 *** -0.170 ** -0.231 *** -0.211 *** -0.197 *** -0.201 *** 
 
(0.055) 
 
(0.055) 
 
(0.056) 
 
(0.056) 
 
(0.056) 
 
(0.058) 
 He low she medium 0.005 
 
-0.006 
 
-0.203 ** -0.199 ** -0.174 * 
  
 
(0.065) 
 
(0.065) 
 
(0.073) 
 
(0.074) 
 
(0.075) 
   earning potential woman 
  
-0.075 *** 
  
-0.064 *** 0.031 
 
-0.003
 
   
(0.019) 
   
(0.019) 
 
(0.031) 
 
(0.037) 
 earning potential man 
    
-0.148 *** -0.139 *** -0.235 *** -0.197 *** 
     
(0.026) 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.036) 
 
(0.043) 
 Pairing by earning potential  
(Ref. He higher potential than 
she) 
            Both similar earning 
potential 
        
-0.146 *** -0.135 ** 
         
(0.038) 
 
(0.043) 
 She higher potential than 
he 
        
-0.284 *** -0.178 * 
         
(0.071) 
 
(0.083) 
 Pairing by gender 
composition of field (Ref. 
She female-He male) 
            Both male 
          
-0.003 
 
           
(0.044) 
 Both balanced 
          
-0.031 
 
           
(0.065) 
 Both female 
          
-0.044 
 
           
(0.042) 
 She male he balanced 
          
-0.048 
 
           
(0.075) 
 She male he female 
          
-0.043 
 
           
(0.069) 
 She balanced he male 
          
-0.013 
 
           
(0.055) 
 She balanced he female 
          
-0.103 
 
           
(0.087) 
 She female he balanced 
          
0.140 ** 
  
          
(0.050) 
 ln-L -165418 
 
-165407 
 
-165398 
 
-165386 
 
-165374 
 
-128196 
  
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; Significance: '†'=10%; '*'=5%; '**'=1%; '***'=0.1%. All models 
include: duration splines, woman’s age at first birth and its square, union’s cohorts, respondent’s sex, 
respondent’s enrollment, union order of the respondent, type of union, age difference between partners, country 
dummies. 
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Table 3.4 Regression coefficients for the transition to third birth: joint model  
 
 
M1 
 
M2 
 
M3 
 
M4 
 
M5 
 
M6 
 Educational pairing 
 (Ref. He high she lower) 
            Both low 1.269 *** 1.308 *** 1.036 *** 0.937 *** 0.973 *** 
  
 
(0.105) 
 
(0.084) 
 
(0.129) 
 
(0.134) 
 
(0.135) 
   Both medium -0.157 
 
0.219 ** -0.193 * -0.200 * -0.196 * -0.117
 
 
(0.089) 
 
(0.072) 
 
(0.089) 
 
(0.089) 
 
(0.089) 
 
(0.097) 
 Both high 0.030 
 
0.168 
 
0.034 
 
0.052 
 
0.046 
 
0.033 
 
 
(0.101) 
 
(0.089) 
 
(0.101) 
 
(0.102) 
 
(0.102) 
 
(0.109) 
 He medium she low 0.380 *** 0.418 *** 0.341 ** 0.228 * 0.212 
   
 
(0.107) 
 
(0.086) 
 
(0.107) 
 
(0.116) 
 
(0.118) 
   He lower she high -0.336 ** -0.136 
 
-0.384 *** -0.352 ** -0.341 ** -0.330 ** 
 
(0.113) 
 
(0.088) 
 
(0.114) 
 
(0.116) 
 
(0.116) 
 
(0.123) 
 He low she medium 0.109 
 
0.262 ** -0.136 
 
-0.132 
 
-0.138 
   
 
(0.117) 
 
(0.089) 
 
(0.139) 
 
(0.140) 
 
(0.143) 
   earning potential woman 
  
-0.100 ** 
  
-0.089 * -0.016 
 
-0.110
 
   
(0.038) 
   
(0.038) 
 
(0.061) 
 
(0.074) 
 earning potential man 
    
-0.176 ** -0.164 ** -0.245 *** -0.198 * 
     
(0.056) 
 
(0.056) 
 
(0.073) 
 
(0.094) 
 Pairing by earning potential  
(Ref. He higher potential than 
she) 
            Both similar earning   
potential 
        
-0.158 * -0.057 
 
         
(0.072) 
 
(0.082) 
 She higher potential than he 
        
-0.208 
 
0.031 
 
         
(0.136) 
 
(0.161) 
 Pairing by gender composition 
of field 
 (Ref. She female-He male) 
            Both male 
          
-0.002 
 
           
(0.090) 
 Both balanced 
          
0.135 
 
           
(0.121) 
 Both female 
          
0.040 
 
           
(0.086) 
 She male he balanced 
          
0.012 
 
           
(0.146) 
 She male he female 
          
-0.106 
 
           
(0.145) 
 She balanced he male 
          
-0.014 
 
           
(0.106) 
 She balanced he female 
          
0.059 
 
           
(0.169) 
 She female he balanced 
          
0.167 † 
  
          
(0.100) 
 ln-L -165418 
 
-165407 
 
-165398 
 
-165386 
 
-165374 
 
-128196 
  
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; Significance: '†'=10%; '*'=5%; '**'=1%; '***'=0.1%. All models 
include: duration splines, woman’s age at first birth and its square, union’s cohorts, respondent’s sex, 
respondent’s enrollment, union order of the respondent, type of union, age difference between partners, country 
dummies. 
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Deviations from the general pattern 
Regional differences 
We should keep in mind that the above results are a stylized average of eight different 
European countries. Appendix 3.C shows results obtained by analyzing sub-groups of 
countries. What clearly stands out is that the U-shaped effect of educational pairing is mainly 
a result of the effect of education in very different groups of regions. In southern Eastern 
countries, i.e., Bulgaria and Romania, second and third birth rates are higher among lowly 
educated homogamous couples and lower among highly educated homogamous couples. It 
also emerged that the negative effect of women’s high education on second and third birth 
rates is driven by the presence of Central and Eastern European countries; overall, these 
findings are in line with previous studies regarding the effect of women’s education on second 
and third birth rates (Klesment et al. 2014; Wood et al. 2014).  
Sensitivity analyses  
As mentioned in the data section, we have to deal with a selective sample, i.e., we only 
observe fertility histories of those unions intact at the time of interview. We ran several 
sensitivity analyses to check how the results could be altered. At first, we analyzed the data by 
separating them into different cohorts. The youngest cohorts are more heterogeneous in terms 
of union stability given that their time of union formation is closer to the interview, and thus 
they may represent a less selective group (results are shown in Appendix 3.D). The analyses 
based on the sample of the youngest cohorts showed a very similar pattern with regard to the 
role of educational pairing and earning potential. Next, we specified a model where we 
censored first births after the first five years of union formation, so that all the couples are 
observed for the same amount of time. Results seem to be quite in line with our main general 
findings. In both kinds of sensitivity analyses, however, the effect of hypergamy according to 
the earning potential seems to be reduced, especially with regard to third birth rates.  
Discussion 
In this study, we explored the relationship between educational pairing and couples’ transition 
to first, second, and third births. We focused on the earning potential by field of study as an 
additional dimension of education, beyond the level of educational attainment of the partners. 
Compared to previous studies, we were able to estimate the earning potential of the field of 
study, overcoming endogeneity issues that scholars usually face when analyzing the role of 
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earnings. Moreover, we modeled the parities jointly, accounting for unobserved 
characteristics of the couple, which drive the selection into parenthood.  
Overall, we found consistent support for our second hypothesis according to which an 
imbalance of earning potential and education in favor of the man may be conducive to 
fertility. Still, variation across birth parities was found. In general, we found that 
hypergamous couples composed of a highly educated man tend to have higher first, second, 
and third birth rates compared to the hypogamous couples with a highly educated woman. 
While this finding is in line with our second hypothesis, we also found that hypergamous 
couples do not differ from the highly educated homogamous couples, at least with regard to 
the transition to higher order births. The fact that a traditional pairing may be conducive to 
first birth, it does not necessarily imply that is conducive to fertility overall. According to our 
findings, a highly educated woman enhances her fertility if mated with a highly educated 
man. This could be explained by the fact that highly educated partners “join forces” in 
overcoming opportunity costs by finding optimal solutions for both of them (Kravdal 2007; 
Kravdal and Rindfuss 2008). In particular, it can be that highly educated men behave in a 
more egalitarian way with their partners, which enable a highly educated woman to continue 
with childbearing without renouncing to her career.  
The role of educational level is quite different from the role of earning potential, since in 
all our models we found that a higher earning potential, especially of the male partner, leads 
to lower birth rates. These findings are against the expectation that a higher earning potential 
is positively associated with fertility (hypothesis 3). We found that an imbalance of earning 
potential in favor of the man enhances fertility which, in contrast, is line with the second 
hypothesis. Hypergamous couples showed higher second and third birth rates compared to 
hypogamous and homogamous couples.  
The main findings hold even when we exclude from the sample the lowly educated 
group. We had to ran separated analyses with a selected sample of medium and highly 
educated partners to test our fourth hypothesis regarding the role of pairing by type of field. 
We did not find evidence that gender-stereotypical couples have higher fertility rates than 
other pairings. The gender composition of the type of field does not play a role itself but via 
the role of earning potential. 
It could be, however, that the estimation of the earning potential may be rough due to the 
heterogeneity in terms of earnings within each group of fields considered. For instance, 
cultural studies, which typically lead to a lower earning potential, had to be clustered with 
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business and management, which instead are much more profitable. Unfortunately, EU-LFS 
data do not allow a more detailed estimation. Moreover, in order to avoid problems of 
endogeneity with the estimation of earning potential, we did not include part-time individuals; 
otherwise, especially for women, the estimation could have reflected labor force participation, 
which is also dependent on the motherhood status. However, since we only consider full-time 
working people, part of the differentials in the labor market success across fields of study is 
eliminated. In the future, it would be good to account for unemployment risks, if feasible, 
keeping in mind that unemployment risks are strongly related to the parenthood status as well. 
Future studies could approach the problem differently by exploring different scenarios, e.g., 
where women have same unemployment risks and earning potential of childless men. 
As already mentioned, our sample suffers from a selection bias since we only included 
unions that were intact at interview. As a result, it is likely that our sample includes more 
stable unions that tend to be more conducive to overall childbearing. The selectivity would 
not be a problem if dissolution rates are random across educational pairings. However, some 
divorce studies showed that when the woman is more educated than her partner, the couple is 
more likely to dissolve (Kalmijn 2003; Mäenpää and Jalovaara 2014). Changes over time 
have been observed since the women’s negative educational gradient in divorce rates is 
flattening out (Härkönen and Dronkers 2006; Matysiak et al. 2014). Country-specific studies 
showed that educational hypogamy does not necessarily lead to higher divorce rates, 
especially with regard to unions formed in the 1990s and afterwards (see Schwartz and Han 
2014 for the United States and Theunis et al. 2015 for Belgium).  
In order to check the sensitivity of our results to a possible sample-selection effect, we 
ran alternative models: (1) separating by group of cohorts and (2) censoring the first births 
after five years of union formation. Overall, results seem to be in line with the general pattern. 
In the future, it would be wise to switch from a retrospective to a prospective approach by 
using longitudinal data, if available, in a way that union dissolution could be integrated in the 
framework. The use of longitudinal data would also help in avoiding possible biases related to 
anticipatory effects (Hoem and Kreyenfeld 2006), since we used education of both partners as 
a time-constant variable.  
Overall, our results with regard to first birth seem to be in line with a recent study that 
examined the role of educational pairings on fertility in several European countries by using 
EU-SILC data (Nitsche et al. 2015). With regard to higher order births, however, we have 
different results. The authors found that highly educated homogamous couples tend to have 
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higher second and third birth rates compared to other pairings in general, and compared to 
hypergamous couples with a highly educated man in particular. In our study, we found no 
statistically significant difference between those hypergamous couples and the highly 
educated homogamous couples. This discrepancy may be associated with a different 
composition of the sample of countries. In contrast to Nitsche et al. (2015), our sample is 
constituted of several Central and Eastern European countries, where more traditional patterns 
are still observed. If we look at the results by group of countries, we found that only in 
Western European countries highly educated homogamous couples have higher second birth 
rates compared to other pairings, which is line with Nitsche et al. (2015). Still, this effect does 
not hold for third birth rates and for any other group of countries. Thus, it is also possible that 
the results of Nitsche et al. (2015) partly suffer of a selection bias, given that birth rates were 
not modeled jointly as we did in this study. In fact, without controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity, we would have underestimated the positive effect of lower education on higher 
order births.  
Further investigations are necessary to really understand the role of educational pairing 
for fertility. The next challenge will be to study macro-level factors related to the role of 
educational assortative mating for fertility. Our study gives a stylized average of eight 
different European countries, without delving deeper into country differences. As mentioned 
above, the pattern we obtained by analyzing separated regions clearly highlights differences 
among these European countries about the role of women and men in families. 
Notwithstanding, Western countries are not at the end of the Gender Revolution 
(Goldscheider et al. 2015), they are probably at a more advanced stage compared to, for 
instance, southern Eastern countries. Educational assortative mating may eventually have 
similar effects on fertility across European countries, which is in line with theories about the 
role of gender egalitarianism (Esping-Andersen and Billari 2015; Goldscheider et al. 2015). 
However, this convergence may not occur so quickly and the impact of educational 
assortative on fertility may have consequences for the reproduction of social inequalities in 
society. A polarized behavior of fertility in Europe (e.g., more educated couples have higher 
fertility rates in the West, whereas lower educated couples have higher fertility in the East) 
may lead to a widening of inequalities across European countries. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 3.A 
Table 3.A1 Sample selection 
 
 
N 
Initial sample size 44690 
not in co-residential union 16302 
respondent education missing 71 
partner's respondent education missing 173 
Homosexual couples 89 
Previous children from other relationships 3077 
Date union missing 99 
Date first birth missing 28 
Woman's age missing  249 
Time of birth <= date of union 1219 
Male partner's age missing or < 15 at time of union 20 
Sample first births 23363 
Sample second births 19225 
Sample third births 11876 
Source: Own calculation on GGS data 
 
In order to test the sensitivity of our analyses to the choice of first birth instead of first 
conception we ran analyses with a sample based on conception, for this reason we had to drop 
3792 couples. Results, however, remains substantially the same. 
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Appendix 3.B 
Table 3.B1 Regression coefficients for the transition to first birth, control variables 
 
 
M1 
 
M2 
 
M3 
 
M4 
 
M5 
 
M6 
 0-2 0.582 *** 0.583 *** 0.583 *** 0.584 *** 0.584 *** 0.559 *** 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.019) 
 2-3 -0.531 *** -0.532 *** -0.532 *** -0.532 *** -0.532 *** -0.498 *** 
 
(0.034) 
 
(0.034) 
 
(0.034) 
 
(0.034) 
 
(0.034) 
 
(0.038) 
 3-5 0.050 * 0.050 * 0.050 * 0.050 * 0.050 * 0.058 * 
 
(0.024) 
 
(0.024) 
 
(0.024) 
 
(0.024) 
 
(0.024) 
 
(0.026) 
 5-7 -0.096 ** -0.096 ** -0.096 ** -0.096 ** -0.096 ** -0.089 ** 
 
(0.030) 
 
(0.030) 
 
(0.030) 
 
(0.030) 
 
(0.030) 
 
(0.033) 
 7-10 -0.123 *** -0.123 *** -0.123 *** -0.123 *** -0.123 *** -0.117 *** 
 
(0.030) 
 
(0.030) 
 
(0.030) 
 
(0.030) 
 
(0.030) 
 
(0.033) 
 10+ -0.227 *** -0.227 *** -0.227 *** -0.227 *** -0.227 *** -0.220 *** 
 
(0.039) 
 
(0.039) 
 
(0.039) 
 
(0.039) 
 
(0.039) 
 
(0.042) 
 Constant -0.909 *** -0.906 *** -0.878 *** -0.876 *** -0.884 *** -0.749 *** 
 
(0.050) 
 
(0.050) 
 
(0.051) 
 
(0.051) 
 
(0.060) 
 
(0.071) 
 Union's cohort (Ref. 1990-1999) 
            1975-1989 0.007
 
0.007
 
0.007
 
0.006
 
0.006
 
0.064 * 
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.025) 
 2000-2010 -0.189 *** -0.189 *** -0.184 *** -0.184 *** -0.184 *** -0.194 *** 
 
(0.025) 
 
(0.025) 
 
(0.025) 
 
(0.025) 
 
(0.025) 
 
(0.027) 
 woage22 -0.021 *** -0.020 *** -0.020 *** -0.020 *** -0.020 *** -0.011 * 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.005) 
 woag22s -0.001 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.001 
 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.001) 
 Respondent enrollment (Ref. Not enrolled) -0.093 ** -0.091 ** -0.090 ** -0.090 ** -0.090 ** -0.068 * 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.030) 
 Sex respondent (Ref. Female) -0.087 *** -0.087 *** -0.087 *** -0.087 *** -0.087 *** -0.089 *** 
 
(0.018) 
 
(0.018) 
 
(0.018) 
 
(0.018) 
 
(0.018) 
 
(0.021) 
 Age difference (Ref. Difference <=1) 
            She older than he (2+ years) 0.100 ** 0.101 ** 0.102 ** 0.102 ** 0.102 ** 0.140 *** 
 
(0.037) 
 
(0.037) 
 
(0.037) 
 
(0.037) 
 
(0.037) 
 
(0.041) 
 He older than she (2-4 years) 0.033 
 
0.033 
 
0.034 
 
0.034 
 
0.034 
 
0.041 
 
 
(0.023) 
 
(0.023) 
 
(0.023) 
 
(0.023) 
 
(0.023) 
 
(0.026) 
 He older than she (5+) 0.048 
 
0.048 
 
0.047 
 
0.047 
 
0.047 
 
0.055 
 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.030) 
 Respondent union order (Ref. First union) 0.150 *** 0.150 *** 0.150 *** 0.150 *** 0.151 *** 0.158 *** 
 
(0.040) 
 
(0.040) 
 
(0.040) 
 
(0.040) 
 
(0.040) 
 
(0.046) 
 Couple's marital status (Ref. Married) 
            Unmarried -1.668 *** -1.668 *** -1.667 *** -1.667 *** -1.667 *** -1.880 *** 
 
(0.030) 
 
(0.030) 
 
(0.030) 
 
(0.030) 
 
(0.030) 
 
(0.036) 
 Unknown -1.186 *** -1.186 *** -1.185 *** -1.185 *** -1.185 *** -1.374 *** 
 
(0.032) 
 
(0.032) 
 
(0.032) 
 
(0.032) 
 
(0.032) 
 
(0.039) 
 Country (Ref. Bulgaria) 
            France -0.578 *** -0.581 *** -0.587 *** -0.589 *** -0.585 *** -0.607 *** 
 
(0.035) 
 
(0.035) 
 
(0.035) 
 
(0.035) 
 
(0.037) 
 
(0.044) 
 Romania -0.580 *** -0.577 *** -0.583 *** -0.581 *** -0.578 *** -0.677 *** 
 
(0.033) 
 
(0.033) 
 
(0.033) 
 
(0.033) 
 
(0.034) 
 
(0.042) 
 Austria -0.627 *** -0.629 *** -0.641 *** -0.642 *** -0.641 *** -0.618 *** 
 
(0.039) 
 
(0.039) 
 
(0.039) 
 
(0.039) 
 
(0.040) 
 
(0.046) 
 Belgium -0.756 *** -0.759 *** -0.765 *** -0.767 *** -0.766 *** -0.689 *** 
 
(0.039) 
 
(0.039) 
 
(0.039) 
 
(0.039) 
 
(0.039) 
 
(0.046) 
 Lithuania -0.173 *** -0.176 *** -0.185 *** -0.187 *** -0.185 *** -0.239 *** 
 
(0.036) 
 
(0.036) 
 
(0.036) 
 
(0.036) 
 
(0.037) 
 
(0.041) 
 Poland -0.038 
 
-0.043 
 
-0.054 
 
-0.057 
 
-0.053 
 
-0.139 *** 
 
(0.032) 
 
(0.032) 
 
(0.032) 
 
(0.032) 
 
(0.035) 
 
(0.039) 
 Czech Republic -0.379 *** -0.381 *** -0.391 *** -0.392 *** -0.389 *** -0.423 *** 
 
(0.043) 
 
(0.043) 
 
(0.043) 
 
(0.043) 
 
(0.045) 
 
(0.049) 
  
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; Significance: '*'=5%; '**'=1%; '***'=0.1%. Each model included: 
M1=educational pairing only; M2=M1+ man’s earning potential; M3=M1+ woman’s earning potential; 
M4=M1+ both partners’ earning potential; M5=M4+ pairing by earning potential; M6=M5+pairing by gender 
composition of the field, without low educated group.  
 
  
 139 
 
Table 3.B2 Regression coefficients for the transition to second birth, control variables  
 
Splines M1 
 
M2 
 
M3 
 
M4 
 
M5 
 
M6 
 0-2 0.699 *** 0.700 *** 0.700 *** 0.700 *** 0.701 *** 0.754 *** 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.022) 
 2-4 -0.183 *** -0.183 *** -0.182 *** -0.182 *** -0.181 *** -0.180 *** 
 
(0.018) 
 
(0.018) 
 
(0.018) 
 
(0.018) 
 
(0.018) 
 
(0.021) 
 4-6 -0.125 *** -0.125 *** -0.125 *** -0.125 *** -0.125 *** -0.123 *** 
 
(0.024) 
 
(0.024) 
 
(0.024) 
 
(0.024) 
 
(0.024) 
 
(0.027) 
 6-11 -0.260 *** -0.259 *** -0.259 *** -0.259 *** -0.259 *** -0.255 *** 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.019) 
 11+ -0.223 *** -0.223 *** -0.223 *** -0.223 *** -0.223 *** -0.219 *** 
 
(0.053) 
 
(0.053) 
 
(0.053) 
 
(0.053) 
 
(0.053) 
 
(0.059) 
 Constant -3.210 *** -3.190 *** -3.152 *** -3.138 *** -2.976 *** -3.260 *** 
 
(0.064) 
 
(0.064) 
 
(0.065) 
 
(0.065) 
 
(0.076) 
 
(0.092) 
 Union's cohort (Ref. 1990-1999) 
            1975-1989 0.280 *** 0.279 *** 0.279 *** 0.279 *** 0.280 *** 0.312 *** 
 
(0.025) 
 
(0.025) 
 
(0.025) 
 
(0.025) 
 
(0.025) 
 
(0.028) 
 2000-2010 -0.344 *** -0.342 *** -0.337 *** -0.336 *** -0.335 *** -0.286 *** 
 
(0.036) 
 
(0.036) 
 
(0.036) 
 
(0.036) 
 
(0.036) 
 
(0.040) 
 woage25 -0.031 *** -0.030 *** -0.031 *** -0.030 *** -0.030 *** -0.026 *** 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.005) 
 woag25s 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
-0.001 
 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 Respondent enrollment (Ref. Not enrolled) -0.263 *** -0.253 *** -0.256 *** -0.248 *** -0.244 *** -0.218 *** 
 
(0.044) 
 
(0.044) 
 
(0.044) 
 
(0.044) 
 
(0.044) 
 
(0.046) 
 Sex respondent (Ref. Female) -0.053 * -0.053 * -0.052 * -0.052 * -0.053 * -0.068 ** 
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.026) 
 Age difference (Ref. Difference <=1) 
            She older than he (2+ years) 0.022
 
0.023
 
0.024
 
0.025
 
0.026
 
0.025
 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.052) 
 He older than she (2-4 years) 0.020 
 
0.021 
 
0.020 
 
0.021 
 
0.020 
 
0.055 
 
 
(0.029) 
 
(0.029) 
 
(0.029) 
 
(0.029) 
 
(0.029) 
 
(0.032) 
 He older than she (5+) 0.070 * 0.068 * 0.065 * 0.065 * 0.066 * 0.092 * 
 
(0.032) 
 
(0.032) 
 
(0.032) 
 
(0.032) 
 
(0.032) 
 
(0.036) 
 Respondent union order (Ref. First union) 0.104 
 
0.102 
 
0.105 
 
0.103 
 
0.103 
 
0.029 
 
 
(0.056) 
 
(0.056) 
 
(0.056) 
 
(0.056) 
 
(0.056) 
 
(0.063) 
 Couple's marital status (Ref. Married) 
            Unmarried -0.461 *** -0.460 *** -0.458 *** -0.459 *** -0.457 *** -0.575 *** 
 
(0.056) 
 
(0.056) 
 
(0.056) 
 
(0.056) 
 
(0.056) 
 
(0.068) 
 Unknown -0.465 *** -0.464 *** -0.464 *** -0.464 *** -0.468 *** -0.555 *** 
 
(0.048) 
 
(0.048) 
 
(0.048) 
 
(0.048) 
 
(0.048) 
 
(0.061) 
 Country (Ref. Bulgaria) 
            France 0.896 *** 0.888 *** 0.881 *** 0.874 *** 0.824 *** 1.110 *** 
 
(0.042) 
 
(0.042) 
 
(0.042) 
 
(0.042) 
 
(0.044) 
 
(0.055) 
 Romania -0.288 *** -0.279 *** -0.292 *** -0.285 *** -0.319 *** -0.293 *** 
 
(0.041) 
 
(0.041) 
 
(0.041) 
 
(0.041) 
 
(0.042) 
 
(0.054) 
 Austria 0.756 *** 0.746 *** 0.728 *** 0.721 *** 0.688 *** 0.944 *** 
 
(0.047) 
 
(0.047) 
 
(0.047) 
 
(0.047) 
 
(0.048) 
 
(0.056) 
 Belgium 0.901 *** 0.887 *** 0.889 *** 0.878 *** 0.863 *** 1.339 *** 
 
(0.052) 
 
(0.052) 
 
(0.052) 
 
(0.052) 
 
(0.052) 
 
(0.064) 
 Lithuania 0.051 
 
0.038 
 
0.028 
 
0.018 
 
-0.020 
 
0.152 ** 
 
(0.045) 
 
(0.045) 
 
(0.045) 
 
(0.045) 
 
(0.047) 
 
(0.052) 
 Poland 0.488 *** 0.472 *** 0.458 *** 0.445 *** 0.379 *** 0.513 *** 
 
(0.035) 
 
(0.036) 
 
(0.036) 
 
(0.036) 
 
(0.039) 
 
(0.046) 
 Czech Republic 0.260 *** 0.250 *** 0.235 *** 0.228 *** 0.158 ** 0.323 *** 
 
(0.047) 
 
(0.047) 
 
(0.047) 
 
(0.047) 
 
(0.050) 
 
(0.056) 
  
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; Significance: '*'=5%; '**'=1%; '***'=0.1%. Each model included: 
M1=educational pairing only; M2=M1+ man’s earning potential; M3=M1+ woman’s earning potential; 
M4=M1+ both partners’ earning potential; M5=M4+ pairing by earning potential; M6=M5+pairing by gender 
composition of the field, without low educated group. 
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Table 3.B3 Regression coefficients for the transition to third birth, control variables 
 
Splines M1 
 
M2 
 
M3 
 
M4 
 
M5 
 
M6 
 0-2 0.495 *** 0.495 *** 0.494 *** 0.495 *** 0.495 *** 0.566 *** 
 
(0.040) 
 
(0.040) 
 
(0.040) 
 
(0.040) 
 
(0.040) 
 
(0.052) 
 2-4 -0.341 *** -0.341 *** -0.341 *** -0.340 *** -0.340 *** -0.378 *** 
 
(0.039) 
 
(0.039) 
 
(0.039) 
 
(0.039) 
 
(0.039) 
 
(0.049) 
 4-6 -0.134 ** -0.134 ** -0.134 ** -0.134 ** -0.134 ** -0.103 
 
 
(0.047) 
 
(0.047) 
 
(0.047) 
 
(0.047) 
 
(0.047) 
 
(0.057) 
 6-11 -0.191 *** -0.191 *** -0.191 *** -0.191 *** -0.191 *** -0.174 *** 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.033) 
 11+ -0.128 
 
-0.128 
 
-0.128 
 
-0.128 
 
-0.128 
 
-0.092 
 
 
(0.074) 
 
(0.074) 
 
(0.074) 
 
(0.074) 
 
(0.074) 
 
(0.085) 
 Constant -5.444 *** -5.589 *** -5.365 *** -5.350 *** -5.204 *** -6.258 *** 
 
(0.130) 
 
(0.108) 
 
(0.132) 
 
(0.132) 
 
(0.151) 
 
(0.229) 
 Union's cohort (Ref. 1990-1999) 
            1975-1989 0.102 * 0.101 * 0.099 * 0.099 * 0.099 * 0.137 * 
 
(0.045) 
 
(0.045) 
 
(0.045) 
 
(0.045) 
 
(0.045) 
 
(0.055) 
 2000-2010 -0.245 ** -0.243 ** -0.239 ** -0.238 ** -0.232 * -0.231 * 
 
(0.091) 
 
(0.092) 
 
(0.092) 
 
(0.092) 
 
(0.092) 
 
(0.108) 
 woage25 -0.043 *** -0.043 *** -0.044 *** -0.043 *** -0.043 *** -0.038 *** 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.010) 
 woag25s 0.002 * 0.002 * 0.002 * 0.002 * 0.002 * -0.001 
 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 Respondent enrollment (Ref. Not enrolled) -0.301 ** -0.281 * -0.288 * -0.271 * -0.265 * -0.251 * 
 
(0.112) 
 
(0.112) 
 
(0.112) 
 
(0.112) 
 
(0.112) 
 
(0.124) 
 Sex respondent: Male (Ref. Female) -0.054 
 
-0.054 
 
-0.055 
 
-0.054 
 
-0.055 
 
-0.049 
 
 
(0.042) 
 
(0.042) 
 
(0.042) 
 
(0.042) 
 
(0.042) 
 
(0.052) 
 Age difference (Ref. Difference <=1) 
            She older than he (2+ years) 0.062
 
0.065
 
0.068
 
0.070
 
0.072
 
-0.005
 
 
(0.087) 
 
(0.087) 
 
(0.087) 
 
(0.087) 
 
(0.087) 
 
(0.108) 
 He older than she (2-4 years) -0.067 
 
-0.066 
 
-0.066 
 
-0.066 
 
-0.066 
 
-0.079 
 
 
(0.055) 
 
(0.055) 
 
(0.055) 
 
(0.056) 
 
(0.056) 
 
(0.065) 
 He older than she (5+) 0.056 
 
0.055 
 
0.052 
 
0.052 
 
0.053 
 
0.109 
 
 
(0.060) 
 
(0.060) 
 
(0.060) 
 
(0.060) 
 
(0.060) 
 
(0.072) 
 Respondent union order (Ref. First union) 0.040 
 
0.040 
 
0.041 
 
0.040 
 
0.041 
 
0.035 
 
 
(0.099) 
 
(0.099) 
 
(0.099) 
 
(0.099) 
 
(0.099) 
 
(0.114) 
 Couple's marital status (Ref. Married) 
            Unmarried -0.064
 
-0.066
 
-0.060
 
-0.063
 
-0.065
 
-0.301
 
 
(0.138) 
 
(0.138) 
 
(0.138) 
 
(0.138) 
 
(0.138) 
 
(0.207) 
 Unknown -0.091 
 
-0.090 
 
-0.090 
 
-0.089 
 
-0.093 
 
-0.221 
 
 
(0.097) 
 
(0.097) 
 
(0.097) 
 
(0.097) 
 
(0.097) 
 
(0.137) 
 Country (Ref. Bulgaria) 
            France 1.940 *** 1.934 *** 1.917 *** 1.912 *** 1.876 *** 2.791 *** 
 
(0.089) 
 
(0.089) 
 
(0.089) 
 
(0.089) 
 
(0.092) 
 
(0.167) 
 Romania 0.638 *** 0.646 *** 0.617 *** 0.625 *** 0.598 *** 1.251 *** 
 
(0.092) 
 
(0.092) 
 
(0.092) 
 
(0.092) 
 
(0.094) 
 
(0.178) 
 Austria 1.616 *** 1.609 *** 1.571 *** 1.567 *** 1.537 *** 2.423 *** 
 
(0.091) 
 
(0.091) 
 
(0.093) 
 
(0.093) 
 
(0.094) 
 
(0.164) 
 Belgium 1.787 *** 1.772 *** 1.768 *** 1.755 *** 1.746 *** 2.871 *** 
 
(0.097) 
 
(0.098) 
 
(0.097) 
 
(0.098) 
 
(0.098) 
 
(0.171) 
 Lithuania 0.852 *** 0.840 *** 0.804 *** 0.797 *** 0.765 *** 1.576 *** 
 
(0.103) 
 
(0.103) 
 
(0.104) 
 
(0.104) 
 
(0.105) 
 
(0.170) 
 Poland 1.685 *** 1.662 *** 1.634 *** 1.617 *** 1.559 *** 2.424 *** 
 
(0.077) 
 
(0.077) 
 
(0.078) 
 
(0.078) 
 
(0.083) 
 
(0.157) 
 Czech Republic 0.907 *** 0.893 *** 0.863 *** 0.852 *** 0.792 *** 1.636 *** 
 
(0.108) 
 
(0.108) 
 
(0.109) 
 
(0.109) 
 
(0.113) 
 
(0.175) 
  
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; Significance: '*'=5%; '**'=1%; '***'=0.1%. Each model included: 
M1=educational pairing only; M2=M1+ man’s earning potential; M3=M1+ woman’s earning potential; 
M4=M1+ both partners’ earning potential; M5=M4+ pairing by earning potential; M6=M5+pairing by gender 
composition of the field, without low educated group. 
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Appendix 3.C 
Table 3.C1 Models by groups of countries 
 
First  Westa 
 
Central-Easternb 
 
South-Easternc 
 Educational pairing (Ref. Both medium) 
      Both low 0.210 
 
0.256 * 0.106 
 
 
(0.117) 
 
(0.124) 
 
(0.072) 
 Both high -0.268 *** -0.506 *** -0.320 *** 
 
(0.051) 
 
(0.044) 
 
(0.055) 
 He high she lower -0.008 
 
-0.154 ** 0.036 
 
 
(0.064) 
 
(0.059) 
 
(0.084) 
 He medium she low 0.356 *** 0.375 *** -0.058 
 
 
(0.098) 
 
(0.094) 
 
(0.081) 
 He lower she high -0.326 *** -0.205 *** -0.121 * 
 
(0.059) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.062) 
 He low she medium -0.038 
 
-0.099 
 
-0.006 
 
 
(0.108) 
 
(0.084) 
 
(0.089) 
 earning potential woman 0.001 
 
0.026 
 
-0.069 
 
 
(0.050) 
 
(0.036) 
 
(0.043) 
 earning potential man -0.194 ** -0.057 
 
0.003 
 
 
(0.068) 
 
(0.037) 
 
(0.053) 
 Pairing by earning potential  
(Ref. Both similar earning potential) 
      He higher potential than she 0.036 
 
0.011 
 
0.050 
 
 
(0.058) 
 
(0.044) 
 
(0.078) 
 She higher potential than he -0.034 
 
-0.006 
 
0.054 
 
 
(0.069) 
 
(0.063) 
 
(0.070) 
        Second 
      Educational pairing (Ref. Both medium) 
      Both low 0.202 
 
0.148 
 
0.635 *** 
 
(0.124) 
 
(0.138) 
 
(0.091) 
 Both high 0.432 *** -0.007 
 
-0.220 ** 
 
(0.063) 
 
(0.057) 
 
(0.077) 
 He high she lower 0.145 
 
0.033 
 
0.123 
 
 
(0.078) 
 
(0.073) 
 
(0.107) 
 He medium she low 0.180 
 
0.227  * 0.289 ** 
 
(0.101) 
 
(0.104) 
 
(0.108) 
 He lower she high 0.051 
 
-0.191  ** -0.244 ** 
 
(0.071) 
 
(0.061) 
 
(0.085) 
 He low she medium -0.245 * -0.162 
 
0.235 * 
 
(0.115) 
 
(0.100) 
 
(0.111) 
 earning potential woman 0.168 ** 0.002 
 
-0.081 
 
 
(0.062) 
 
(0.048) 
 
(0.064) 
 earning potential man -0.179 * -0.230  *** -0.078 
 
 
(0.082) 
 
(0.053) 
 
(0.073) 
 Pairing by earning potential  
(Ref. Both similar earning potential) 
      He higher potential than she 0.137 
 
0.079 
 
0.087 
 
 
(0.071) 
 
(0.056) 
 
(0.107) 
 She higher potential than he 0.015 
 
-0.026 
 
-0.091 
 
 
(0.087) 
 
(0.082) 
 
(0.097) 
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Table 3.C1 (continued) 
Third 
      Educational pairing (Ref. Both medium) 
      Both low 0.839 *** 0.670 ** 1.372 *** 
 
(0.189) 
 
(0.205) 
 
(0.329) 
 Both high 0.588 *** -0.127 
 
-1.272 * 
 
(0.108) 
 
(0.127) 
 
(0.515) 
 He high she lower 0.380 ** -0.128 
 
0.440 
 
 
(0.127) 
 
(0.157) 
 
(0.310) 
 He medium she low 0.440 ** 0.448 ** 0.423 
 
 
(0.159) 
 
(0.162) 
 
(0.361) 
 He lower she high 0.103 
 
-0.453 *** -0.086 
 
 
(0.132) 
 
(0.134) 
 
(0.340) 
 He low she medium 0.234 
 
-0.019 
 
-0.419 
 
 
(0.187) 
 
(0.180) 
 
(0.436) 
 earning potential woman -0.096 
 
0.032 
 
-0.401 
 
 
(0.101) 
 
(0.096) 
 
(0.245) 
 earning potential man 0.047 
 
-0.282 * -0.232 
 
 
(0.135) 
 
(0.111) 
 
(0.238) 
 Pairing by earning potential  
(Ref. Both similar earning potential) 
      He higher potential than she -0.080 
 
0.142 
 
0.122 
 
 
(0.123) 
 
(0.105) 
 
(0.342) 
 She higher potential than he 0.147 
 
-0.030 
 
0.317 
 
 
(0.142) 
 
(0.155) 
 
(0.353) 
 SigmaEps 0.674 *** 0.616 *** 0.578 *** 
 
(0.029) 
 
(0.020) 
 
(0.026) 
 ln-L -48183 
 
-66049 
 
-49978 
  
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; a) West=Austria, Belgium and France; b) Central-Eastern=Czech 
Republic, Lithuania and Poland; c) South-Eastern=Bulgaria and Romania; Significance: '*'=5%; '**'=1%; 
'***'=0.1%. All models include: duration splines, woman’s age at first birth and its square, union’s cohorts, 
respondent’s sex, respondent’s enrollment, union order of the respondent, type of union, age difference between 
partners, country dummies. 
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Appendix 3.D 
Table 3.D1 Alternative specification of the model, sensitivity analyses 
 
First  
Main 
model 
(M5) 
 
Younger  
cohorts 
 
Censoring first births 
after 5 years coresidence 
 Educational pairing 
(Ref. Both medium) 
      Both low 0.141 ** 0.239 *** 0.159 ** 
 
(0.050) 
 
(0.064) 
 
(0.050) 
 Both high -0.390 *** -0.455 *** -0.485 ***
 
(0.029) 
 
(0.033) 
 
(0.031) 
 He high she lower -0.076 * -0.078 
 
-0.109 ** 
 
(0.038) 
 
(0.045) 
 
(0.040) 
 He medium she low 0.167 *** 0.297 *** 0.181 ***
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.056) 
 
(0.046) 
 He lower she high -0.227 *** -0.306 *** -0.262 ***
 
(0.031) 
 
(0.037) 
 
(0.032) 
 He low she medium -0.087 
 
-0.034 
 
-0.061 
 
 
(0.053) 
 
(0.064) 
 
(0.053) 
 earning potential woman -0.020 
 
-0.016 
 
-0.019 
 
 
(0.024) 
 
(0.027) 
 
(0.024) 
 earning potential man -0.070 * -0.084 ** -0.075 ** 
 
(0.027) 
 
(0.032) 
 
(0.028) 
 Pairing by earning potential (Ref. Both 
similar earning potential) 
      He higher potential than she -0.004 
 
-0.010 
 
0.001 
 
 
(0.031) 
 
(0.036) 
 
(0.032) 
 She higher potential than he 0.018 
 
-0.006 
 
0.018 
 
 
(0.038) 
 
(0.044) 
 
(0.039) 
        Second 
      Educational pairing (Ref. Both 
medium) 
      Both low 0.404 *** 0.492 *** 0.428 ***
 
(0.059) 
 
(0.079) 
 
(0.061) 
 Both high 0.127 *** 0.171 *** 0.075 
 
 
(0.036) 
 
(0.044) 
 
(0.038) 
 He high she lower 0.093 * 0.118 
 
0.078 
 
 
(0.047) 
 
(0.060) 
 
(0.050) 
 He medium she low 0.179 *** 0.267 *** 0.200 ***
 
(0.053) 
 
(0.070) 
 
(0.055) 
 He lower she high -0.105 ** -0.121 * -0.129 ** 
 
(0.040) 
 
(0.049) 
 
(0.042) 
 He low she medium -0.081 
 
-0.077 
 
-0.065 
 
 
(0.060) 
 
(0.079) 
 
(0.062) 
 earning potential woman 0.031 
 
0.028 
 
0.019 
 
 
(0.031) 
 
(0.039) 
 
(0.032) 
 earning potential man -0.235 *** -0.229 *** -0.220 ***
 
(0.036) 
 
(0.044) 
 
(0.037) 
 Pairing by earning potential (Ref. Both 
similar earning potential) 
      He higher potential than she 0.146 *** 0.123 ** 0.115 ** 
 
(0.038) 
 
(0.048) 
 
(0.040) 
 She higher potential than he -0.138 ** -0.097 
 
-0.122 * 
 
(0.048) 
 
(0.061) 
 
(0.050) 
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Table 3.D1 (continued) 
Third 
      Educational pairing  
(Ref. Both medium) 
      Both low 1.168 *** 0.982 *** 1.137 ***
 
(0.104) 
 
(0.149) 
 
(0.107) 
 Both high 0.241 *** 0.200 * 0.245 ** 
 
(0.073) 
 
(0.096) 
 
(0.077) 
 He high she lower 0.196 * 0.023 
 
0.207 * 
 
(0.089) 
 
(0.126) 
 
(0.094) 
 He medium she low 0.408 *** 0.355 ** 0.382 ***
 
(0.090) 
 
(0.130) 
 
(0.093) 
 He lower she high -0.145 
 
-0.103 
 
-0.172 
 
 
(0.088) 
 
(0.114) 
 
(0.093) 
 He low she medium 0.057 
 
0.177 
 
0.006 
 
 
(0.115) 
 
(0.157) 
 
(0.119) 
 earning potential woman -0.016 
 
-0.160 
 
-0.030 
 
 
(0.061) 
 
(0.085) 
 
(0.064) 
 earning potential man -0.245 *** -0.155 
 
-0.248 ** 
 
(0.073) 
 
(0.098) 
 
(0.076) 
 Pairing by earning potential  
(Ref. Both similar earning potential) 
      He higher potential than she 0.157 * -0.018 
 
0.128 
 
 
(0.072) 
 
(0.099) 
 
(0.075) 
 She higher potential than he -0.050 
 
0.107 
 
-0.033 
 
 
(0.095) 
 
(0.124) 
 
(0.099) 
 SigmaEps 0.669 *** 0.646 *** 0.650 ***
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.015) 
        ln-L -165374 
 
-104441 
 
-147665 
  
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; Significance: '*'=5%; '**'=1%; '***'=0.1%. All models include: 
duration splines, woman’s age at first birth and its square, union’s cohorts, respondent’s sex, respondent’s 
enrollment, union order of the respondent, type of union, age difference between partners, country dummies. 
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Chapter 4. Pathways to marital and non-marital first 
birth: the role of his and her education 
 
 
Abstract  
A key demographic trend of the past decades has been the increasing share of first births 
occurring outside marriage. In analyzing factors associated with this, scholars have tended to 
focus on the characteristics of only one of the parents, typically the mother. This study 
examines the pathways to parenthood from a couple’s perspective, focusing on the role of 
educational pairings, i.e. the combination of his and her education. By means of a multistate 
approach, we examine the connection between educational pairings and the occurrence of the 
first birth inside or outside marriage for 12 European countries. The presence of at least one 
highly educated partner lowers the rate of non-marital first births relative to first childbearing 
within marriage. Strikingly, it does not matter whether it is he or she who has the highest level 
of education. 
 
Keywords: Non-marital childbearing, couple’s fertility, educational assortative mating 
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Introduction 
Family behavior has been increasingly characterized by a decoupling of marriage and 
parenthood and, consequently, by an increasing rate of childbearing within cohabitation 
(Sobotka and Toulemon 2008; Perelli-Harris et al. 2012). Although changes in family 
behavior have not occurred everywhere to the same extent and speed, it is possible to 
underline at least two common features across European countries. First, non-marital 
childbearing has not spread homogenously: differences between educational subgroups have 
been detected (Perelli-Harris et al. 2010). This is associated with the fact that new family 
forms play a key role in the reproduction of social inequalities and in affecting children’s 
well-being in different social strata (McLanahan and Percheski 2008). Second, within Europe, 
the increase in non-marital childbearing has been largely attributed to the rise of childbearing 
within cohabiting unions rather than to single-motherhood (Kiernan 2004; Perelli-Harris et al. 
2010).  
In studies about new family forms, scholars have focused mainly on the relation between 
the mother’s human capital and non-marital childbearing and rarely on the link between 
human capital and non-marital fatherhood (Perelli-Harris et al. 2010; Carlson et al. 2013). 
Acknowledging that most non-marital births occur within co-residential unions, the decision 
to have a child usually involves two persons, i.e. the couple. However, scholars have 
disregarded the role of partners’ educational characteristics as determinant of non-marital 
childbearing, keeping an individual–female perspective. Only in recent years, the partner’s 
role is increasingly considered in studies as a potential determinant of the transition to 
parenthood (see e.g., Gustafsson and Worku 2006; Begall 2013; Jalovaara and Miettinen 
2013; Nitsche et al. 2015), but empirical evidence on its effects on non-marital family 
formation is still scarce (Trimarchi, Schnor and Van Bavel, forthcoming). 
The couple’s perspective is important because the focus on the features of only one 
partner may lead to a misinterpretation of the results (Gustafsson and Worku 2006). The 
effects of the characteristics of one partner may to some extent actually reflect the effects of 
the characteristics of the other partner. Furthermore, considering the role of the partner’s 
education does not only have methodological implications. On a societal level, the way  
partners combine their human-capital, i.e. the educational pairing of his and her education, 
also affects the reproduction of inequalities in societies. Educational assortative mating 
patterns reflect the degree of openness in a society and  affect the distribution of resources in 
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societies (Blossfeld 2009; Schwartz 2009). If men and women mate assortatively according to 
their socioeconomic status and if both lower educated men and lower educated women tend 
towards higher rates of cohabitation and unmarried parenthood, we would expect a 
concentration of these family behaviors among couples with lower socioeconomic resources. 
This would lead to an exacerbation of social inequalities in societies driven by changes in 
family forms. 
In this paper we aim to fill the gap in the literature on the educational gradient of non-
marital childbearing by examining the link between educational pairing and the transition to 
first child, while distinguishing between couples who got married before the birth of the child 
and those who did not. How is the combined education of the partners associated with the 
transition to a first marital or non-marital birth? A cohabiting couple may or may not have 
already made the transition to parenthood. They may or may not have gotten married yet, and 
marriage may or may not have occurred before the birth of the first child. We use multistate 
modeling to investigate which of these pathways a couple has followed and how both his and 
her education are associated with the trajectory. As we need information about both his and 
her education, we focus on people who are in a union at the time of the interview (only then 
do we have information about both him and her). 
We look retrospectively to the couples’ union status and childbearing history. Couples 
who split up before the interview, represent cases of left censoring. This implies that we may 
underestimate non-marital childbearing, since cohabiting couples are more likely to split up 
(Kiernan 2004), and that hypogamous couples may be underrepresented in our study if they 
are less stable (as indicated by Jalovaara 2013; Blossfeld 2014; Mäenpää and Jalovaara 2014; 
but not by Schwartz and Han 2014; Theunis et al. 2015). Nevertheless, our study will yield 
insight into how the combination of his and her education is associated with marital versus 
non-marital births for the snapshot of couples living together at the time of the interview. 
We used the retrospective fertility and partnership histories for 12 European countries 
recorded in the Generation and Gender Surveys (GGS) and in the Italian Family and Social 
Subjects (FSS) survey of 2009. We selected 12 countries which mirror the main family 
regimes in Europe, providing us insights into contextual variation in the effect of educational 
pairing on first birth. Our results, obtained by means of a basic illness-death multistate model 
(Putter, Fiocco and Geskus 2007), show that low human capital in any of the partners is 
associated with non-marital childbearing. In contrast, the presence of at least one highly 
educated partner, be it he or she, enhances the rate of marital rather than non-marital 
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childbearing. This finding is consistent across all the countries considered. In contrast, there is 
no clear pattern with regard to the transition to a first birth within marriage. 
Inequalities, new family forms and the role of educational 
assortative mating 
On a societal level, the diffusion of more liberal family behaviors, such as divorce, 
cohabitation, the acceptance of abortion, as well as non-marital childbearing, has often been 
interpreted as an expression of an ideational change in values and attitudes toward the family 
within the Second Demographic Transition (SDT) framework (Van de Kaa 1987; Surkyn and 
Lesthaeghe 2004). According to the SDT, both cohabitation and non-marital childbearing are 
considered, at least in an initial stage, prerogative behaviors of the more secularized 
individuals, typically the highly educated, as far as those behaviors are believed to be 
antithetic to traditional family forms and life paths (Surkyn and Lesthaeghe 2004; Lesthaghe 
2010). 
On the individual level, despite the steep increase in the level of non-marital fertility, 
marriage remains generally more conducive to childbearing than unmarried cohabitation 
(Baizan et al. 2003). Partners perceive higher commitment within a marriage (Perelli et al. 
2014) and in particular the male partner is considered more committed within a marriage 
(Lehrer, Grossbard-Shechtman and Leasure 1996). Since married unions tend to be more 
stable, they tend to have higher fertility than unmarried ones (Lillard and Waite 1993; Lillard 
et al. 1995; Baizan et al. 2003). 
A recent strand of literature emphasizes the lack of socioeconomic resources as 
determinant in the choice of cohabitation over marriage to form a new family (Perelli-Harris 
et al. 2010; Perelli-Harris and Gerber 2011). More specifically, for many people, marriage is 
associated with an expensive wedding ceremony and marriage as a whole requires that the 
couple is able to secure their long-term economic independence (Kravdal 1999; Salvini and 
Vignoli 2014). As a consequence, non-marital childbearing is expected to be more prevalent 
among the least educated. Perelli-Harris and Gerber (2011) called this gradient the “pattern-
of-disadvantage”. Insofar as marriage is becoming “a province of the most educated” 
(Goldstein and Kenney 2001:506), the diffusion of cohabitation and non-marital childbearing 
among the lower educated would exacerbate inequalities in society. Children born to highly 
educated women would enjoy a growing amount of resources, both in social and economic 
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terms. Children born to low educated women would face the dissolution of their parents’ 
union more frequently and suffer higher poverty rates (McLanahan 2004; McLanahan and 
Percheski 2008). 
While the pattern of disadvantage framework mainly focuses on women’s socioeconomic 
conditions, Oppenheimer (2003) proposed a theoretical argument based on the relation 
between men’s socioeconomic conditions and the rise of cohabitation. Men with poor and 
uncertain economic prospects favor cohabitation as the preferable type of union because a low 
and unstable economic situation may undermine  their capabilities to make a strong 
commitment. This further raises uncertainties about the future of his economic prospects 
(Oppenheimer 2003). 
The theoretical frameworks mentioned so far only look at the human capital of either 
women or men. More generally, studies on fertility have particularly privileged a female 
perspective rather than a couple’s perspective, even if we know that most children are born to 
couples. An argument that has been used to justify the focus on just one of the partners is that 
people often mate with individuals who share similar characteristics (Corijn et al. 1996). The 
tendency to form homogamous partnerships has indeed been documented for several 
characteristics, e.g. age, ethnicity, religion, education, etc. (Kalmijn 1991, 1994). People who 
mate homogamously mostly have the same social background, have followed similar 
educational paths or have attended the same religious community (Kalmijn 1991; Blossfeld 
and Timm 2003).  
Our focus here is on assortative mating by education, because education may affect 
individual economic potential and also individual tastes, preferences and lifestyles (Blossfeld 
2009). In general, educational homogamy remains the most common mating pattern in Europe 
(Blossfeld and Timm 2003; Hamplova 2009) but remarkable changes occurred since female 
educational expansion with regard to heterogamous couples. Recent studies have shown that 
traditional mating patterns, i.e. unions in which the man is more educated than the woman 
(hypergamy), are now less common than non-traditional mating pattern, i.e. unions in which 
the woman is higher educated than the man (hypogamy) (Esteve et al. 2012; Grow and Van 
Bavel 2015). Even if educational homogamy remains the most common pattern, the shift from 
hypergamy to hypogamy represents a shift of relative human capital within couples. This shift 
may have implications for family formation in general and non-marital childbearing in 
particular.  
 151 
 
In the last decades, especially in the United States, several scholars have argued that 
educational assortative mating varies according to the type of union. One perspective 
emphasizes the micro-economic approach to the household and the role of specialization 
within the couple. According to Becker’s theory of partner’s specialization, a dissimilarity of 
socioeconomic resources between spouses induces higher gains from marriage because 
partners increase their interdependence by the division of labor, which may be attached to sex 
roles (Becker 1991). As a result, since educationally homogamous couples may be less likely 
to specialize, these couples may be more inclined to live within a more “equal” kind of union 
such as cohabitation, whereas more specialized couples would have greater gains from a long-
term committed union such as marriage (Schoen and Weinick 1993; Brines and Joyner 1999).  
An alternative perspective emphasizes cultural aspects of education, considering the 
match in lifestyles, values, and preferences (Blackwell and Lichter 2000). According to this 
perspective, mate selection develops as a process characterized by several stages. In this 
process, cohabitation is seen as the stage where partners’ may evaluate each other according 
to their “cultural matching”. As a consequence, unmarried cohabitations, where typically 
commitment is weaker, may include relatively more heterogamous unions compared to 
marriages; matches that share more cultural traits will be more likely to make the transition to 
marriage (Blackwell and Lichter 2000; Saarela and Finnäs 2014). 
Previous findings 
Educational differences with regard to cohabitation and non-marital fertility differ over time 
and context (Perelli-Harris and Sanchez-Gassen 2012, Ní Bhrolcháin and Beaujouan 2013). 
This diversity has motivated cross-national comparisons. Perelli-Harris et al. (2010) found 
that in Austria, France, the Netherlands, Norway, Russia, United Kingdom and Western 
Germany, the negative educational gradient in the transition to first birth for women was 
steeper for non-marital births compared to marital births, supporting the “pattern of 
disadvantage” framework. In Italy, the educational gradient of the first non-marital birth 
compared to the first marital birth was U-shaped. The authors related these findings to the low 
prevalence of cohabitation and argued that in contexts where non-marital childbearing is just 
emerging, as in Italy, it is more prevalent among both low and highly educated women than 
among the group in between. In contrast, the low educated are more likely to have a non-
marital child than all the other groups if cohabitation is common. In France, the link between 
education and non-marital childbearing has changed over time: highly educated women drove 
the increase in non-marital childbearing during the 1970s and 1980s; from around the start of 
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the 21st century, the positive effect of education has disappeared (Perelli-Harris et al. 2010). In 
Hungary, the diffusion of non-marital childbearing did not follow a top-down pattern, rather 
bottom-up, given that the frequency of childbearing in cohabitation was lower among the 
higher levels of education, although highly educated individuals played a crucial role in the 
spread of cohabitation (Speder and Kamaras 2008: 629). A similar pattern has been observed 
in Czech Republic (Sobotka et al. 2008). Carlson et al. (2013) showed that the pattern of 
disadvantage is also applicable to men/fathers. The authors found that, in the United States, 
non-marital fatherhood is negatively associated with education: the higher the level of 
education, the lower the risk of having a child outside marriage. 
All the studies mentioned so far mainly focus on the characteristics of one partner. 
Several studies have analyzed the transition to parenthood from a couple’s perspective, 
including both partners’ educational level (e.g. Corijn et al. 1996; Thomson 1997; Gustafsson 
and Worku 2006; Vignoli et al. 2012; Jalovaara and Miettinen 2013; Begall 2013). None of 
these studies, however, specifically addressed the difference in the risk of marital and non-
marital birth. 
From a couple’s perspective, Trimarchi et al. (forthcoming) found that the presence of at 
least one highly educated partner decreases the risk of non-marital childbearing relative to 
marital childbearing in Austria (cohorts 1970-1983) and Eastern Germany (cohorts 1971-1973 
and 1981-1983). In Western Germany, instead, the authors found that the couples where the 
man is more educated than the woman are less likely to have a non-marital relative to marital 
compared to other groups of educational pairings. Overall, the results showed the importance 
of considering the combination of the educational level of both partners when studying non-
marital childbearing and the role of different contexts. In Finland, Saarela and Finnäs (2014) 
found that heterogamous couples have a higher risk of union dissolution, a higher risk of 
living in an unmarried union and a lower risk of becoming parents compared to the 
homogamous couples. Moreover, they found family formation within marriage to be more 
typical of the highly educated, whereas unmarried family formation is more common among 
the lower educated (Saarela and Finnäs 2014). These results strongly points towards the fact 
that an interaction between homogamy and the level of education affects family formation 
behavior of couples, highlighting the importance of a couple’s perspective approach to 
fertility. 
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Research hypotheses 
Based on theoretical arguments and previous findings, we formulate three main hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1 relies on the socioeconomic argument according to which more education 
ensues a greater availability of resources to get married. From this general statement we 
derive two sub-hypotheses which are transition-specific. Hypothesis 1a contends that there is 
a positive educational gradient with regard to the transition from cohabitation to marriage. 
Hypothesis 1b concerns the transition from cohabitation to parenthood: unmarried couples 
with lower human capital are expected to have higher birth rates than couples with more 
human capital. The presence of at least one highly educated partner should, according to this 
argument, reduce the risk of a non-marital birth. 
Hypothesis 2 focuses on the behavior of the heterogamous couples. In general, we expect 
that hypergamous couples (he has more education than her) are more inclined to traditional 
family behaviors, while the hypogamous couples (she has more education) are more prone to 
less conventional family behaviors, especially in countries with traditional gender roles 
expectations (i.c. Italy and Poland). This expectation stems from the Beckerian assumption 
that unions with an education imbalance in favor of the male partner lead to a gendered 
division of labor which generate higher gains from marriage for both partners. This 
hypothesis may be reinforced by socioeconomic arguments according to which, given the 
same level of education, men may have a higher earning potential than women. In particular, 
hypothesis 2a concerns the transition from cohabitation to marriage: we expect that 
hypergamous couples have a higher rate of marriage compared to hypogamous couples. As a 
complement, we expect that hypergamous couples are more inclined to have a first child 
within marriage compared to hypogamous couples (hypothesis 2b). 
Hypothesis 3 is based on the argument that homogamous partners tend to have similar 
beliefs and backgrounds, which would lead to strengthen their commitment through marriage 
(i.e. “cultural matching”). We expect, then, that homogamous partners have a higher 
transition rate from cohabitation to marriage compared to the heterogamous couples. 
Data and methods 
We used Generation and Gender Survey (GGS) data for 11 European countries (Austria, 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Norway, 
Romania) and the Family and Social Subjects (FSS) 2009 for Italy. For the GGS countries the 
information is derived from both male and female respondents, whereas for Italy we could use 
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only female respondents. To acquire information on both partners’ characteristics, we selected 
only individuals who are in a union at the time of interview. We focused on cohorts for which 
the respondents and their partners are born after 1950. The focus is the transition to 
parenthood, thus we selected couples in which the woman was 15-45 years old at the 
beginning of the co-residential union and we excluded cases in which one of the partners had 
a child before in another relationship (overall we have 48344 couples). Appendix 4.A details 
the number of cases that were and were not selected in our analytical sample for various 
reasons. 
The main explanatory variable: educational pairings 
Given the importance of the concept of assortative mating, social scientists have invested 
considerable effort in its measurement. On the macro level, scholars have been interested in 
measuring the propensity to marry partners of given characteristics using measures of 
attraction which also account for the pool of potential mates (Schoen 1981). For studies 
whose focus is on the micro level, on education in particular, the main concern has been how 
to include the best indicator which could account both for the effect of education and the 
effect of educational differences between partners (Eeckhout et al. 2012). 
Since the focus of this paper is on a micro-level, in line with previous studies on the 
effect of educational assortative mating on demographic behavior (see e.g. Mäenpää and 
Jalovaara 2014), we have defined our main explanatory variable as the combined educational 
attainment of the partners. Collapsing categories from the international standard classification of 
education (ISCED 1997), we grouped individuals into three levels of attainment: low, medium 
and high. The first group includes those who completed primary plus lower secondary school (at 
least 8 years of schooling, ISCED 0, 1, 2). The medium category consists of individuals who 
attained the upper-secondary and those who also got a post-secondary level (ISCED 3, 4). Finally, 
respondents and their partners were defined highly educated if they got a bachelor/master/PhD 
degree (ISCED 5, 6). 
In our model we used a compound measure of educational assortative mating which 
consists of three categories for couples where men and women have the same educational 
attainment, i.e. homogamous couples (“both low” (1); “both medium” (2), “both high” (3)); 
two categories for hypergamy (couples in which man is highly educated and the woman 
medium or low educated (4) and couples in which men are medium educated and women low 
educated (5)); two categories for hypogamy (couples in which the woman is highly educated 
and the man medium or low educated (6) and couples in which women are medium educated 
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and men low educated (7)). A separate category is assigned in case of missing educational 
information for one of the partners. 
Table 4.1 shows the distribution of the educational assortative mating variable - as it has 
been employed in the models. Homogamous couples represent more than half of the couples 
in all countries. The majority of couples consisted of both medium educated partners, with the 
exception of Belgium and Italy. In Belgium, most couples are homogamously highly educated 
(32%), whereas in Italy the majority are homogamously low educated couples (30%). Even if 
the most typical mating pattern is homogamy, it is interesting to look at the distribution of 
heterogamous couples. As we can see in Table 4.1, in many countries, couples in which the 
woman is more educated than the man are more common than more traditional combinations, 
i.e. where the man is more educated than his partner. This is line with recent trends of 
educational assortative mating which have been found across European and non-European 
countries (Esteve et al. 2012; Grow and Van Bavel 2015). 
Control variables  
We included the age difference between partners in our models because it is an important 
determinant of couple’s fertility (Ní Bhrolcháin 1992; Bozon 1991). It is operationalized in 
five categories: age difference is 0 or 1 (considered as age homogamy); the woman is older 
than the man; the man is 2 to 4 years older than the woman; the man is 5 years or more older 
than the woman; and a missing category if the age difference between partners is not 
available. We also control for the respondent’s sex; the woman’s age at union formation and 
its square to control for non-linearities; the union’s cohort in four categories: 1967-1979 (1); 
1980-1989 (2); 1990-1999 (3); 2000-2010 (4). We added a control only for the union order of 
the respondent, since the union order of the partner is unavailable. Finally, we added a 
variable which specifies whether a conception occurred before marriage. 
Table 4.2 shows the distribution of couples by country, according to their marital status at 
the time of co-residential union. The difference in the institutionalization of cohabitation and 
its diffusion across Europe shows up in a very simple way in Table 4.2. In countries where 
cohabitation has typically spread much slower and/or does not have a legal status yet, the 
majority of couples start co-residing directly by marrying. This holds for the Central-Eastern 
European countries (i.e. Poland, Lithuania, Hungary, Romania and, to a lesser extent, Czech 
Republic) and Italy. In Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Estonia, France and Norway, instead, the 
majority of partners start to co-reside as an unmarried couple and eventually marry. 
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Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics by country 
 
 
Austria Belgium Bulgaria Czech Republic Estonia France Hungary Italy Lithuania Norway Poland Romania 
Sex (%) 
            Male 38 48.03  41.36 47.96  38.66 43.98 44.69 
 
55.56 49.49 45.41 52.83 
Female 62  51.97 58.64  52.04 61.34 56.02 55.31 100 44.44 50.51 54.59 47.17 
Union's cohort (%) 
            1967-1979 0.08 16.12 13.46 15.95 17.77 16.47 22.08 13.21 13.76 13.84 18.66 19.33
1980-1989 18.47 26.38 36.39 28.95 31.51 27.61 29.32 28.65 31.63 26.89 24.60 33.49 
1990-1999 41.29 28.43 37.05 30.54 33.08 35.78 30.67 30.11 29.91 33.76 24.91 34.74 
2000-2010 40.15 29.07 13.10 24.56 17.64 20.15 17.93 28.02 24.69 25.50 31.83 12.44 
Educational pairings (%) 
            Low homogamous 3.51 11.09 13.6 2.87 2.71 8.17 6.03 30.15 2.83 2.57 3.07 13.27
Med homogamous 52.62 17.07 44.35 62.2 42.3 28.45 53.43 25.06 49.39 22.04 54.5 50.88 
High homogamous 10.95 32.25 14.13 7.92 14.85 23.31 11.14 6.79 16.19 26.04 14.94 8.71 
He high She lower  13.52 8.29 3.6 9.7 7.83 7.59 5.71 4.54 8.6 8.28 4.81 4.39 
He medium She low 8.28 7.19 5.51 4.77 4.23 9.85 9.51 10.62 2.83 7.45 4.71 16.1 
He lower She high 7.82 14.46 13.04 5.24 21.02 13.85 10.12 8.51 13.97 16.75 12.6 2.95 
He low She medium 8.3 7.95 5.59 5.08 7.06 8.17 4.06 14.32 6.14 5.52 4.67 3.71 
Not available 
 
1.7 0.2 2.21  0.00 0.61  0.00  0.00 0.06 11.35 0.69  0.00 
Respondent union's order (%) 
            First union  84.40 70.17 98.75 94.68 92.94 88.54 88.58 93.55  97.85  82.65 98.19 98.49  
Higher order 15.60 29.83  1.25  5.32   7.06  11.46  11.42  2.11 2.15  17.35  1.81   1.51 
Not available 
       
 4.35 
    Age difference (%) 
            Age homogamy (or <= 1 year) 22.15 28.12 20.14 23.32 27.24 26.48 20.31 25.24 25.58 25.36 25.82 19.81
Woman older 2+ 12.38 12.15  6.80  7.22 12.65 13.66 10.14  7.24 10.60 11.75 10.59  8.23 
Man older 2-4 37.74 36.90 38.84 42.18 34.77 37.04 39.41 36.55 43.98 38.45 39.56 36.72 
Man older 5+ 27.73 22.37 33.83 27.09 25.34 22.83 29.97 30.97 19.81 24.24 24.03 35.24 
Not available  0.00  0.45  0.40  0.19  0.00 0.00  0.18  0.00  0.03  0.21  0.00  0.00 
             Median Woman Age at union (years) 22 23 20 22 21 22 21 24 22 23 22 21
Median time in union till interview (years) 11.08 16.33 14.91 13.83 14.91 14.33 15.33 17.25 15.54 14.91 18.08 16.05 
N events by transition 
            Cohabitation to Marriage 974 740 2615 671 787 1238 564 536 580 1570 1141 654
Cohabitation to Kid 608 399 553 175 561 764 251 323 145 1633 390 270 
Marriage to Kid 1139 1759 4037 1814 1434 1761 2848 5069 2582 2348 6144 3731 
N respondents 2366 2642 5031 2577 2364 3097 3994 6213 3256 4819 7402 4583 
Source: authors’ calculations on Generations and Gender Surveys and the Italian Family and Social Subjects (2009) samples. 
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Table 4.2 Distribution of couples by country and marital status at the time of union formation 
 
Country  Cohabitation first Direct marriage Total 
 
(N) (%) (N) (%) (N) (%) 
Austria  1988 84.02 378 15.98 2366 100 
Belgium  1383 52.35 1259 47.65 2642 100 
Bulgaria  3363 66.85 1668 33.15 5031 100 
Czech Republic 1139 44.20 1438 55.80 2577 100 
Estonia  1610 68.10 754 31.90 2364 100 
France 2354 76.01 743 23.99 3097 100 
Hungary  1224 30.65 2770 69.35 3994 100 
Italy 1034 16.64 5179 83.36 6213 100 
Lithuania  996 30.59 2260 69.41 3256 100 
Norway 3808 79.02 1011 20.98 4819 100 
Poland  1796 24.26 5606 75.74 7402 100 
Romania  1008 21.99 3575 78.01 4583 100 
Total 21703 44.89 26641 55.11 48344 100 
Source: Authors’ calculations on Generations and Gender Surveys and the Italian Family and Social Subjects 
(2009) samples. 
 
Analytical strategy 
We applied multistate models to test our hypotheses about the effect of educational parings on 
the chosen pathway of first birth. The multistate approach can account for possible changes in 
union status of the couples since they started to cohabit till the interview date. Since we 
observe only the period during which partners are in a union, single-status is not in our 
framework, and couples who separated before the survey date were left-censored. We selected 
couples that were intact at the time of the interview and looked retrospectively at their 
changes in union status leading to the first shared birth, if it occurred. Unions that survived 
until the time of the interview may on average be more stable than the total population of 
couples ever formed. Obviously, unions formed during the years closer to the interview may 
be much more heterogeneous with regard to their stability (as they were not at risk yet to split 
up). To check how strongly this affected our results, we ran analyses only for younger cohorts 
and found that our conclusions remained the same. 
In this setup, our main event of interest is the birth of the first child, which represents the 
absorbing state in multistate terminology (Putter et al. 2007; Willekens 2014). Figure 4.1 
shows all the possible transitions within our analytical state-space. At the start of the co-
residential union, partners may cohabit (top left in Figure 4.1) or be married (top right). After 
marriage, couples are at risk of only one transition, i.e. transition to parenthood. Couples who 
started co-residence as an unmarried couple were at risk of two possible pathways. First, they 
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may have gotten married and gotten a child afterwards (Figure 4.1 – solid line). Second, they 
may have a child within cohabitation (Figure 4.1 – dashed line). In the last case a separate 
analysis will be carried out to check which kind of couples will eventually marry after a non-
marital birth. This model assumes a Markov process, implying that the pathway of a couple 
and its timing will depend only on the present state and not on the event history of the couple. 
 
Figure 4.1 State-space considered and possible transitions. 
 
Once we have all the transition dates, we expand the dataset for each possible transition that 
the couple may experience, defining the entry into and the exit from that state (or the end of 
the observational period) and a status variable which defines if the transition has occurred or 
not. As in Putter et al. (2007), to estimate the model, we apply a Cox’s proportional hazard 
model for each transition (i.e. stratified hazard model), separately country by country. 
Formally, the hazard for transition i to j for a couple with a covariate vector Z will be: 
𝜆𝑖𝑗(𝑡|𝒁) = 𝜆𝑖𝑗,0(𝑡)exp (𝛽𝑖𝑗
𝑇 𝒁) 
Where 𝜆𝑖𝑗,0(𝑡)  is the baseline hazard of transition i to j which is not parametrically 
specified, and 𝛽𝑖𝑗 are the regression coefficients which describe the effect of the covariate-
profile of each couple. All models have been estimated by using the package mstate 
implemented in the  R software (De Wreede, Fiocco and Putter 2011). 
Results 
Figures 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 show the main results relative to the effect of educational pairing for 
all the transitions considered (Appendix 4.B gives all the model estimates). Each of these 
figures consists of a grid of panels, with columns representing her educational attainment and 
rows representing his educational attainment, so that homogamous unions are on the diagonal 
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of each figure. The reference category across all panels are medium educated homogamous 
couples. 
Figure 4.2 displays the hazard ratios for the transition from cohabitation to marriage. 
When focusing on the diagonal, we find that in countries where the difference is significant, 
low educated homogamous couples have a lower transition rate from cohabitation to marriage 
compared to the reference category of medium educated homogamous couples. Austria is a 
striking exception: low educated homogamous couples are found to have almost 2.5 times 
higher transition rate to marriage compared to the medium homogamous couples. Additional 
inspection of the data revealed that this is related to the fact that migrant populations, who are 
typically more traditional with regard to the type of union, are strongly represented among the 
low educated, which also supports previous findings about Austria (Berghammer, 
Fliegenschnee and Schmidt 2014). 
The heterogamous couples, represented above and below the diagonal, generally tend not 
to be statistically different from the medium homogamous couples. However, when switching 
the reference category to the low educated homogamous couples, we notice that the 
heterogamous couples with at least one highly educated partner tend to have higher rates of 
marriage than low educated homogamous couples (see Appendix 4.C – Table 4.C1 for all the 
pairwise contrasts). This difference holds for Bulgaria, Estonia, Italy, Lithuania and Romania, 
and it is in line with our expectations derived from the socioeconomic hypothesis 1a. 
In general, the results for the transition from cohabitation to marriage support the 
socioeconomic argument of the first hypothesis (1a), whereas we did not find evidence that 
lends support to the second hypothesis (2a). Moreover, there is no evidence for the third 
hypothesis which is based on the role of homogamy and heterogamy. After testing all the 
contrasts, for all levels of education, between homogamous couples and heterogamous 
couples (see Figure 4.2 and Appendix 4.C – Table 4.C1), we found no significantly different 
transition rates from cohabitation to marriage. Basically, we find no empirical evidence for an 
effect of homogamy (or heterogamy), itself detached from the role of the level of education. 
Still, we should highlight that beyond Austria, two more countries deviate from this 
general pattern. First, in Bulgaria, highly educated homogamous couples have a lower 
transition rate to marriage compared to the medium homogamous and the heterogamous 
couples. It remains unclear why the presence of only one highly educated partner enhances 
the transition to marriage more than if the couple would be composed of two highly educated 
partners. 
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Second, Poland also represents a puzzling exception. Here, couples in which the man is 
highly educated and the woman is lower educated, have a lower transition rate to marriage 
compared to all the homogamous and the hypogamous educational pairings. Among the 
countries considered, Poland represents a traditional context, where the diffusion of 
cohabitation has been relatively slow and the male-breadwinner model persists as main family 
model especially after the birth of the first child (Matysiak 2005; Kotowska et al. 2008). This 
result, however, contrasts with our expectations according to which, especially in traditional 
contexts, hypergamous couples are more prone to marriage than hypogamous ones 
(hypothesis 2a). 
 
Figure 4.2 Hazard ratios for the transition from cohabitation to marriage  
 
 
Source: Models’ estimates (see Appendix 4.B, Table 4.B1), GGS and Italian FSS 2009 
 
Next, Figure 4.3 shows hazard ratios for the transition from cohabitation to first birth. In 
all countries, low educated homogamous couples have higher non-marital birth rates 
compared to medium educated couples, whereas highly educated unmarried couples exhibit 
lower rates (diagonal Figure 4.3). In general, there are no statistically significant differences 
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between heterogamous couples and the reference category (medium educated homogamous 
couples). Changing our reference category to highly or low educated homogamous couples, 
the results strongly support the socioeconomic resource argument, i.e. hypothesis 1b (see 
Appendix 4.C – Table 4.C2 for all the pairwise contrasts). As the overall human-capital of the 
couple increases, the risk of non-marital family formation decreases in basically all countries. 
This is striking because it implies that there is no difference in family formation behavior 
depending on whether it is the woman or the man who is the partner with more education. In 
both cases, the estimates point in the same direction. 
 
Figure 4.3 Hazard ratios for the transition from cohabitation to first birth  
 
 
Source: Models’ estimates (see Appendix 4.B, Table 4.B2), GGS and Italian FSS 2009 
 
Figure 4.4 shows the hazard ratios for the transition to parenthood after marriage. Here, 
we do not observe such a clear pattern as the one observed for the transition to a non-marital 
birth. The only exception is Norway, where the pattern found for the transition to a marital 
birth resembles almost exactly the one found for the transition to a non-marital birth. 
Moreover, in Italy, similar to Norway, low educated homogamous couples have the highest 
marital birth rates compared to all the other educational pairings. In Italy, such a gradient is 
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much stronger than the one found for the non-marital birth. These results are in line with 
previous findings according to which, in Italy, highly educated women have been found to 
have higher relative risk of first birth within cohabitation relative to marriage compared to 
medium educated women (Perelli-Harris et al. 2010). In Bulgaria, in contrast, low educated 
homogamous couples tend to have lower marital birth rates compared to the medium educated 
homogamous couples and the heterogamous couples with at least one highly educated partner 
(see Appendix 4.C – Table 4.C3 for all the pairwise contrasts). In Austria and Romania, 
hypergamous couples, where men are highly educated, have a higher marital childbearing rate 
than hypogamous couples, where women are highly educated. Meanwhile there is no 
statistically significant difference between hypergamous and hypogamous couples, where the 
partner with the highest level of education is medium educated. These results provide 
evidence for hypothesis 2b, according to which couples where the man is more educated than 
the woman are more prone to marital childbearing compared to couples where the woman is 
more educated than the man. Moreover, comparing patterns in the transition to parenthood in 
marriage and unmarried cohabitation, we notice that in Austria hypogamous couples with a 
highly educated woman had significantly lower birth rates overall compared to hypergamous 
couples formed by a man who is highly educated. This implies that, at least in Austria, where 
the male-breadwinner model has remained relatively strong (Prskawetz et al. 2008), 
hypogamous couples are not conducive to childbearing, irrespective of whether the couple is 
married or not. 
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Figure 4.4 Hazard ratios for the transition from marriage to first birth 
 
Source: Models’ estimates (see Appendix 4.B, Table 4.B3), GGS and Italian FSS 2009 
 
We briefly discuss the effects of two additional couple level variables, namely the effect 
of  the union’s cohort and the age difference between partners. As expected, across European 
countries unions formed most recently between 2000-2010 had a lower transition rate to 
marriage compared to unions formed in the 1990s (our reference category). On the other 
hand, unions formed in the 1970s and ‘80s had a higher transition rate from cohabitation to 
marriage compared to the reference category. This cohort-effect is probably due to the fact 
that, ceteris paribus, unmarried cohabitation becomes over time more socially accepted and 
individuals tend to spend more time as an unmarried couple, feeling less the pressure to get 
married. We ran the same models by censoring the observation time after 5 or 10 years since 
co-residential union and the results were robust. Next, we did not find a strong effect with 
regard to the age difference between partners. Also in other contexts the age difference 
between partners with regard to fertility within cohabiting unions was not found to be  
significant (cf. Wu 1996). The age difference between partners mattered the most for the 
transition from cohabitation to marriage: where the effect was significant, more traditional 
types of couples, i.e. those where he is older than her, tend to have a higher transition rate to 
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marriage than couples where partners have a similar age. Such a finding is in line with the 
hypothesis that more traditional couples are more prone to marriage compared to other 
pairings, i.e. hypothesis 2a. However, this holds only for the transition from cohabitation to 
marriage, when it comes to childbearing, the effect of age difference is not significant. 
Discussion: the beaten path to parenthood 
In this study, we examined whether and how the educational pairing, i.e. how his and her 
education combine, affects the likelihood of first birth within marriage and cohabitation in 
twelve European countries. We observed couples who are in a co-residential union and 
examined their pathways to parenthood by means of multistate modeling. 
Overall, we found most support for our general first hypothesis, according to which a 
higher level of human capital is associated with a lower likelihood of non-marital family 
formation. This hypothesis is based on the argument that educational resources, used as 
proxies for long-term good economic prospects, are perceived as prerequisites to marry. Our 
results show that couples with lower human capital tend to stay longer in an unmarried 
relationship compared to their counterparts with higher human capital (hypothesis 1a). 
Couples with lower human capital also tend to have a higher transition rate to a non-marital 
first birth in most of the countries considered. The presence of at least one highly educated 
partner, independently of whether it is he or she, inhibits the rate of a non-marital first birth 
(hypothesis 1b). Moreover, additional analyses suggested that more education is positively 
associated with marriage rates even after having a first non-marital child (results not shown). 
Hence, what has been called the “pattern of disadvantage” framework, which usually refers to 
non-marital childbearing, finds support in our study. The more educated partners do not 
necessarily avoid cohabitation altogether, but they are more likely to get married once they 
expect to have a child, or after having a child already. For European countries, similarly to 
United States, our results highlight that the diffusion of non-marital childbearing among lower 
social strata may envisage a widening of social inequalities. Future studies could focus on 
children’s well-being to assess whether and to what extent a lack of human capital among 
unmarried parents translates in disadvantages for the children.  
Next, we did not find evidence supporting our general second hypothesis, which focuses 
on the difference in the effect of his versus her education. Based on the Beckerian 
specialization model, we hypothesized that hypergamous couples are more inclined to marital 
family forms compared to hypogamous couples for at least two reasons. First, couples where 
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he has more education than her may reinforce traditional behaviors driven by the imbalance of 
socioeconomic resources in favor of the man. Second, they may be more economically 
advantaged by the fact that, ceteris paribus, men earn on average more than women. Our 
results show that in most countries there is no statistically significant difference in the 
pathways to the first birth between hypergamous and hypogamous couples. Poland represents 
an exception: hypergamous couples composed of a highly educated man have a lower 
transition rate to marriage compared to the hypogamous couples and all the other 
homogamous educational pairings, which is in contrast with hypothesis 2a. Other studies 
focusing on Poland showed that couples in unmarried cohabitation are typical of unemployed 
people or people still enrolled in education who are supported economically by their parents 
(Kotowska et al. 2008; Matysiak 2009). This plausibly also explains our findings, since 
additional data-inspections revealed that those couples were formed mostly by young people 
who have not completed their education yet by the time they start their co-residence. 
Furthermore, in line with previous findings, we did not find support for our third 
hypothesis about the role of homogamy, on top of the role of each partners’ level of 
education. The behavior of educationally homogamous couples, either unmarried or married, 
is not statistically different from that of educationally heterogamous couples. Rather, the 
behavior in family formation depends on the overall human capital of the couple. Bulgaria is 
an interesting exception to this pattern: we found that couples where partners have different 
levels of education get married earlier compared to the highly educated homogamous couples 
who, instead, are less likely to marry. This result contrasts both with our first (1a) and third 
hypotheses. It contrasts our hypothesis 1a because we expected that a higher level of human 
capital would enhance the transition to marriage and this is not the case in Bulgaria. 
Furthermore, it contrasts our third hypothesis which is about the role of homogamy in 
marriage. According to the third hypothesis, homogamous couples are more inclined to marry 
compared to the heterogamous ones (cf. Blackwell and Lichter 2000). In Bulgaria, our 
findings indicate that the heterogamous couples with at least one highly educated partner are 
more inclined to marry, instead. We can speculate that this occurs because of the advantages 
derived from a specialization model à la Becker, characterized by unequal but complementary 
socioeconomic resources within the couples, not attached to traditional gender roles in this 
case (Becker 1991; Schoen and Weinick 1993; Brines and Joyner 1999). 
Marriage, however, is not the only way to express commitment. Family formation 
processes also include the transition to parenthood, which can be read as an alternative, 
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perhaps even stronger way to commit to a partner. If heterogamy inhibits marriage, 
consequently, cohabitation and non-marital childbearing would be more diffused among the 
heterogamous couples. Still, a child born within cohabitation may be considered a strong 
commitment between partners. In our study we could not disentangle the two arguments 
based on whether commitment is manifested via marriage or via childbearing, since in our 
sample the more stable couples, i.e. where childbearing is more likely, are overrepresented. In 
fact, it is worth reminding that to answer our research question we limited our study to people 
who were in a union at the time of interview. By applying a multi-state framework, we could 
account for the selective exit from cohabitation via marriage of “surviving” unions, but we 
could not empirically test the role of divorce or separation. In the future, it would be 
interesting to examine how educational assortative mating varies across union type and its 
interactions between union dissolution and childbearing. A previous study from Finland, 
which focused on cohabiting unions formed between 1995-2002, found that unions where the 
woman is more educated than the man were more likely to dissolve (Mäenpää and Jalovaara 
2014). However, other studies showed that this may not hold for marital unions formed after 
the 1990s (cf. Schwartz and Han 2014 for the United States; Theunis et al. 2015 for Belgium). 
It could be that we underestimated the differential role of partners’ education in our study, 
which has been cancelled out by considering mainly couples where childbearing is more 
likely. Our results point out that, among the more stable unions, the difference in partners’ 
education rarely plays a role in the choice between marital or non-marital birth, rather it is the 
overall level of education that matters. Future studies should test if accounting for the 
selective exit from cohabitation or marriage via union dissolution affects the role of 
educational pairings on fertility behavior. This could be achieved by using longitudinal 
country-specific data, which have detailed information on the time of partnerships’ formation 
and dissolution. 
It is also possible that we were unable to grasp the role of educational heterogamy 
because of measurement issues. Since heterogamy is less common than homogamy, we could 
not consider all the possible pairings of partners’ education due to small categories. By using 
a compound measure of educational pairing, which does not consider all the possible 
combinations, we may have overlooked the role of heterogamy. The absence of a statistically 
significant effect of heterogamy could be due to large standard errors. An obvious solution 
could be to use larger datasets. Alternatively, a diagonal reference model, which is a more 
parsimonious and interpretable approach to analyze dyads, may be an option (cf. Eeckhout et 
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al. 2012), but diagonal reference models have not been implemented yet in combination with 
survival analysis. Measurement issues may be linked to another aspect: we could not include a 
time-varying covariate of educational pairing because of lack of information. Our results may 
suffer from anticipatory bias, since partners may have acquired their highest level of 
education after they start to co-reside. The use of more detailed data, which includes the full 
educational history of both partners, could help in avoiding anticipatory bias when applying 
event history analysis (Hoem and Kreyenfeld 2006). 
Overall, our study showed that it is important to also consider the male partner’s 
education since it can counterbalance the effect of women’s education. Still, in order to 
uncover the mechanisms which link the mate selection processes to fertility, the challenge to 
integrate micro and macro level studies remains. As some authors pointed out, non-marital 
childbearing may be associated with changes in education-specific mating markets (Harknett 
2008; Van Bavel 2012). The difficulties in finding a suitable partner, especially for the low 
educated persons who may be considered less attractive on the mating market, can push 
people to settle for a less committed partnership without renouncing childbearing. As a result, 
the study of contextual factors such as mating markets can also play a role in the distribution 
of non-marital childbearing among social strata. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 4.A 
Table 4.A1 Sample selection 
 
GGS 
countries 
FSS 
Italy 
Initial sample size 123390 
4385
0 
Not in a union time of interview 44874 
2234
1 
Same sex couples 232 // 
Not born > 1950 (and for Italy being younger than 18 at time of interview) for 
the respondent  22666 7623 
Not born > 1950 (and for Italy being younger than 18 at time of interview) for 
the respondent's partner 2832 1017 
Children from previous relationships 6861 264 
Date union missing 928 // 
Date birth missing 67 // 
Date birth <= 0 2167 281 
Woman's age missing or not in interval 15-45 457 82 
Man's age union formation < 15 3 // 
Date marriage missing 170 // 
Respondent's age missing 1 // 
Reported date of events after interview date 1 1 
Male respondent (only Italy) // 6028 
Final N 42131 6213 
 169 
 
Appendix 4.B 
Table 4.B1 Cox regressions coefficients for the transition from cohabitation to marriage 
Transition from cohabitation to marriage AT BE BG CZ EE FR HU IT LT NO PL RO 
             Sex(ref. Male) Female -0.03 -0.11 0.05 0.03 -0.09 -0.11 -0.17 
 
0.05 0.04 -0.004 0.01 
 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.04) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.09) 
 
(0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) 
Woman’s age at union 0.30*** 0.05 0.32*** 0.23** 0.33*** 0.44*** 0.24** 0.09 0.40*** 0.36*** 0.46*** 0.20** 
 
(0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.10) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) 
Woman age at union (squared) -0.004*** -0.001 -0.01*** -0.004** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.005** -0.002 -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.004* 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Union's cohort (ref. 1990-1999) 
            1967-1979  0.88 0.92*** 0.63*** 0.74*** 1.12*** 1.03*** 0.89*** 0.58** 0.37* 1.12*** 0.45*** 0.23 
 
(1.02) (0.16) (0.06) (0.14) (0.11) (0.10) (0.19) (0.22) (0.16) (0.08) (0.13) (0.13) 
1980-1989 0.46*** 0.27** 0.56*** 0.56*** 0.84*** 0.38*** 0.51*** -0.04 0.39*** 0.49*** 0.19 0.15 
 
(0.09) (0.10) (0.05) (0.10) (0.09) (0.07) (0.10) (0.15) (0.11) (0.06) (0.11) (0.10) 
2000-2010 -0.24** -0.58*** -0.64*** -0.55*** -0.32* -0.31** -0.61*** -0.01 -0.84*** -0.30*** -0.45*** -0.43*** 
 
(0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.11) (0.13) (0.10) (0.13) (0.10) (0.11) (0.09) (0.08) (0.12) 
             Respondent's union order (ref. 1st union) Higher order unions -0.40*** -0.42*** -1.08*** -0.43* -0.05 -0.35*** -0.22* -0.11 -0.79*** -0.11 -0.56*** -0.80** 
 
(0.10) (0.08) (0.27) (0.17) (0.16) (0.10) (0.10) (0.16) (0.24) (0.07) (0.17) (0.27) 
Age difference (ref. Age homogamy or 1 year difference) 
            Woman older(2+) -0.24 -0.05 -0.30** -0.19 -0.08 -0.21* -0.31* -0.03 -0.16 -0.20* -0.13 -0.34* 
 
(0.12) (0.13) (0.09) (0.17) (0.13) (0.10) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.09) (0.10) (0.17) 
Man older (2-4 years) 0.15 0.25* 0.19*** 0.08 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.03 0.17 
 
(0.08) (0.10) (0.06) (0.10) (0.09) (0.07) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.06) (0.08) (0.12) 
Man older (5+) 0.26** 0.35** 0.25*** 0.10 0.19 0.05 -0.19 -0.17 0.14 0.12 0.07 -0.08 
 
(0.09) (0.11) (0.06) (0.11) (0.10) (0.08) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.07) (0.09) (0.12) 
NA 
 
-0.38 0.26 -0.07 
        
  
(0.72) (0.29) (1.03) 
        Conceived  (ref. No conceived) 0.98*** 0.92*** 0.35*** 0.93*** 1.39*** 0.80*** 1.18*** 1.01*** 0.77*** 0.97*** 0.95*** 0.70*** 
 
(0.08) (0.12) (0.04) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.12) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) 
Educational assortative mating (ref. Both medium) 
            Both low 0.85*** 0.06 -0.85*** -0.35 -0.79** -0.08 -0.29 -0.32* -1.00*** -0.02 0.21 -0.76*** 
 
(0.24) (0.17) (0.08) (0.22) (0.29) (0.15) (0.17) (0.15) (0.29) (0.18) (0.23) (0.13) 
Both high -0.28** 0.03 -0.34*** -0.06 -0.02 0.02 0.20 0.32* 0.08 0.17* 0.01 -0.12 
 
(0.10) (0.11) (0.06) (0.13) (0.11) (0.08) (0.13) (0.14) (0.11) (0.07) (0.08) (0.15) 
He high & She medium-low 0.07 -0.01 -0.03 -0.26 0.12 0.09 -0.0001 0.24 -0.24 0.09 -0.40** 0.20 
 
(0.09) (0.17) (0.10) (0.14) (0.13) (0.12) (0.18) (0.20) (0.15) (0.10) (0.15) (0.19) 
He medium & She low 0.04 0.09 -0.54*** -0.31 -0.05 -0.10 -0.08 -0.15 -0.68** 0.14 -0.11 -0.28* 
 
(0.14) (0.18) (0.10) (0.25) (0.18) (0.12) (0.18) (0.17) (0.25) (0.11) (0.17) (0.12) 
He medium-low & She high -0.06 -0.04 -0.09 -0.26 -0.08 -0.15 0.09 0.30* 0.04 -0.04 0.02 -0.12 
 
(0.12) (0.13) (0.06) (0.19) (0.10) (0.09) (0.16) (0.14) (0.13) (0.09) (0.09) (0.26) 
He low & She medium 0.64*** -0.22 -0.09 -0.38* -0.43** -0.16 -0.23 -0.09 -0.01 -0.14 0.09 -0.35 
 
(0.17) (0.18) (0.09) (0.17) (0.17) (0.12) (0.20) (0.14) (0.19) (0.13) (0.17) (0.20) 
NA 
 
0.01 0.11 -0.10 
 
-0.13 
   
-0.94*** -0.07 
 
  
(0.30) (0.50) (0.26) 
 
(0.41) 
   
(0.13) (0.32) 
 Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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 Table 4.B2 Cox regressions coefficients for the transition from cohabitation to first child 
 
Transition from cohabitation to first child AT BE BG CZ EE FR HU IT LT NO PL RO 
Sex(ref. Male) 
            Female 0.14 0.12 0.09 0.09 -0.13 0.04 -0.10 
 
0.24 0.03 0.15 0.05 
 
(0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.16) (0.09) (0.07) (0.13) 
 
(0.17) (0.05) (0.10) (0.12) 
Woman age at union 0.31*** 0.12 0.14 -0.04 0.55*** 0.20** 0.08 -0.13 0.19 0.20*** 0.10 0.09 
 
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.12) (0.10) (0.06) (0.10) (0.07) (0.13) (0.05) (0.08) (0.12) 
Woman age at union (squared) -0.01*** -0.002 -0.004 0.0001 -0.01*** -0.004** -0.002 0.002 -0.004 -0.003*** -0.003 -0.003 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Union's cohort (ref. 1990-1999) 
            1967-1979 0.71 0.14 -0.25 -0.15 -0.62** -0.29 -0.89* -0.02 0.41 -0.47*** -0.27 0.33 
 
(1.02) (0.35) (0.16) (0.35) (0.21) (0.19) (0.38) (0.40) (0.42) (0.12) (0.27) (0.19) 
1980-1989 0.27* -0.55** -0.23 0.33 0.03 -0.23* -0.34 0.13 0.17 -0.27*** 0.09 0.31* 
 
(0.12) (0.19) (0.12) (0.23) (0.12) (0.09) (0.19) (0.20) (0.28) (0.06) (0.19) (0.15) 
2000-2010 0.07 0.52*** -0.08 -0.06 -0.57*** 0.20 0.11 0.30* -0.13 0.04 -0.003 -0.09 
 
(0.09) (0.12) (0.11) (0.18) (0.12) (0.10) (0.17) (0.14) (0.20) (0.07) (0.13) (0.18) 
Respondent's union order (ref. 1st union) 
            Higher order union -0.12 0.02 -0.26 -0.07 -0.03 0.12 -0.25 0.32 0.09 0.19** 0.25 0.46 
 
(0.12) (0.11) (0.27) (0.30) (0.15) (0.11) (0.15) (0.20) (0.33) (0.06) (0.20) (0.26) 
NA 
       
0.36** 
    
        
(0.13) 
    Age difference (ref. Age homogamy or 1 year difference) 
            Woman older(2+) 0.18 -0.001 -0.42* 0.85** 0.06 0.13 0.30 0.14 0.38 0.01 0.25 -0.16 
 
(0.14) (0.17) (0.18) (0.27) (0.15) (0.13) (0.23) (0.22) (0.32) (0.09) (0.18) (0.30) 
Man older (2-4 years) 0.13 0.08 -0.25* 0.25 0.05 0.23* -0.03 0.25 0.40 0.07 0.16 -0.08 
 
(0.11) (0.13) (0.12) (0.23) (0.12) (0.10) (0.20) (0.16) (0.25) (0.07) (0.14) (0.21) 
Man older (5+) 0.15 0.19 -0.01 0.60** 0.19 0.30** 0.15 0.11 0.25 0.16* 0.15 0.07 
 
(0.12) (0.15) (0.12) (0.23) (0.12) (0.11) (0.19) (0.16) (0.27) (0.07) (0.15) (0.20) 
NA 
 
-1.62 -0.70 
   
-0.33 
     
  
(1.02) (0.72) 
   
(0.75) 
     Educational assortative mating (ref. Both medium) 
            Both low 1.20*** 0.47* 1.09*** 0.82** 0.54** 0.37* 0.99*** 0.27 0.85** 0.22 0.91*** 0.75*** 
 
(0.25) (0.23) (0.12) (0.27) (0.20) (0.15) (0.18) (0.16) (0.27) (0.15) (0.25) (0.16) 
Both high -1.00*** -0.42** -0.88*** -0.22 -0.87*** -0.59*** -0.74* -0.27 -1.13*** -0.61*** -1.61*** -2.04** 
 
(0.17) (0.15) (0.21) (0.33) (0.16) (0.11) (0.30) (0.24) (0.33) (0.08) (0.19) (0.72) 
He high & She medium-low -0.17 -0.15 -0.31 -0.19 -0.56** -0.08 -0.64 -0.62 -0.66 -0.22* -0.60* -0.09 
 
(0.12) (0.22) (0.35) (0.30) (0.19) (0.15) (0.39) (0.40) (0.36) (0.10) (0.25) (0.52) 
He medium & She low 0.38** 0.11 0.70*** 0.92** 0.31 0.44*** 0.96*** 0.23 0.35 0.25* 0.45* 0.47** 
 
(0.14) (0.24) (0.16) (0.28) (0.18) (0.13) (0.20) (0.20) (0.31) (0.10) (0.20) (0.18) 
He medium-low & She high -0.61*** -0.51** -0.64** -0.36 -0.41*** -0.30** -0.40 -0.27 -0.65 -0.19* -0.69*** -1.40 
 
(0.18) (0.18) (0.21) (0.43) (0.12) (0.12) (0.30) (0.23) (0.34) (0.08) (0.16) (1.01) 
He low & She medium -0.09 0.42* 0.70*** 0.51 0.33* 0.12 0.67** 0.01 0.58* 0.10 0.15 0.20 
 
(0.27) (0.20) (0.19) (0.26) (0.14) (0.13) (0.25) (0.18) (0.28) (0.11) (0.23) (0.31) 
NA 
 
-1.17 
 
-0.44 
 
-0.06 
   
-1.46*** 0.24 
 
  
(0.72) 
 
(0.72) 
 
(0.45) 
   
(0.11) (0.39) 
 Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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Table 4.B3 Cox regressions coefficients for the transition from marriage to first child 
 
Transition from marriage to first child  AT BE BG CZ EE FR HU IT LT NO PL RO 
Sex(ref. Male) Female 0.09 0.01 0.09** 0.04 0.06 0.06 -0.004 
 
0.07 -0.04 0.12*** 0.05 
 
(0.06) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) 
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
Woman age at union -0.03 0.12* 0.06 0.11 0.04 0.05 0.13** 0.05 -0.004 0.17*** -0.11*** -0.04 
 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) 
Woman age at union (squared) -0.0001 -0.003* -0.002* -0.003* -0.002 -0.002 -0.003*** -0.002** -0.001 -0.003*** 0.001 0.0001 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Union's cohort (ref. 1990-1999) 
            1967-1979 1.15 -0.34*** -0.14** -0.30*** -0.03 -0.04 -0.97*** 0.005 -0.22*** 0.09 -0.05 -0.02 
 
(1.02) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) 
1980-1989 -0.15* -0.06 -0.01 -0.07 0.11 -0.17** 0.03 0.04 -0.12* -0.02 0.003 0.06 
 
(0.08) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) 
2000-2010 -0.20* 0.11 0.07 -0.34*** -0.33* -0.12 -0.09 0.004 -0.10 -0.16* 0.02 -0.24*** 
 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09) (0.13) (0.12) (0.08) (0.04) (0.07) (0.08) (0.04) (0.07) 
Respondent's union order (ref. 1st union) Higher order unions 0.05 0.14* -0.19 0.13 -0.17 -0.06 0.19* 0.15 0.19 0.14* 0.06 -0.02 
 
(0.11) (0.06) (0.22) (0.13) (0.15) (0.10) (0.08) (0.14) (0.20) (0.07) (0.16) (0.19) 
Age difference (ref. Age homogamy or 1 year difference) 
            Woman older(2+) 0.15 0.06 0.02 0.08 0.04 -0.03 0.10 0.03 0.18* -0.14 0.18*** 0.02 
 
(0.12) (0.09) (0.08) (0.12) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.05) (0.07) 
Man older (2-4 years) 0.002 -0.09 -0.04 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.003 -0.02 -0.04 -0.003 
 
(0.08) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) 
Man older (5+) -0.05 0.01 -0.09 -0.14* -0.10 0.01 0.05 -0.01 -0.03 -0.07 -0.11** 0.05 
 
(0.09) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) 
NA 
 
-0.26 -0.13 -0.48 
  
0.40 
 
-0.21 
   
  
(0.36) (0.24) (0.51) 
  
(0.58) 
 
(1.00) 
   Educational assortative mating (ref. Both medium) 
            Both low -0.14 0.23* -0.19** 0.15 0.20 0.10 -0.01 0.20*** -0.06 0.27* 0.03 -0.003 
 
(0.14) (0.09) (0.06) (0.16) (0.22) (0.09) (0.09) (0.04) (0.14) (0.13) (0.07) (0.06) 
Both high 0.001 0.13 -0.07 -0.19* -0.15 0.005 -0.12 0.06 -0.21*** -0.20*** -0.27*** -0.25*** 
 
(0.11) (0.08) (0.05) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) 
He high & She medium-low 0.09 0.10 0.04 -0.14 -0.11 0.03 0.03 0.02 -0.01 -0.24** -0.16* 0.10 
 
(0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) 
He medium & She low 0.10 0.05 -0.09 0.02 0.33* 0.14 0.06 0.19*** 0.16 -0.07 0.02 0.02 
 
(0.11) (0.11) (0.08) (0.12) (0.15) (0.09) (0.07) (0.05) (0.13) (0.09) (0.06) (0.05) 
He medium-low & She high -0.32** -0.07 -0.02 0.13 -0.05 -0.07 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.15* -0.17*** -0.16 
 
(0.12) (0.09) (0.05) (0.11) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.04) (0.10) 
He low &and She medium -0.13 0.03 -0.12 -0.27* 0.17 0.05 0.04 0.07 -0.04 -0.04 -0.06 0.11 
 
(0.16) (0.10) (0.07) (0.13) (0.13) (0.10) (0.10) (0.05) (0.08) (0.10) (0.06) (0.09) 
NA 
 
0.57** -0.69 -0.50** 
 
-0.06 
  
0.26 -0.18 -0.05 
 
  
(0.18) (0.36) (0.16) 
 
(0.34) 
  
(0.71) (0.12) (0.16) 
 Log Likelihood -16792 -18651 -51937 -17173 -17172 -24508 -25269 -44330 -22351 -38065 -57873 -33413 
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Appendix 4.C 
Table 4.C1 Pairwise comparisons between levels of the educational pairing variable: regression coefficients for the transition from cohabitation to marriage  
 
 
AT BE BG CZ EE FR HU IT LT NO PL RO 
Both low vs Both high 1.126*** 0.026 -0.514*** -0.288 -0.774** -0.105 -0.486* -0.643*** -1.079*** -0.190 0.203 -0.639*** 
 
(0.254) (0.156) (0.092) (0.251) (0.298) (0.147) (0.197) (0.168) (0.297) (0.175) (0.242) (0.184) 
He high She lower vs 
Both high 0.353** -0.040 0.307** -0.201 0.133 0.063 -0.198 -0.088 -0.326* -0.074 -0.407** 0.329 
 
(0.124) (0.152) (0.107) (0.181) (0.150) (0.115) (0.204) (0.213) (0.165) (0.094) (0.155) (0.228) 
He medium She low vs 
Both high 0.315* 0.060 -0.198 -0.254 -0.035 -0.123 -0.278 -0.478* -0.765** -0.030 -0.115 -0.157 
 
(0.159) (0.166) (0.110) (0.278) (0.191) (0.123) (0.204) (0.188) (0.264) (0.108) (0.182) (0.176) 
He lower She high vs 
Both high 0.223 -0.074 0.252*** -0.205 -0.065 -0.172 -0.109 -0.020 -0.044 -0.208** 0.010 0.001 
 
(0.146) (0.111) (0.073) (0.216) (0.118) (0.091) (0.184) (0.158) (0.148) (0.077) (0.091) (0.283) 
He low She medium vs 
Both high 0.921*** -0.256 0.249* -0.318 -0.409* -0.186 -0.427 -0.414* -0.089 -0.308* 0.087 -0.222 
 
(0.188) (0.173) (0.101) (0.203) (0.178) (0.123) (0.229) (0.163) (0.200) (0.128) (0.175) (0.237) 
He high She lower  vs  
Both low -0.774** -0.067 0.821*** 0.087 0.906** 0.169 0.288 0.554* 0.753* 0.116 -0.610* 0.968*** 
 
(0.248) (0.200) (0.119) (0.254) (0.310) (0.171) (0.237) (0.218) (0.312) (0.187) (0.272) (0.217) 
He medium She low vs  
Both low -0.811** 0.034 0.316** 0.034 0.739* -0.018 0.208 0.164 0.314 0.160 -0.318 0.482** 
 
(0.265) (0.205) (0.116) (0.322) (0.326) (0.175) (0.225) (0.189) (0.372) (0.193) (0.282) (0.147) 
He lower She high vs 
 Both low -0.903*** -0.100 0.766*** 0.083 0.709* -0.066 0.377 0.622*** 1.035*** -0.018 -0.193 0.640* 
 
(0.260) (0.173) (0.092) (0.281) (0.297) (0.156) (0.222) (0.165) (0.307) (0.180) (0.245) (0.281) 
He low She medium vs  
Both low -0.205 -0.282 0.762*** -0.030 0.364 -0.080 0.059 0.229 0.990** -0.118 -0.116 0.417 
 
(0.282) (0.212) (0.110) (0.267) (0.321) (0.176) (0.248) (0.164) (0.331) (0.205) (0.278) (0.222) 
He lower She high  vs   
He high She lower  -0.130 -0.034 -0.055 -0.004 -0.197 -0.235 0.089 0.068 0.282 -0.134 0.416** -0.328 
 
(0.140) (0.169) (0.107) (0.224) (0.145) (0.127) (0.228) (0.213) (0.181) (0.104) (0.161) (0.311) 
He low She medium vs  
He medium She low 0.605** -0.317 0.447*** -0.064 -0.375 -0.062 -0.149 0.065 0.676* -0.278 0.202 -0.065 
 
(0.207) (0.220) (0.127) (0.295) (0.226) (0.156) (0.258) (0.187) (0.303) (0.153) (0.231) (0.216) 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001; reference category in bold 
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Table 4.C2 Pairwise comparisons between levels of the educational pairing variable: regression coefficients for the transition from cohabitation to first child.  
 
 
AT BE BG CZ EE FR HU IT LT NO PL RO 
Both low vs  
Both high 2.205*** 0.884*** 1.973*** 1.040* 1.411*** 0.963*** 1.732*** 0.539* 1.981*** 0.838*** 2.522*** 2.792*** 
 
(0.295) (0.212) (0.207) (0.405) (0.240) (0.166) (0.326) (0.240) (0.396) (0.154) (0.310) (0.723) 
He high She lower vs 
Both high 0.827*** 0.269 0.578 0.034 0.308 0.509** 0.100 -0.351 0.476 0.395*** 1.012*** 1.944* 
 
(0.191) (0.202) (0.384) (0.414) (0.230) (0.163) (0.471) (0.429) (0.458) (0.106) (0.293) (0.872) 
He medium She low vs 
Both high 1.377*** 0.523* 1.592*** 1.137** 1.174*** 1.032*** 1.708*** 0.498 1.481*** 0.866*** 2.066*** 2.508*** 
 
(0.206) (0.224) (0.235) (0.415) (0.229) (0.144) (0.334) (0.264) (0.423) (0.103) (0.262) (0.727) 
He lower She high vs 
Both high 0.391 -0.092 0.244 -0.141 0.462** 0.296* 0.344 -0.006 0.480 0.426*** 0.927*** 0.639 
 
(0.234) (0.155) (0.268) (0.515) (0.179) (0.128) (0.395) (0.285) (0.440) (0.079) (0.223) (1.226) 
He low She medium vs 
Both high 0.915** 0.833*** 1.592*** 0.736 1.197*** 0.716*** 1.410*** 0.281 1.709*** 0.712*** 1.761*** 2.239** 
 
(0.305) (0.190) (0.256) (0.389) (0.190) (0.144) (0.369) (0.251) (0.402) (0.111) (0.285) (0.765) 
He high She lower vs 
Both low -1.379*** -0.615* -1.388*** -1.007** -1.103*** -0.454* -1.632*** -0.890* -1.505*** -0.443** -1.510*** -0.848 
 
(0.270) (0.262) (0.344) (0.379) (0.258) (0.197) (0.416) (0.398) (0.411) (0.169) (0.342) (0.515) 
He medium She low vs 
Both low -0.829** -0.361 -0.378* 0.096 -0.237 0.069 -0.025 -0.041 -0.500 0.028 -0.455 -0.284 
 
(0.279) (0.275) (0.149) (0.347) (0.249) (0.179) (0.228) (0.197) (0.361) (0.166) (0.298) (0.161) 
He lower She high vs 
Both low -1.814*** -0.976*** -1.721*** -1.182* -0.949*** -0.666*** -1.388*** -0.545* -1.501*** -0.412** -1.594*** -2.153* 
 
(0.303) (0.232) (0.216) (0.492) (0.217) (0.169) (0.327) (0.236) (0.402) (0.154) (0.290) (1.010) 
He low She medium vs 
Both low -1.291*** -0.051 -0.375* -0.305 -0.214 -0.247 -0.323 -0.257 -0.272 -0.126 -0.761* -0.553 
 
(0.356) (0.250) (0.184) (0.347) (0.219) (0.180) (0.272) (0.182) (0.343) (0.171) (0.327) (0.300) 
He lower She high  vs 
He high She lower  -0.436* -0.362 -0.309 -0.175 0.155 -0.213 0.244 0.345 0.004 0.031 -0.085 -1.304 
 
(0.206) (0.222) (0.387) (0.500) (0.205) (0.167) (0.472) (0.430) (0.468) (0.108) (0.276) (1.121) 
He low She medium vs 
He medium She low -0.462 0.311 0.013 -0.401 0.023 -0.317* -0.298 -0.217 0.228 -0.154 -0.305 -0.269 
 
(0.291) (0.262) (0.218) (0.359) (0.210) (0.161) (0.283) (0.216) (0.372) (0.127) (0.284) (0.311) 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001; reference category in bold 
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Table 4.C3 Pairwise comparisons between levels of the educational pairing variable: regression coefficients for the transition from marriage to first child  
 
 
AT BE BG CZ EE FR HU IT LT NO PL RO 
Both low vs  
Both high -0.137 0.101 -0.112 0.341 0.351 0.099 0.107 0.138* 0.156 0.470*** 0.298*** 0.246** 
 
(0.172) (0.087) (0.073) (0.180) (0.231) (0.095) (0.103) (0.065) (0.147) (0.131) (0.083) (0.079) 
He high She lower  vs 
Both high 0.088 -0.034 0.117 0.045 0.036 0.025 0.149 -0.036 0.205* -0.037 0.112 0.349*** 
 
(0.123) (0.095) (0.091) (0.114) (0.115) (0.099) (0.099) (0.087) (0.086) (0.078) (0.071) (0.097) 
He medium She low vs 
Both high 0.094 -0.084 -0.019 0.203 0.477** 0.137 0.177* 0.134 0.374** 0.131 0.289*** 0.268*** 
 
(0.143) (0.103) (0.086) (0.142) (0.159) (0.092) (0.087) (0.072) (0.138) (0.087) (0.072) (0.075) 
He lower She high vs 
Both high -0.318* -0.202* 0.056 0.313* 0.099 -0.071 0.105 -0.087 0.191** 0.048 0.101* 0.092 
 
(0.145) (0.080) (0.059) (0.134) (0.087) (0.085) (0.083) (0.076) (0.074) (0.063) (0.051) (0.116) 
He low She medium vs 
Both high -0.133 -0.101 -0.050 -0.084 0.314* 0.041 0.158 0.015 0.172 0.156 0.215** 0.361*** 
 
(0.187) (0.100) (0.081) (0.148) (0.138) (0.103) (0.113) (0.069) (0.096) (0.101) (0.071) (0.105) 
He high She lower  vs 
Both low 0.225 -0.135 0.229* -0.296 -0.314 -0.074 0.042 -0.175* 0.049 -0.508*** -0.186 0.103 
 
(0.160) (0.108) (0.099) (0.176) (0.238) (0.114) (0.115) (0.072) (0.153) (0.142) (0.095) (0.093) 
He medium She low vs 
Both low 0.232 -0.185 0.092 -0.138 0.126 0.038 0.070 -0.004 0.217 -0.339* -0.010 0.022 
 
(0.167) (0.110) (0.088) (0.194) (0.262) (0.104) (0.101) (0.050) (0.186) (0.144) (0.093) (0.063) 
He lower She high vs 
Both low -0.181 -0.303** 0.168* -0.028 -0.252 -0.170 -0.002 -0.225*** 0.035 -0.423** -0.197* -0.153 
 
(0.181) (0.099) (0.073) (0.192) (0.229) (0.105) (0.104) (0.060) (0.147) (0.135) (0.083) (0.114) 
He low She medium vs 
Both low 0.004 -0.202 0.062 -0.425* -0.036 -0.058 0.051 -0.123** 0.016 -0.315* -0.083 0.115 
 
(0.209) (0.109) (0.087) (0.199) (0.251) (0.115) (0.125) (0.046) (0.157) (0.155) (0.093) (0.099) 
He lower She high  vs 
He high She lower  -0.406** -0.168 -0.061 0.268* 0.063 -0.096 -0.043 -0.051 -0.014 0.085 -0.010 -0.256* 
 
(0.138) (0.107) (0.092) (0.133) (0.112) (0.109) (0.100) (0.084) (0.087) (0.085) (0.072) (0.127) 
He low She medium vs  
He medium She low -0.227 -0.017 -0.030 -0.287 -0.162 -0.096 -0.019 -0.119* -0.201 0.024 -0.073 0.093 
 
(0.188) (0.122) (0.099) (0.167) (0.187) (0.112) (0.113) (0.057) (0.150) (0.120) (0.083) (0.095) 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001; reference category in bold 
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Conclusions 
 
Summary and discussion of main findings  
The contribution of this thesis consisted of investigating the effect of education-specific 
mating patterns on fertility. We wanted to explore gender-driven mechanisms in social 
reproductive behavior by focusing on an important domain of an individual’s life: education. 
In order to answer the general research question how does educational assortative mating 
affect fertility?, we articulated this project in two parts: individual-level analysis and couple-
level analysis. 
Part I: Individual-level analysis 
In the first part, the principal research objective was to analyze the effect of men’s education 
on fertility behavior. The relationship between education and fertility for women has been a 
long-standing research interest in family demography; in contrast, much less is known about 
this relationship for men. The main contribution is twofold: 1) accounting for the interrelation 
between family processes and how they are associated with men’s education; and 2) 
considering the role of earning potential by field of study on men’s and women’s fertility 
trajectories. 
Chapter 1: How does men’s education affect the transition to fatherhood?  
In the first chapter, we hypothesized that a man’s education affects the transition to 
fatherhood via the selection into union. According to the selection-into-union hypothesis, the 
level of educational attainment has a consistently positive effect on men’s transition into 
fatherhood, but this effect is largely indirect, namely through its positive effect on the rate of 
union formation. The underlying assumption is that highly educated men tend to be attractive 
on the mating market, while low educated men have more difficulty finding a committed 
partner and therefore, all else equal, are expected to experience lower fatherhood rates. 
Our results generally supported the hypothesis; there were differences between European 
countries but a clear overall pattern: there is a positive educational gradient in men’s union 
formation but, after accounting for that, not in their transition into fatherhood. This pattern 
shows up particularly for men who left school more than two years ago – presumably the time 
needed for the majority to have gained an established position in the labor market; before that, 
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just after leaving school, the results are more mixed. Moreover, the hypothesis seems more 
strongly supported in Central and Eastern European countries. In these countries, educational 
inequalities may be stronger, and since the gender system tends to be more traditional than in 
Western and Northern European countries, a high level of education for a man is an important 
asset to form a family.  
In general, by jointly modeling union formation and fatherhood, this study was able to 
overcome some limitations of earlier work on education and the transition into fatherhood. 
Earlier studies that focused on the role of men’s education were typically based on a couple-
level analysis: only couples were selected in the sample (e.g., Begall 2013; Jalovaara and 
Miettienen 2013). Our argument is that this approach suffers from a crucial selection bias 
because men’s education chiefly influences fertility through the selection into unions. 
Alternatively, studies in the transition-to-adulthood tradition have typically failed to control 
for the female partners’ educational attainment, ignoring strong educational homogamy and, 
hence, unable to tell whether it is his or her education that matters (Corijn and Klijzing 2001; 
Winkler-Dworak and Toulemon 2007). 
This study strongly emphasizes the role of interlinked processes in line with the 
theoretical approaches of the life course (Huinink and Kohli 2014). We argued that the role of 
men’s characteristics on fatherhood needs to be examined in relation to men’s partnership 
status. As a direct consequence of this claim, we disregarded dynamics related to single 
fatherhood, which typically occurs among the more disadvantaged strata of society (Carlson 
et al. 2013). Highly educated men are attractive partners and tend to form more stable unions, 
which eventually are conducive to childbearing. As a result, while fertility rates within the 
context of a union may be higher among highly educated men, the opposite may hold with 
regard to the role of education on fertility outside unions, i.e., low educated men tend to have 
higher fertility rates outside unions. 
Chapter 2: Are there gender differences in the effect of education on fertility?  
In the second chapter, we compared men’s and women’s transitions to first, second, and third 
births. The main contribution has been to consider an additional dimension of education, i.e., 
the earning potential by field of study, both for men and women. Micro-economic theories of 
the family predict gender differences in the effect of earning potential and educational level 
on fertility (Becker 1991); we tested to what extent gender differences exist for a group of 
eight European countries.  
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Overall, the findings showed that the differences between men’s and women’s 
educational gradients in fertility mostly concern the transition to parenthood, rather than 
higher order births. Moreover, the earning potential by field of study has similar effects on 
fertility for both men and women, which is in contrast with predictions derived from 
economic theories of the family. 
Similar to the results of the first chapter, a key variable to understand our findings is the 
role of partnership status, along with partners’ education. With regard to the transition to 
parenthood, in line with the selection-into-union hypothesis (Chapter 1), we found that the 
positive educational gradient in men’s first births disappears once we control for partnership 
status. For women, in contrast, once we included the union status variable, a negative 
educational gradient in first birth shows up. This latter finding highlights that the selection-
into-union hypothesis may hold for women’s as well. In fact, scholarly work has emphasized 
the fact that the relationship between education and union formation is turning positive, at 
least in some countries (cf. Goldscheider et al. 2015).  
Next, we found that the role of the partner’s education is stronger for women’s second 
birth rates, in line with previous studies (Kreyenfeld 2002; Kreyenfeld and Koniektza 2008). 
After controlling for partnership status, the positive effect of women’s education on second 
births disappears. With regard to third births, instead, we observed a negative educational 
gradient for both women and men. 
Unexpectedly, we found a negative effect of earning potential for both women and men, 
which is particularly evident in higher order births; a finding that highlights the role of the 
opportunity costs of children. While the negative effect of earning potential on fertility for 
women is in line with our expectations, the negative effect of earning potential for men is 
unexpected. We can speculate that men who desire a second child are more inclined to be 
involved in housework. Since both the economic burden and the time invested in childrearing 
increase after the first child, both women and men need to be involved in housework if they 
want to proceed with the second child; this is why opportunity costs show up for men too. 
The fact that women and men appear more similar than expected may be also related to 
the choice of our baseline-hazard, since we chose the end of schooling as the start of our 
observational period. We preferred to take this route to completely focus on the role of 
educational attainment and field by limiting, to some extent, endogeneity problems derived 
from the fact that education and fertility are strongly interdependent processes, especially for 
women (Marini 1984; Billari and Philipov 2004; Martín-García and Baizan 2006). It is 
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plausible to expect that gender differences in the effect of education on fertility could be 
somewhat more marked if our baseline hazard was respondent’s age instead of time since 
graduation; despite the fact that both women and men are normatively under pressure to finish 
their education before embarking in family processes.  
Focusing on the results of the analyses with only the medium and highly educated 
respondents, we notice that the effect of education and earning potential tend to follow the 
same patterns for women and men. The fact that gender differences in the effect of education 
and earning potential do not emerge strongly may also highlight the role of educational 
assortative mating. The higher the level of educational homogamy, the more the effect of 
education on fertility will be similar between the two genders (Kravdal and Rindfuss 2008; 
Struffolino, Studer and Fasang 2016).  
Assuming that all men and women manage to enter into a partnership, if assortative 
mating was perfect, i.e., each man with given educational level was partnered with a woman 
of the same educational level, differentials in fertility will be linked only to the level of 
education and not to gender. This is because, since the totality of highly educated men is 
partnered with the totality of highly educated women, highly educated men and highly 
educated women must end up with the same fertility. Such a situation would be the 
consequence of no selection into union driven by education; however, educational 
homogamy, despite being strongly diffused, is not universal. Men and women with the same 
educational level who mate with a partner with a different level of education may have 
different life trajectories: the effect of one’s own education may depend more on the other 
partner’s education, widening gender differences in the effect of education on fertility. 
Part II: Couple-level analysis 
As seen from the results of the previous chapter, studying women’s and men’s fertility 
separately gives us an incomplete picture of the impact of education on fertility. Partnership 
formation, in general, and educational assortative mating, in particular, may play a role in 
shaping fertility for both women and men; the effect of their own education on fertility may 
also depend on their partner’s education.  
Chapter 3: How does educational pairing affect couples’ fertility?  
In this study, we explored the relationship between educational pairing and couples’ 
transitions to first, second, and third births. We focused on the earning potential by field of 
study as an additional dimension of education, beyond the level of educational attainment of 
the partners. Compared to previous studies, we were able to estimate the earning potential of 
 179 
 
the field of study and account for unobserved characteristics of the couple that affect the 
selection into parenthood.  
Overall, we found consistent support for the fact that an imbalance of earning potential 
and education in favor of the man may be conducive to fertility. We found that hypergamous 
couples composed of a highly educated man tend to have higher first, second, and third birth 
rates than hypogamous couples with a highly educated woman. Moreover, with regard to the 
role of earning potential by field of study, we found that couples where the man has a higher 
earning potential than the woman have higher second birth rates than other pairings. 
However, this effect does not hold strong with regard to first and third birth rates. Inspecting 
the data, we noticed that couples where the man has a higher earning potential than the 
woman were typically homogamous couples with regard to the field of study, which was 
male-dominated or balanced. These kinds of fields are usually considered not conducive to 
childbearing for women (cf. Tesching 2012; Begall and Mills 2013). It could be that a man’s 
higher earning potential inhibited female partners from investing in their human capital and 
they rather embark in childbearing in order to meet a two-child goal. However, this kind of 
pairing may not be efficient for an additional birth, since the economic burden raises notably 
with a third child.  
Next, we found that there is not a statistically significant difference in higher order birth 
rates between hypergamous couples and highly educated homogamous couples. This implies 
that positive assortative mating for a highly educated woman is associated with higher 
fertility. This finding has been interpreted by following those arguments that state that highly 
educated men tend to be more gender-egalitarian and probably more willing to share 
housework in order to persuade the partner to have an additional child. However, while 
women’s education is generally associated with stronger attachment to the labor force, it can 
also be that the higher earnings (due to higher education) of the partner discourage the dual-
career family model, reinforcing more traditional patterns. Among the less educated, instead, 
her lower education discourages equality in sharing income responsibilities, but the lower 
earnings of the male partner may encourage low educated women to also contribute to the 
budget (Evertsson et al. 2009). 
In our empirical study, we could not completely disentangle the two lines of arguments, 
but we did find that the role of earning potential, associated with the field of study, and the 
role of educational level tend to diverge; this corroborates the idea that homogamy in 
educational level entails a different meaning than homogamy with regard to earning potential. 
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Still, it remains to be seen to what extent these results hold with other sets of data and with a 
more refined estimation of earning potential.   
Chapter 4: How does educational pairing affect the pathway to first birth?  
In this study, we examined whether and how educational pairing affects the likelihood of first 
birth within marriage versus within cohabitation in twelve European countries. We observed 
couples who were in co-residential unions and examined their pathways to parenthood by 
means of multistate modeling. 
Overall, we found the most support for the hypothesis that a higher level of human capital 
is associated with a lower likelihood of non-marital family formation. This hypothesis is 
based on the argument that educational resources, used as proxies for long-term good 
economic prospects, are perceived as prerequisites to marry. Our results show that couples 
with lower human capital tend to stay longer in unmarried relationships and they also tend to 
have a higher transition rate to a non-marital first birth, compared to their counterparts with 
higher human capital, in most of the countries considered. The presence of at least one highly 
educated partner, independently of whether it is he or she, inhibits the rate of a non-marital 
first birth. Hence, what has been called the “pattern of disadvantage” framework, which 
usually refers to non-marital childbearing, is supported by our study. The better-educated 
partners do not necessarily avoid cohabitation altogether, but they are more likely to get 
married once they expect to have a child or after having a child already. 
Theoretical and empirical considerations 
The overall original contributions of this thesis have been more empirical than theoretical. In 
this project, we argued that for men who want to become fathers, the process of union 
formation is fundamental and their role in fertility needs to be seen in perspective, namely 
being aware that a process of selection occurs. Once in a couple, however, it is important to 
consider with whom a man or a woman has partnered, since their fertility behavior may also 
depend on the characteristics of their partners. In the following subsections, we reflect on the 
strengths and limitations of the thesis by looking at the theoretical perspectives in 
combination with the empirical work in order to outline a research agenda for the future. 
On theories and theoretical frameworks  
In general, economic perspectives were considered more conducive to formulate hypotheses 
about the role of both partners’ education on fertility than sociological perspectives, which 
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attempt to address the role of interdependence in partners’ lives (cf. Huinink and Kohli 2014). 
Micro-economic theories derived from Becker’s work, despite being founded on the male-
breadwinner family model that has declined over time, have the merit of referring to a general 
framework, which is not limited to fertility but also includes assortative mating, marriage 
formation, and divorce. This broad framework facilitates making clearer predictions about the 
role of men’s and women’s education on fertility, even if many predictions derived from the 
theory turn out to be wrong, as we have shown in some of the empirical studies.  
Perspectives addressing the interdependence of partners’ lives emphasize the role of 
preferences that partners develop for the family or career domain (Huinink and Kohli 2014). 
Plausibly, the educational homogamy of the partners entails similar life paths, which can 
homogenize partners’ preferences regarding family life (Thomson 1990). However, it is not 
clear whether this will have positive or negative effects on fertility and how these effects will 
manifest. It could be that partners with similar educational pathways will converge on the 
decision to remain childless, have at most one child, or postpone children as long as possible, 
in this way offsetting positive effects of homogamy on fertility, while the partnership can still 
be very solid.  
Similarly, theoretical approaches that emphasize the role of gender-egalitarianism within 
the couple and in society at large fail to yield clear predictions about the quantum and timing 
of fertility (cf. Esping-Andersen and Billari 2015; Goldscheider et al. 2015). Moreover, these 
theoretical perspectives seem to downplay the fact that men’s socioeconomic resources 
remain a necessary condition, even if insufficient, for family formation. For men, being a 
steady earner is still a requirement to be considered a good long-term partner (Cherlin 
2016:124); having a high level of education, as we have shown, enables men to meet this 
requirement, with positive effects on fertility. Things may change in the near future, and 
women's socioeconomic resources may also become more important for the formation of new 
families (Sweeney 2002; Vignoli et al. 2012; Van Bavel 2012; De Hauw et al. 2015).  
The idea that gender equality is more widespread at the top of the educational scale 
(Esping-Andersen 2009; Evertsson et al. 2009) may conflict with the fact that gender equality 
becomes a need. Highly educated men, who are more attractive on the mating market, may 
not necessarily be willing to share domestic work (even if this interpretation has been put 
forward). Low educated men may be “obliged” to share the domestic work, perhaps to allow 
their partners to contribute to the budget, given that their sole contribution to the family 
income may not be enough. On one hand, we may have a polarization from the side of the 
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highly educated, i.e., those highly educated people who will be happy to share tasks with their 
partners in order to have children and highly educated men who would rather prefer not to 
have children in order to avoid domestic work (Jensen 2010). On the other hand, we may have 
low educated men who accept sharing economic and household responsibilities in order to 
enhance their standards of living (Van Bavel 2012). Taken together, this highlights the role of 
men’s preferences for family life, which has been overlooked so far, for example by Hakim 
(2003). It remains unclear, then, to what extent gender-egalitarianism will have those positive 
effects for future fertility levels without having clues on the roles of individuals’ (both women 
and men) preferences and constraints.  
Next, a theoretical reflection that has also repercussions for our empirical design 
concerns the choice of the time frame. The role of education has been framed mostly as a 
dimension that affects opportunity and constraints over individuals’ life courses. The life 
course approach, however, also emphasizes the role of cohort-memberships (Elder 1975, 
1994). Our approach has been synchronic in nature, rather than diachronic, since cohort 
changes in the effect of education on fertility have not really been investigated. A diachronic 
perspective is very insightful in principle, but it is difficult; with the available data, it is hard 
to find out whether the effect of education and educational assortative mating on fertility has 
changed over time or if it is rather the meaning of education itself that has changed over time. 
Compositional changes that have occurred within the groups of low educated and highly 
educated individuals are not trivial problems to face when keeping a diachronic perspective, 
and in turn it also becomes demanding in terms of data suitability to explore changes over 
time.   
Finally, while we emphasized the role of selection into unions and the links between 
partnership formation and fertility, we disregarded the role of selection out of unions. The 
theoretical scheme presented in the overview at the beginning of the thesis misses the 
relationships that exist between education, partnership formation, and union dissolution, both 
at the individual and couple levels. Educational differentials in dissolution and re-partnering 
rates exist between women and men, and as a consequence, they affect the role of educational 
assortative mating on dissolution (cf. Härkönen and Dronkers 2006; Lyngstad and Jalovaara 
2010; Schwartz and Han 2014; Theunis et al. 2015). Thus, the theoretical framework behind 
our empirical studies is generally more adequate to address fertility in cohabiting unions than 
single motherhood or single fatherhood; it is more adequate for studying couples’ fertility for 
more stable unions than for unstable unions. Overall, it is a reasonable choice when the main 
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outcome is fertility, considering that: 1) the majority of births occur within cohabiting unions 
(Perelli-Harris et al. 2010); and 2) union dissolution cannot (still) be considered an engine for 
fertility rates (Thomson et al. 2012; Van Bavel, Jansen and Wijckmans 2012).  
Strengths and limitations of the empirical studies 
A first caveat for this thesis regards the data. We cannot be sure about whether or not the men 
in our sample may have had other, perhaps unacknowledged, children than the ones 
identified. Overall, we are more interested in children who are at least actually acknowledged 
by their fathers than in biological fatherhood per se. Still, it may be the case that some men 
have underreported their children in GGS data, either unintentionally (they simply do not 
know about those children) or intentionally (Alich 2009). In this last case, the intentional 
underreporting may be linked to social desirability and social pressure. Men who are afraid to 
be socially sanctioned for their extra-union childbearing behavior, or men who are in trouble 
for paying child alimony, may tend to omit children born from dissolved unions and who do 
not co-reside with them anymore (Lindberg et al. 1998; Joyner et al. 2012). The GGS 
questionnaire has been designed in a way that questions about child alimony and support are 
asked separately, after reporting fertility and partnership histories. This kind of design has 
been considered useful to limit male fertility underreporting (Lindberg et al. 1998; Alich 
2009). Still, it remains to be seen whether our findings can be replicated with other data. 
Next, we should underline the pros and cons related to our estimates of the earning 
potential of the field of study. First, the idea to use a different source to directly estimate 
earning power is a good way to limit endogeneity problems in case of missing detailed time-
varying information on lifetime earnings (Xie et al. 2003). However, we could only estimate 
the earning potential of people who were in the labor force at the time of the survey. On the 
one hand, this can be considered an advantage, since in this way our measure of earning 
potential does not reflect parenthood status, limiting endogeneity issues. On the other hand, 
this is a shortcoming, since our estimate of earning potential, measured in income deciles, 
tends to vary little across fields of study within a country. Moreover, our regressions of 
earning potential tend to have low predictive power. This is most likely related to the fact that 
we did not include occupation in our OLS regressions; the inclusion of an individual’s 
occupation would have enhanced the predictive power of our function, but since occupation 
also reflects parenthood status, we would have risked incurring endogeneity issues. Overall, 
we suggest that the combination of different data sources is a promising analytical strategy 
with regard to studies that focus on micro-level fertility behavior. In the future, however, it 
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could be helpful to refine the variable of earning potential and, if feasible, add other indicators 
of labor market success by field of study, e.g., unemployment risks.  
With regard to the two couple-level studies, it must be noticed that we used a selective 
sample, i.e. we considered only those unions that were intact at the time of interview. While 
this may have advantages with regard to the quality of reported fertility and partnership 
information (cf. Vergauwen et al. 2015), since people tend to report and better recall events 
related to the present, it becomes a limitation in our sample because the more stable couples, 
i.e., where childbearing is more likely, are overrepresented. This caveat is inherently linked to 
the theoretical flaw that we highlighted above: the missing link with the selection out of 
unions. In the future, probably by means of longitudinal data, it would be interesting to 
examine to what extent our results were affected by dissolution rates, which may differ across 
educational pairings and across union types, i.e., marriage or cohabitation.   
Another aspect to be considered is the role of measurement issues linked to the fact that 
we could not include the educational pairing as a time-varying covariate because of a lack of 
information. Our results may suffer from anticipatory bias, since partners may have acquired 
their highest level of education after they started to co-reside. The use of more detailed data 
that include the full educational history of both partners could help to avoid anticipatory bias 
when applying event history analysis (Hoem and Kreyenfeld 2006). In our studies, most of 
those who became parents after starting the co-residential union got their highest educational 
attainment before the birth of the child; however, in the future, it would be interesting to test 
to what extent patterns of educational assortative mating are affected by fertility itself. Some 
respondents, more likely women, may have interrupted their studies to become parents and 
this could have affected their educational pairing: assortative mating may affect fertility and, 
in turn, fertility trajectories may affect educational assortative mating. 
Finally, in line with the life course approach, we used extensions of event history models 
for three out of four empirical chapters. Identifying multiprocess models and models with 
unobserved heterogeneity, however, is not so straightforward. The lack of repeatable events 
may prevent the model from reaching convergence and some restrictions on the estimated 
parameters need to be specified; this is also the case when there are low numbers of events 
per covariate. A good estimation process is favored by a careful choice of the starting values: 
“selection of good starting values is somewhat an art” (Lillard and Panis 2003:18), which is 
often a time-consuming process. In our first chapter, given that we faced non-repeatable 
events, we proceeded very carefully. First, we estimated the simplest models with two 
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software programs (STATA and aML), since the basic results need to be similar. Then, we 
proceeded to estimate models of increasing complexity, updating the starting values each 
time. Sensitivity analyses were carried out to assess to what extent estimates of substantial 
interest for our topic would have been biased by restricting the variance parameters; 
afterward, we could finally conclude that the results were robust. However, it is necessary to 
underline that if the whole aim of a study relies on values of the unobserved heterogeneity 
(and this is not our case), then this procedure would not be adequate and other solutions 
should be found. 
Overall, in all the models of this thesis, like in the majority of demographic studies that 
focus on micro-level behavior, the outcome of interest is the hazard rate (or transition rate). 
The hazard rate, however, combines information regarding both the timing and quantum of 
events, leading to difficulties in interpretation, a problem which has not been solved in this 
thesis since we always referred to “rates.” This is much less of a problem when everybody (or 
the majority of individuals) in the sample experiences the event, since the quantum eventually 
ends up to one, whereas this is more problematic in those cases when the differential in 
quantum is much higher (e.g., experience of a third birth). The inclusion of unobserved 
heterogeneity may, to some extent, account for the fact that some individuals (for unobserved 
reasons) have less inclination to experience an event than others; however, it is not helpful 
enough to disentangle whether the inclination refers to the timing or to the quantum. In the 
future, techniques that are able to provide simultaneous estimates for the two dimensions, i.e., 
timing and quantum, could be applied, and it is especially important for studies that include 
education in their framework: it is plausible that participation in education may tend to be 
negative on the timing of fertility, rather than on the overall quantum.  
Policy relevance and concluding remarks 
Societal changes that have occurred in the last few decades have emphasized the changing 
meaning of fatherhood and the importance of gender-egalitarianism at both the individual and 
societal levels for the future of the family (Esping-Andersen and Billari 2015; Goldscheider et 
al. 2015). The increasing participation of women in higher education and labor force 
participation have had notable consequences on men’s life courses. The general aim of this 
thesis has been to (re)consider the role of men in fertility by focusing on two dimensions that 
affect inequalities in society: gender and education. In this section, we discuss some policy 
implications of the results of this thesis.  
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The positive educational gradient in men’s birth rates points to the fact that policies that 
aim to reduce long-term educational inequalities may have positive effects on fertility. 
Moreover, these policies may also have long-term positive effects for low educated men 
overall, since lowering their risk of remaining childless may entail positive effects on their 
wellbeing at older ages (Eggebeen and Knoester 2001; Dykstra 2009).  
In connection with the previous point, in the last chapter of this thesis, we showed that 
there is an association between non-marital childbearing and lower human capital. This 
implies that children born from less educated people tend to have lower socioeconomic 
resources, which may have a negative effect on their wellbeing. The disadvantage refers not 
only to the lack of socioeconomic resources, but also to the fact that cohabiting unions are 
less stable and have a lower relationship quality (Harknett 2008). The diffusion of 
cohabitation and non-marital childbearing among the less educated would exacerbate 
inequalities in society: children born to low educated parents would more frequently face the 
dissolution of their parents’ union and suffer higher poverty rates (McLanahan 2004; 
McLanahan and Percheski 2008). Social policies aiming to reduce inequalities in societies 
will probably need to find ways to adapt institutions to new family structures (Perelli-Harris 
and Sanchez-Gassen 2012).  
Moving forward to the other dimension, i.e., gender, the relevance of promoting gender-
equality policies for both women and men remains, with the caveat that these types of policies 
may have at least two types of counter-effects. On the one hand, they may risk reinforcing 
labor market gender-segregation. For instance, generous maternal leaves may to some extent 
favor the inactiveness of women, who may be more oriented to choose female-dominated 
occupations or occupations in the public sector, which are typically paid less but have a lower 
risk of skill depreciation (Gornick et al. 2003). On the other hand, gender-equality policies 
may increase expectations toward fatherhood in a way that prevents men from choosing the 
“family track” (Jensen 2010).  
At some point, for disadvantaged men, gender egalitarianism may be the result of 
constraints rather than a chosen personal attitude. As a result, the concept of being a 
breadwinner may shift its boundaries: men with a lower breadwinner status tend to more 
easily accept gender egalitarian ideologies; similarly, men with egalitarian views tend to be 
more likely to equally share the breadwinning role (Zuo 2004). In both cases, the role of 
contextual constraints is fundamental. A couple where the man (independent of his economic 
status) will eventually embrace gender-egalitarian views by being willing to share both 
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economic and household responsibilities may face problems in actually realizing the dual-
career family model, especially if the context does not offer opportunities to easily combine 
work and family, e.g., by lacking childcare services. 
Overall, the way education and gender (equality) interact in differentiating the fertility 
levels of couples will have consequences for the reproduction of inequalities in society. The 
heterogeneity of European countries in this regard may serve as a “laboratory” to explore the 
role of contextual factors and possible policy outcomes. While theories about gender-
egalitarianism and fertility tend to be optimistic regarding positive outcomes for fertility, 
empirical evidence shows that European countries are far from reaching a convergent 
behavior in the relationship between gender-education and fertility (cf. Cherlin 2016; 
Goldscheider et al. 2015). 
Similar fertility levels across contexts may be the output of different social processes. For 
instance, in Chapter 3, we have seen that couples where both partners are highly educated 
have higher second birth rates, especially in Western countries, whereas in southern Eastern 
countries, the low educated homogamous couples have higher second birth rates. At the 
extremes, such polarized behavior in the relationship between educational assortative mating 
and fertility may lead to a widening of social inequalities, driven by the fact that in poorer 
European countries couples who tend to have more children are those with lower human 
capital, whereas in richer countries, couples who tend to have more children are those with 
more human capital.  
We acknowledge that our arguments about policy implications lose strength due to the 
fact that the focus of this thesis is on micro-level behavior. An explicit examination of 
contextual factors that may be associated with the intersection between gender, education, and 
fertility (e.g., welfare state, gender culture, mating markets) is, in fact, lacking. We are aware 
of the fact that these relationships strongly vary across countries and the challenge to 
reconcile micro-macro levels of analysis, hoping for improvements in data availability, 
remains an important task for the future. 
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Summary 
The link between education and fertility has been a long-standing research interest in family 
demography, since education is considered an important indirect determinant of fertility 
behavior. Empirical evidence on the relationship between education and fertility, however, is 
mostly based on findings concerning women’s life courses. Fertility studies have disregarded 
the role of male partners and how the process of selecting a mate with given education-
specific characteristics may affect fertility. This is a major drawback for at least two reasons. 
First, the majority of births occurs within unions. Second, women, and highly educated 
women in particular, tend to increasingly require men’s active involvement in household 
activities to engage in motherhood. As a result, the timing and number of children is not 
confined to the decision of one of the partners, but it depends on both partners, who 
increasingly become more equally involved in the process of parenthood.  
Using a multi-country design, this dissertation aims to fill these gaps by looking at two 
under-researched topics in the field of family demography: men’s and couple’s fertility. The 
dyadic articulation of the project is based on two fundamental research objectives: the first 
one is to uncover the role of men’s education in the transition to fatherhood and higher order 
births (Chapters 1 and 2), whereas the second one is to examine the role of the interaction 
between partners’ educational characteristics on fertility (Chapters 3 and 4). We argue that 
partnership formation in general, and educational assortative mating in particular, play a role in 
shaping fertility, both for women and men. 
The first part of the thesis shows that there is a consistent positive effect of men’s 
education on the transition to fatherhood, but it operates chiefly through selection into union. 
Failing to account for this selection process leads to a major underestimation of the salience 
of education for the transition to fatherhood. Moreover, we find that gender differences in the 
effect of education on fertility mainly show up with regard to the transition to parenthood. In 
contrast with predictions from micro-economic theories of the family, effects on higher order 
births appear to be more similar between genders: we find a positive effect of educational 
attainment on the transition to second birth but a negative effect of the earning potential 
indicated by the degree obtained, both for women and men. Overall, in line with the argument 
put forward in this thesis, a key variable to understand the results is partnership status along 
with partner’s education, which gives the motivation for the couple-level analyses that follow 
in the second part of the dissertation. 
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Findings from the couple-level analyses suggest that traditional pairings, characterized by 
an imbalance of education and earning potential in favor of the man, are more conducive to 
fertility than non-traditional pairings, i.e., characterized by an imbalance of education and 
earning potential in favor of the woman. However, highly educated women partnered with 
highly educated men tend to have a higher second birth rate compared to highly educated 
women who partnered with a man lower educated than themselves. Next, we found that the 
presence of at least one highly educated partner lowers the rate of non-marital first births, 
relative to first childbearing within marriage. Strikingly, it does not matter whether it is he or 
she who has the highest level of education.  
Overall, these results highlight that the effect of men’s and women’s own education on 
fertility also depend on their partners’ education. This, eventually, will have consequences for 
the reproduction of societal inequalities given that fertility outcomes differ by patterns of 
educational assortative mating and across contexts. Future research should focus on the role 
of contextual factors in shaping the intersection between gender roles, education and fertility. 
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